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Abstract 
This study examines the autobiographical writing of five contemporary Canadian 
Mennonite authors in order show how these texts, when read collectively, work to disrupt 
conventional ways of thinking about life writing. Life writing scholars typically see constructed 
autobiographical selves as falling into one of two categories: individualistic or relational. In the 
case of the former, authors construct autonomous and exceptional identities that typically stand 
outside and above their society; in the latter case, autobiographical identities are constructed in 
relation to and are influenced by a significant other person or persons. Initial theories by life 
writing scholars such as Mary G. Mason and Susan Stanford Friedman divided these categories 
along gender lines, suggesting that men typically constructed themselves as autonomous 
individuals while women’s autobiography became a space for relational identities. By the late 
1990s, though, critics such as Paul John Eakin and Nancy K. Miller collapsed this binary 
opposition with Eakin observing that “all identity is relational” (How Our Lives 43). I suggest 
that while the claims made by Eakin and Miller were crucial, subsequent critics have perhaps too 
broadly applied the term relationality (or what Eakin termed the “relational paradigm”) to what I 
consider to be a variety of extraordinarily different sorts of textual lives.  
The examples of contemporary Canadian Mennonite life writing I examine, for example, 
contain identities that are shown not so much in a mutual dynamic with another (as relational 
identities are understood to be) but are, instead, frequently de-privileged in the name of other 
people and other stories. In these cases, I look at how dominating narratives of history as well as 
dominating conceptions of family and community have affected the way in which these five 
authors make use of the discourse of autobiography. In the case of history, I consider the 
significant amount of attention these authors give either to the Mennonite exile from the Soviet 
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Union after the Russian revolution or even earlier Mennonite or Anabaptist historical events. In 
the case of family, I consider how particular texts challenge the stereotypical conception of the 
way family operates amongst Mennonites, yet at the same time reveal its overwhelming presence 
in the construction of these examples of autobiographical selves. I also examine the ways that 
these authors focus on the importance of particular (not necessarily Mennonite) communities, 
such as women’s rights communities or pro-environment communities, over the narrative of the 
self. While such texts would conventionally fall within the category of relational writing, I argue 
that they instead illustrate the problems of using the same terminology to describe vastly 
different forms of self-representation. Ultimately, I suggest that these texts work nicely together 
in order to showcase the validity of interrogating the relational paradigm in life writing theory. 
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Introduction 
In her introduction to a 1989 collection of Mennonite short stories, Liars and Rascals, 
Hildi Froese Tiessen traces the somewhat difficult emergence of Mennonite fiction writing in 
Canada. The title of the collection, she notes, is a reference to the way that Mennonite authors 
were perceived by the Mennonite community from the nascent stages of Canadian Mennonite 
writing, written in German, in the 1920s through to, at least, the 1960s. Published in 1989, Liars 
and Rascals was a testament to the significant sea change in thinking about creative writing 
within Mennonite communities that began in the 1960s, particularly writing by authors 
publishing for a wider English speaking audience. Yet while Froese Tiessen argues that some of 
the authors collected in the short story anthology have moved away from “the beliefs and 
conventions of their forebears,” it is nevertheless the case that “all write out of the Mennonite 
ethos in which they were nurtured, an ethos which dictated that embellishment of object or word 
was sin. What was true was objective and clear and one-dimensional. The play of the 
imagination was frivolous and worldly; it was an expression of the cardinal sin of pride” (xiii). In 
this dissertation, I look at five examples of contemporary Canadian Mennonite life writing: Di 
Brandt’s So this is the world & here I am in it, Connie Braun’s The Steppes Are the Colour of 
Sepia, Katie Funk Wiebe’s You Never Gave Me a Name, Miriam Toews’s Swing Low, and Rudy 
Wiebe’s Of This Earth. Ultimately, I aim to show that until recently the issues that Froese 
Tiessen discusses above have worked, perhaps even more severely, to curb the development of 
secular life writing by Canadian Mennonites and that a similar “Mennonite ethos” continues to 
play an important role in shaping the strategies of self-construction in the cases of Canadian 
Mennonite life writing that I am examining.  
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For my purposes it will be instructive to briefly summarize the history of Mennonite 
writing in Canada. The first major Canadian Mennonite writers, Jacob H. Janzen and Arnold 
Dyck, both struggled against the historical, religious, and cultural concerns that made creative 
writing a less than ideal occupation in a Canadian Mennonite society. Janzen and Dyck both 
arrived in Canada from Russia (Janzen in 1924, Dyck in 1923) with creative ambitions. 
According to Harry Loewen’s article “Mennonite Literature in Canadian and American 
Mennonite Historiography” Janzen and Dyck typically wrote humourous stories and plays, 
attempting to raise cultural awareness amongst Canadian Mennonites. Yet, as Al Reimer notes in 
his discussion of Arnold Dyck’s work, “Canadian Mennonites lacked cultural aspirations and 
still regarded almost any kind of art as sinful” (29).  
Other writers emerged from Canadian Mennonite communities throughout the 1920s and 
1930s such as Peter J. Klassen, Gerhard Loewen, and Fritz Senn. Both Janzen and Dyck, though, 
are understood and remembered as the key figures who attempted to spearhead an artistic climate 
in Canada for Mennonite writers. This attempt largely functioned, as well, to preserve Mennonite 
culture as both Janzen and Dyck understood it. Their work promoted “the German language as a 
vehicle and preserver of German Mennonite values” (H. Loewen 561). Both authors found some 
success. Dyck, in particular, wrote for several decades and published the autobiographical fiction 
Lost in the Steppe, which, as a story that portrays the uncomfortable relationship between artist 
and community, in many ways establishes a key theme that pervades much of Canadian 
Mennonite literature
1
.  
Nevertheless, despite these accomplishments and despite the fact that there were several 
Mennonite authors writing in Canada before the 1960s, the response to the works by both Janzen 
and Dyck was less than overwhelming. As Hildi Froese Tiessen points out in her essay  “Mother 
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Tongue as Shibboleth in the Literature of Canadian Mennonites,” early Mennonite authors in 
Canada “found virtually no Canadian audience outside the Mennonite community where their 
works of gentle good humour were regarded as interesting by some, frivolous by others, and as 
threatening by few” (179). Froese Tiessen goes on to remark that the Mennonite “history of 
migration, as well as their Puritan disposition towards the arts (indeed, toward any form of 
embellishment or ornamentation), their suspicion of fiction (which consisted, after all, of the 
unacceptable activity of telling lies) and their state of isolation from the cultural activities of 
other Europeans precluded the emergence of any kind of sophisticated artistic tradition among 
these people” (178).  
Froese Tiessen, here, points out several of the key factors that initially kept most 
Canadian Mennonites from writing creatively and made them suspicious of those who did. In 
particular, Mennonites were not only apprehensive towards anything that might be considered 
lies, such as “embellishment” and “fiction,” they were also adamant about keeping separate from 
the world outside of the Mennonite community, suspicious of what they frequently saw to be 
“worldliness.” As Edna Froese puts it in To Write or to Belong, “when one’s entire mission in 
life is to avoid worldliness, not much room is left for the seductive delights of creative literature” 
(27). For this reason, the earliest Mennonites in Canada who did write kept mostly within the 
bounds of what was acceptable to their own communities.  
Janzen and Dyck largely wrote about inoffensive themes that, in the words of Froese 
Tiessen “tended to assert the cohesiveness and unique identity of the Canadian Mennonite 
community” (“Mother Tongue” 179). Even while Dyck portrays the potentially tense 
relationship between artist and community, Edna Froese points out how in Lost in the Steppe he 
“evades direct confrontation with Mennonite principles by presenting issues in their least 
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threatening guise” (“Lost in the Steppe” 147). And while Lost in the Steppe was written in High 
German, a good deal of writing by Janzen and Dyck was written in the Low German 
Plautdietsch, which had two significant effects. One was that it gave Mennonite writers an 
informal voice that could effectively represent the community, since Low German was, in the 
words of Froese Tiessen, “the language of work and village life, the intimate language of family 
and friendship” rather than the “language of religion and education,” which was High German 
(“Mother Tongue” 179). The other effect was that it largely kept these creative authors and their 
texts separate from the English or French speaking and reading world of Canada, thereby 
reaffirming the Mennonite position as outsiders. The controversy within Mennonite communities 
in 1962 over Rudy Wiebe’s first published novel Peace Shall Destroy Many was precisely a 
reaction to the fact that this was a novel that, because it was written in English, broke down the 
important border between inside and outside.  
Not only was Peace Shall Destroy Many written in English and widely distributed by 
Canada’s largest publisher, McClelland and Stewart, but it was also, according to Froese Tiessen 
in Liars and Rascals, “a novel in which Wiebe opened a private people’s private affairs to public 
scrutiny” (xiii). What followed, she notes, was an “unprecedented furore” (xii) which “resulted 
in the author’s leaving his editorial post with a Mennonite magazine in Winnipeg and seeking 
sanctuary, at least temporarily, in the U.S.A.” (xiii). Wiebe, though, was not gone for long, and 
his return four years later indicates that his novel was far from a temporary aberration but rather 
the beginning of a new tradition of Mennonite fiction that gradually expanded throughout the 
decades that followed.  
Recently, Hildi Froese Tiessen noted that “Mennonite literature in Canada emerged in the 
era of identity politics” (“Homelands” 16). Froese Tiessen, along with other scholars, suggests 
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that this era saw the marketability of what could ostensibly be called Mennonite literature. 
Similarly, Rob Zacharias refers to the marketing of what he calls “The Mennonite Exotic.” Of 
Turnstone Press, Zacharias writes how, 
the press was deeply invested in the fascination with (and commodification of) 
ethnic difference in Canada – that is, in the active production of ‘the Mennonite 
thing.’ The socio-political contexts that encouraged a generation of Mennonite 
authors to write out of their experiences as ‘ethnic Canadians’ are the same 
contexts in which it became culturally compelling and economically viable for a 
small press to begin publishing book after book of and often about a rural, 
separatist, deeply conservative Christian community, and to be able to reasonably 
expect a ‘mainstream literary market’ to respond enthusiastically. (42-43) 
Out of this marketability of Mennonite ethnic difference in Canada (which Zacharias suggests 
really began in the late 1970s) came a slew of new writers such as Sandra Birdsell, Di Brandt, 
Sarah Klassen, Armin Wiebe, and many others. By October 2006, Froese Tiessen remarked at 
the conference for Mennonite writing that “Mennonite writing is more than alive and well in 
Canada” (“Mennonite/s” 44) and that authors have “persisted in finding their voices and telling 
their stories” (42). 
 Yet, as Froese Tiessen would later say, Mennonite authors who write more recently have 
begun to question the limitations of “Mennonite literature” as a subgenre. More contemporary 
writers have resisted the stereotypical stories about “rural, separatist, deeply conservative 
Christian communities” and have instead written stories not easily classifiable as conventionally 
“Mennonite” if there ever indeed was such a unified and essential literary sub-genre in the first 
place. Froese Tiessen writes, “Many writers, for example, are less interested in origins than in 
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milieus; less concerned with group history than with individual becoming; less compelled by 
essential identity than by multifaceted identifications” (“Homelands” 15). I agree, though the 
writers that I examine (several of whom emerged from the earlier era of identity politics) have 
not fully disassociated themselves from the idea of a “group history” to which they themselves 
belong.  
Indeed, in many cases, the writers I look at in this dissertation are more concerned with 
the history of a group (or at least another individual) than they are with their own “individual 
becoming.” This is a significant fact given that I look exclusively at life writing. What does hold 
true, though, is that none of these books can be read (nor should they) for what they tell us about 
what it means, definitively, to be a Mennonite or what it is like living in a general Mennonite 
community. Indeed, as I will show in my forthcoming chapters, these books challenge 
conventional conceptions of stable, unified, and conventional Mennonite families, communities, 
histories, and individuals. If it is the case that contemporary Mennonite authors of fiction are no 
longer as invested in contributing to the “Mennonite thing,” at least in conventional and 
stereotypical ways, then the same can be said of Mennonite authors who write 
autobiographically. 
This brief history of Canadian Mennonite literature serves as a partial explanation for the 
slow development of Mennonite life writing in Canada as well as for the conditions that allowed 
it to flourish. However, this history certainly does not tell the whole story and does not account 
for the fact that Mennonite life writing in English developed far more slowly than Mennonite 
fiction. After all, if a central concern amongst some Mennonites in their skepticism towards 
creative writing was the fact that fiction contains lies, then one might expect that Mennonite life 
writing would far outweigh fictional writing. But, in fact, the opposite has been true. While 
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Froese Tiessen could easily claim in 2006 that Mennonite writing is “more than alive and well,” 
and had been for quite some time, the same could not have been said for Mennonite life writing 
in Canada, even though Canadian Mennonite life writing had always existed in one form or 
another.  
One response to this could be that fictional texts always outnumber life writing texts. 
However, this is not quite the case. As early as 1980, James Olney observed in his article 
“Autobiography and the Cultural Moment,” that “recent publishing history offers plentiful 
evidence that [autobiography] is practised by almost everyone” (3). Surely, Olney is employing 
some hyperbole here but the point remains that autobiography has been for quite some time a 
popular mode of literary expression
2
. And it is perhaps worth noting that at a time when a major 
scholar of autobiography like Olney could make the admittedly exaggerated claim that 
autobiography was in use by “almost everyone” that very few were being published from the 
Mennonite literary community in Canada which itself was beginning to emerge. 
The life writing texts by Canadian Mennonite writers that did exist typically fell into 
either one of two categories: spiritual or immigration narratives
3
. Indeed both forms of life 
writing indicate just what many Mennonites considered the truth to be – the individual 
experience in submitting to God and the experience of the migrating community as a result of 
centuries of persecution. However, while Rudy Wiebe’s first novel ushered in an era that 
witnessed the development of a more secular tradition of Mennonites writing fiction in English, 
the same development did not occur for life writing. As Mary Cisar noted in her article 
“Mennonite Women’s Autobiography,” “few examples of autobiography, … have found their 
way into Mennonite archives; fewer still have been published” (143). Cisar offers some 
explanations as to why Mennonites have been resistant to life writing including the puzzling 
8 
 
observation that autobiography “requires far greater literacy, intellectual pretension, and leisure” 
(143) than diaries and journals which she notes have been archived.  
Here Cisar reaffirms what was once a long held assumption in autobiography studies. As 
Julie Rak points out, early life writing critics “built a canon for autobiography studies that was 
based on literary value and on ideas about the primacy and uniqueness of the self and the 
creativity of the artist that originated in Romanticism” (“Are Memoirs” 307). Rak observes that 
critics largely took autobiography as a serious form of writing and excluded other forms of life 
writing, such as memoirs as well as diaries and journals for these texts were perceived by critics 
to be lacking in “a quality of literariness and a phenomenological approach to the recovery of the 
self” (308). Cisar’s analysis conveys the influence of early attempts by to categorize and study 
life writing. Later in my introduction, I will address this history of autobiographical criticism in 
more detail as well as tackle the the terminology that designates some life writing texts as 
autobiography and others as memoir. For now, though, I do wish to put pressure on Cisar’s 
comments beyond her adherence to conventional definitions. After all if it is the case, as Cisar 
argues, that Mennonite writers avoided life writing because such texts required “literacy, 
intellectual pretension, and leisure,” it would certainly not explain the explosion of creative 
writing that Froese Tiessen describes above, which, to my mind, requires just as much literacy, 
pretension, and leisure.  
Another explanation from Cisar seems more likely. She observes that “Where Mennonite 
norms call for readers to look through individual experiences and accomplishments toward what 
has sustained the community, autobiography glorifies the first person singular, perhaps exposing 
a dark lining of ambition or conflict” (142). The point Cisar makes here is a good one. After all, 
if it is true indeed that from the 1920s to the 1960s Canadian Mennonites regarded their fiction 
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writers suspiciously because they were expressing “the cardinal sin of pride,” or the inflation of 
the self, as Froese Tiessen notes above, it only makes sense that they would likewise be 
suspicious, perhaps even more so, of Mennonite authors turning to autobiography, since 
autobiography conventionally requires authors to offer themselves and their lives as the central 
focus of the text.  
Several Mennonite writers have called direct attention to this particular tension between 
the historical traditions of Mennonites and the autobiographical form. Katie Funk Wiebe, whose 
own autobiography You Never Gave Me a Name figures significantly in my analysis of 
contemporary Canadian Mennonite autobiography, has observed that “It remained difficult for 
Mennonite Brethren to write their own story, using the first person, about anything other than 
spiritual experience because it might be seen as pride” (“The Dilemma” 114)4. The difficulties 
that Funk Wiebe describes here reflect the anxieties of some older generations of Mennonites 
who would have been firmly grounded in the traditions and beliefs of the culture and the 
religion. The eventual emergence of autobiography authored by Mennonite writers, particularly 
in the twenty-first century, is certainly good evidence of the changing nature of Mennonitism 
since the 1960s.  
Several examples illustrate the recent growing trend of Mennonite authors writing and 
studying secular life writing. In January 2012, the CMW Journal – Center for Mennonite 
Writing, devoted an entire issue to memoir. The issue featured memoirs, autobiographical poetry, 
and one autobiography/essay written by six American Mennonite authors. Meanwhile, American 
Swiss Mennonite scholar and author, and former president of Goshen College, Shirley Showalter 
created a website, 100memoirs.com (now shirleyshowalter.com), on which she posted her own 
reviews of life writing. Currently, Showalter uses the website to promote her recently published 
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memoir, Blush: A Mennonite Girl Meets a Glittering World and also to document the work of 
other contemporary Mennonite memoirists as well as the reviews of their work.  
Nevertheless, the emergence of autobiographies now from Mennonite writers still does 
not quite match the explosion occurring in the world of life writing. Some critics have suggested, 
in fact, that the same issues that Funk Wiebe describes above still exist on some level today. 
Speaking from an American Mennonite perspective, Ann Hostetler recently made the point that 
“A widely distributed memoir by a member of an ethnic cultural minority will inevitably have an 
insider audience critical of its representation of the ethnic group” (“The Self” 28). The issue that 
Hostetler raises here, though, is not so much the problem of pride but rather the pressure put 
upon authors to satisfactorily represent their particular community. Hostetler observes how 
Mennonite texts will often come under scrutiny by Mennonite readers for not adequately 
portraying the so-called realities of Mennonite life. In many ways, then, Hostetler’s remark 
suggests that the same issues that plagued Rudy Wiebe’s first publication are still at work to a 
degree. This, too, can explain the relative absence of Mennonite life writing. 
 Critics have been suggesting for several years that we are experiencing a memoir boom. 
As Jeanne Perreault and Marlene Kadar note in the introduction to Tracing the Autobiographical, 
“the varieties of representation of the autobiographical are multiplying” (1). The large number of 
texts that could lead Olney to plausibly suggest a cultural moment of autobiography in 1980 has 
been vastly superseded in our time. Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson reaffirm this point in their 
chapter on the memoir boom in their recent edition (2010) of Reading Autobiography. There, 
they note how “Over the past two decades, life writing has become a prized commodity in print 
and online venues” (127). They list roughly twenty “emergent forms that have recently gained 
prominence” in the last twenty years and also have a chapter devoted to new Visual-Verbal-
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Virtual Contexts of Life Narratives such as Blogs, Facebook, Youtube, etc. (167).  Quite 
recently, in fact, Julie Rak devoted an entire book, Boom!, to the subject of what she refers to as 
“the memoir industry” (1). In this book, Rak notes how “The publishing industry in the United 
States publishes more than 150,000 new titles every year, and about half of those are purchased 
and stay in print” (8). So while more Canadian Mennonites are writing more autobiographical 
texts now, the overall amount does not necessarily reflect the explosion of life writing that is 
occurring currently.  
Ann Hostetler announced in her introduction to the CMW issue on memoir that “Memoir 
has come of age in Mennonite literature” (1). Hostetler though is quite clearly aware that while 
such a declaration may be true, Mennonites have arrived at the age of memoir quite late. Perhaps 
Hostetler is offering an explanation for this when she notes how “Mennonites have long been 
suspicious of the individual self, the voice unmoderated by community consensus” and that this 
has put them at odds with “Democratic North Americans” with their “ideology of self-
development and equal opportunity” (1). Hostetler’s introduction reveals that while many 
Mennonite communities have become secularized and entirely open to what was once considered 
the problematic outside world, the older traditions are still, to some degree, informing the 
literature of Mennonite writers. I would suggest that the traditions that Hostetler refers to in this 
introduction, traditions that in many ways hindered the development of autobiography are now 
being made apparent in the way that the Mennonite authors I look at have approached their life 
writing texts and the various methods that they have used to represent themselves. 
The struggle between self and the collective has been a crucial topic of debate in 
Mennonite scholarship. As Edna Froese has written, “the choosing to subordinate oneself to the 
community is an integral, or at least an historical, part of Mennonite thinking” (“To Write” 8). 
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Froese cites historian Robert Friedmann as a crucial early figure who detailed the relationship 
between individuality and community. In his 1944 article, “On Mennonite Historiography and 
On Individualism and Brotherhood,” Friedmann suggests that the Anabaptist community was 
marked by “an essential fellowship, something which to a certain extent might be compared with 
family relations where the ‘I’ and the ‘we’ supplement each other. It is a group life, individual 
and free (as far as conscience is concerned), and yet of a kind of self-commitment which by far 
surpasses all sorts of pious co-devotion” (121). The self is therefore necessary but it is necessary 
in that it plays a crucial role as part of a seemingly more crucial community.  
Friedmann’s observations which are, by now, quite dated, reflect what was, at one point, 
a dominant ideology in Mennonite thinking. Indeed, sociologist Calvin Redekop in his book 
Mennonite Society, published during the 1980s, makes a similar claim. There, he states that “the 
emphasis on community relates to our basic understanding of Mennonite society” and that this is 
derived from the Anabaptists who “developed a new form of theologizing and thought: the group 
or community nature of thought” (131). Redekop, here, traces a historical privileging of the 
community over the individual. He also notes how this sort of privileging had previously meant 
that expressions of pride were looked upon negatively because they went against Gelassenheit, 
which he defines as “yieldness to God’s will” (106). He goes on to write: 
Traditionally, if a thought, act, or feeling contributed to the Gelassenheit of a 
Mennonite community, it was sanctioned and accepted. Whatever went beyond 
that, however, seemed to smack of Hochmut (‘pride’), a concept which is still 
very much alive among Mennonites in its various names (‘pride,’ persons who are 
‘high and mighty,’ etc.). The one reason for excommunication that still applies 
within the Old Colony Mennonite community is Hoffart, which means a haughty 
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spirit. Thus, humility, a more observable dimension of Gelassenheit, became the 
norm for general Mennonite demeanor. (118) 
This historical respect for fellowship over individualism appears to correlate nicely to both the 
ethos of modesty within historical Mennonite communities and also what was for a long time a 
suspicion of the prideful world outside of the community that kept Mennonites a private people, 
markedly cut off from the outside world until well into the 20
th
 century.  
 Despite Redekop’s crucial point, here, it is important to note that his claims do not 
necessarily apply to every person who might self-identify as Mennonite. Mennonites were from 
their very beginnings a diverse religious group primarily located in Germany, Holland, and 
Switzerland. Very quickly, in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, when they became 
persecuted victims for their beliefs, they scattered all over the world in search of safety and 
tolerance. Rob Zacharias notes that “Many Swiss Mennonites migrated to Pennsylvania in the 
seventeenth century (of whom a substantial number would ultimately move to southern Ontario 
following the American Revolutionary War), but the Mennonites in northern Europe found 
refuge by fleeing to the relatively liberal city-states of the Prussian Vistula delta, in the north of 
present-day Poland” (48).  
The Mennonites in Prussia eventually left for Russia and from there migrated in two 
major waves to Canada. The earlier wave of Russian Mennonite immigrants, sensing a shift in 
Russian policies that could (and, in fact, did) encroach on their separatist lifestyle, came to 
Canada in the 1870s and became known as the Kanadier, a group that were largely considered to 
be more traditional than the second wave group, known as the Russländer who began emigrating 
as a result of the Russian Revolution. Zacharias also notes the wide spread of “adherents to 
Mennonite churches across the world,” observing that “the largest number of members [are] in 
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Africa” (Zacharias 49). My point here in giving this history is that the name “Mennonite” 
designates a variety of people and cultural groups, each with their own distinct socio-cultural 
background and each with their own histories. Indeed the term “Mennonite” can mean something 
very different from one self-identifying Mennonite to the next. Some, for example, see 
Mennonitism as a religion; some see it as a culture, while others see it as both. 
It is indeed true, of course, that today many of these traditions described above by 
Friedmann and Redekop have been imposed far less rigidly by some or have been abandoned or 
rejected entirely by others. It is important to note too that I am specifically concentrating on 
Canadian Russian Mennonite texts rather than life writing by Swiss Mennonites or U.S. 
Mennonites. As a result, the authors that I examine may not have the same relationship to 
Mennonitism as a religion as Mennonite writers who write out of other traditions might have. 
Anthropologist James Urry writes in his book Mennonites, Politics, and Peoplehood that the 
Russian Mennonites are unique among Mennonites because “their attempts to ensure the 
viability of their communities” in Russia led to “the establishment of a political economy that 
extended far beyond the requirements of mere self-sustenance or the needs of religious 
fellowship” (5). Urry goes on to note that the creation of a distinct Mennonite political economy 
within the Russian economic system gave Mennonites a “sense of a political community, 
creating almost a state within a state” (5).  
Several writers including Al Reimer and Harry Loewen have suggested that the distinct 
history of the Russian Mennonites accounts for some crucial differences between the Swiss and 
Russian traditions and that these differences have resulted in distinct literary histories. Loewen 
has suggested that “the Swiss Mennonite writers appear to be more in tune with their religious 
communities, whereas many Russian Mennonite artists create from an ethnic community rather 
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than from a faith community” (568). Hildi Froese Tiessen has agreed with this sentiment, noting 
that Russian Mennonite literature in Canada is something of an “ethnic or cultural phenomenon” 
rather than a “religious one” (“State of the Art” 44). The texts that I examine reinforce this point 
as all authors appear to position themselves as belonging (or, in some cases, having belonged) 
more to a cultural group than a religious one, though that does not mean that the religious aspect 
of Mennonitism is altogether excluded from all of these works. 
Significantly, though, while the authors that I am looking at often consider their 
Mennonite identity as more cultural than religious, they nevertheless construct their Mennonite 
community or even the environment in which they were raised as being rooted in some way 
within some of the traditions that I have described above, whether it be the condition of being 
fellowship-oriented or being sealed off from worldliness and suspicious of pride and self-
confession. Indeed, for this reason, silence becomes a theme in several of the works. Connie 
Braun notes how her father “grew up in fear of saying ‘too much,’ a habit of silence that even 
now makes disclosure feel unnatural” (The Steppes 20). She acknowledges that this ethos was in 
many ways a part of her own upbringing. She writes, “As young children my brothers and I were 
raised to be polite, which also mean that small children didn’t speak at the table or ask adults 
questions – a result of my father’s own upbringing” (21). Similarly, Miriam Toews in Swing Low 
writes of her father being “embarrassed” by “this business of ‘wanting attention’” to the extent 
that he makes a vow “to remain quiet” (5).  
While Toews describes herself in the book as excited by “the prospect of freedom, 
rebellion, and independence” (157), she nevertheless depicts the home in which she grew up as 
being marked by a father who purposefully made a “plan to remain silent when it came to 
matters of myself” (90). And while Toews in Swing Low does not directly correlate her father’s 
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silence with his Mennonite heritage, she does make the implication clearer in a later interview 
with Natasha G. Wiebe where Toews argues that “that kind of repression, and his own guilt and 
the pressure that he felt to play a certain role in a community, in the church, just this very 
constricted life that he had … was all tied up with religious fundamentalism” (“It Gets Under” 
107-08).  
Meanwhile Katie Funk Wiebe, along with her claims quoted above about the difficulties 
that Mennonite Brethren members have with life writing, says to her father in her book You 
Never Gave Me a Name that “You loaded your Mennonite background on us children” (13). 
Funk Wiebe goes on to say that this background includes the “story of a people enduring pain 
and suffering for the sake of their belief” (13). Funk Wiebe’s own comments regarding life 
writing as well as her own struggles throughout the memoir with speaking as a Mennonite 
woman suggest that her own difficulties with self-confession are very much rooted in this 
background.  
Both Di Brandt and Rudy Wiebe construct a family environment in which worldliness is 
regarded with a great deal of skepticism. In So this is the world & here I am in it, Brandt recalls 
how she was rebuked sharply by her mother for writing poetry and “scattering our cultural 
secrets to strangers, blatantly selling us out to the world” (79). Rudy Wiebe likewise, in Of This 
Earth, constructs his family as imparting a particularly Mennonite tradition onto him and his 
siblings. He writes, “Our families taught us we were Mennonites, and that meant we were hard-
working, quiet and simple people who should do almost anything to live peacefully together” 
(216). These traditions also meant being mindful of the outside world. At one point in Of This 
Earth, Wiebe and his sister Liz go see a movie but notes that they “told our parents nothing 
about it, they might have forbidden us such worldliness” (322).  
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Significantly, near the end of the book, Rudy Wiebe describes how he values a kind of 
privacy for himself, stating that “I discovered how to disappear in a crowd” (385). All the writers 
that I examine, then, construct (in several different ways) an early environment for themselves in 
these texts in which privacy and discretion were privileged over self-confession and worldliness. 
This does not mean that the authors themselves are necessarily “quiet and simple people,” as 
Wiebe puts it. In fact, in some cases, such as with Rudy Wiebe, Di Brandt, and Miriam Toews, 
these authors are notorious for being outspoken and for refusing to fully capitulate to traditional 
and more conservative Mennonite doctrines. That being said, as I will reveal in forthcoming 
chapters in this dissertation, while the authors that I examine do not necessarily present 
themselves as quiet and private people, they nevertheless privilege the story of others over the 
story of the self and I suggest that this decision does come from a background in which the story 
of the self was not recognized as the ultimate priority.    
In this sense I suggest that these writers negotiate a tension between tradition and the 
conventional demands of autobiographical writing. As Mary Cisar points out, autobiography 
represents precisely what many Mennonites largely dismissed – the exaltation of the individual. 
Not only that, though, conventional autobiography places the individual on display for public 
scrutiny on the basis that there is something particularly special about this person or this person’s 
life. My point in this dissertation is not to suggest that these texts are indicative of the way that 
all Mennonites or even all contemporary Canadian Mennonite authors conceive of their identity. 
Indeed, since there is no unified and essentializing category of Mennonite, it would be 
impossible for these authors to demonstrate a single Mennonite textual selfhood.   
Rather, I suggest that these particular authors that I look at in these particular texts 
construct their own subjectivity in a way that betrays the ongoing influence of what were once 
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dominating Mennonite traditions and beliefs. Because they do, these authors often de-privilege 
themselves as the central subject while simultaneously using autobiographical discourse. They 
do so in ways that are not commonly accounted for in autobiography theory. These examples of 
contemporary Canadian Mennonite life writing then are crucial, not because they necessarily 
reveal a single Mennonite autobiographical subject, but because they expose a gap in 
autobiography theory that does not quite account for autobiographical subjects that are 
minimized or concealed in texts that are undeniably discursively autobiographical. In order to 
demonstrate how these texts reveal this gap, then, it is necessary to give a background of 
autobiography theory.  
Despite James Olney’s claim that “In the beginning … was Georges Gusdorf” (“Cultural 
Moment” 8) most contemporary scholars agree that the first major and influential work on life 
writing was done by Georg Misch, in particular his book A History of Autobiography in 
Antiquity
5
. Here, Misch becomes the first of many to locate a working definition of 
autobiography by breaking down the word. He argues that autobiography “can be defined only 
by summarizing what the term ‘autobiography’ implies – the description (graphia) of an 
individual human life (bios) by the individual himself (auto-)” (5). Both in this definition and 
elsewhere in his book, Misch stresses that the very concept of autobiography privileges the 
individual and notes that autobiography ultimately fulfills a writer’s “need for self-assertion” (4). 
In a longer passage, Misch reveals how his own sense of what autobiography is, and how it 
functions best, is ultimately caught up in Enlightenment notions of an autonomous and coherent 
unified self.  He argues that: 
We live in possession of ourselves, after the special manner of a being conscious 
of itself and capable of saying ‘I.’ To stand as an I, or, more exactly, as an ‘I’-
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saying person, over against other persons and living beings and the things around 
us implies that we are aware of our independent existence, [sic] we do not merely 
impart impulses and perform acts as things of elementary existence, but as living 
beings we have knowledge of our impulses and actions as our own. (9) 
According to this early, canonical study of life writing, autobiography is largely considered to be 
a space for the writer to characterize his or herself as having an identity that is wholly self-
formed. Life writing allows us to understand ourselves not simply as unique and independent 
individuals but also, Misch asserts, to understand and assert ourselves “over against other 
persons and living beings and the things around us.”  
This is why autobiography scholars, such as Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, will often 
credit Misch for being the earliest perpetrator of the notion that autobiography functions “as the 
record of a representative life of the great man” (197). While Misch does, in fact, note that 
“autobiographies are bound always to be representative of their period,” he nevertheless 
concludes that “when an autobiography is produced independently, out of [an author’s] own life 
and by the application of his own gifts, by a person of exceptional calibre, it provides a supreme 
example of representation – the contemporary intellectual outlook revealed in the style of an 
eminent person who has himself played a part in the forming of the spirit of the time” (13). The 
best autobiographies, then, reflect the narrative of the extraordinary individual who is not 
influenced by others but, rather, so exceptionally stands out that he plays a significant role in 
creating “the spirit of the time.” The best subject for an autobiography is one whose 
exceptionality paradoxically inspires others to follow his or her lead. 
Misch’s work, first published in 1907, undoubtedly set the tone for autobiography 
scholarship for decades to follow. Georges Gusdorf, who follows in the tradition that Misch 
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establishes, likewise sees autobiography as firmly deriving from an individualist tradition. In his 
1956 landmark essay in life writing scholarship, “Conditions and Limits of Autobiography,” 
Gusdorf traces the emergence of autobiography back to the Copernican Revolution. It is during 
this time, Gusdorf claims, that “humanity, which previously aligned its development to the great 
cosmic cycles, finds itself engaged in an autonomous adventure” (31). It was this new awareness 
of identity as autonomous and unconnected to the world outside of the self that made 
autobiography truly possible. Because Gusdorf sees this connection between autobiography and 
European individualism, it is impossible for him to consider the existence of genuine 
autobiography beyond European influence. He notes that “autobiography is not to be found 
outside of our cultural area; one would say that it expresses a concern peculiar to Western man, a 
concern that has been of good use in his systematic conquest of the universe and that he has 
communicated to men of other cultures; but those men will thereby have been annexed by a sort 
of intellectual colonizing to a mentality that was not their own. When Gandhi tells his own story, 
he is using Western means to defend the East” (29). Gusdorf suggests that while it is possible for 
those outside of the West to write an autobiography, it is not possible to write a non-Western 
autobiography. Gandhi can only write an autobiography by sacrificing part of his lived 
experience since, according to Gusdorf, Gandhi is a member of one of the “more advanced 
civilizations that subscribe to mythic structures” and in such a world “consciousness of self does 
not, properly speaking, exist” (30).  
The writer of autobiography, then, either has to wholly accept the Western conception of 
the human as a singular subject or else confront the fact that a life that is understood as being 
bound to others falls outside of the defined parameters required by the genre. There is no room 
for humility in Georges Gusdorf’s discussion of autobiography. After all, he notes, “The most 
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elementary rule of humility requires the faithful to discover traces of sin everywhere and to 
suspect beneath the more or less appealing exterior of the individual person the horrid decay of 
the flesh” (34). So while “autobiography is the mirror in which the individual reflects his own 
image” (33), the supremely modest individual “cannot look on his own image without anguish” 
(34). As we see, both Misch and Gusdorf established a scholarly definition of autobiography that 
largely excluded those who did not glorify the independent self and, as a result, largely closed off 
the genre to cultural groups – even European ones – that did not adhere to a tradition that 
understood identity as singular and unified.   
Following Misch and Gusdorf, a wave of autobiography theorists attempted to define 
autobiography as a distinct and unique genre. Roy Pascal’s Design and Truth in Autobiography 
is one of the first major books to be published after World War II that explores this subject. In 
defining autobiography, Pascal anticipates contemporary studies when he observes that 
autobiography is “historical in its method, and at the same time the representation of the self in 
and through its relations with the outer world. Perhaps one might say that it involves the 
philosophical assumption that the self comes into being only through interplay with the outer 
world” (8). Pascal’s analysis, here, appears to foresee relational life writing theories, which posit 
an autobiographical self as being constructed in relation to a significant other or others. Yet, 
while in this respect Pascal distances himself somewhat from the earlier tradition of 
autobiography scholarship in observing that “the outside world must appear” (9), he nevertheless 
maintains that “its centre of interest is the self” (9). For this reason, Pascal ultimately shares 
Gusdorf’s view that “autobiography is a distinctive product of Western, post-Roman civilisation” 
(180) and is concerned not “just with the moral personality, like the Stoics, but with the self in its 
delicate uniqueness” (181). Ultimately, while Pascal does pose a minor challenge to earlier 
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theoretical work on autobiography in acknowledging the possibility that the outside world 
influences the individual, he nevertheless relies on a standard definition that privileges the 
individual self above all else and, in doing so, constructs a canon that is far more exclusionary 
than it is inclusive. 
Philippe Lejeune’s landmark essay “The Autobiographical Pact” establishes a now-
famous definition of autobiography. Lejeune shows a concern with the sheer volume of 
autobiographical works and he constructs a definition “so as to be in a position to develop a 
coherent corpus of texts” (3). Crucial to Lejeune’s understanding of autobiography is his notion 
that “autobiography (narrative recounting the life of the author) supposes that there is identity of 
name between the author (such as he figures, by his name, on the cover), the narrator of the 
story, and the character who is being talked about” (12). For this reason, according to Lejeune, 
an autobiography is always self-evident as an autobiography. There should be no question as to 
whether or not a text falls within the category as Lejeune describes it, since the text makes it 
abundantly clear that the author’s name in the front matter of the book is identical with the name 
of the narrator and the character. Again, the very definition of autobiography, as Lejeune would 
have it, ultimately depends on the fact that the author constructs him or herself as the central 
focus of the text.  
As Lejeune defines it very early on, autobiography is a “Retrospective prose narrative 
written by a real person concerning his own existence, where the focus is his individual life, in 
particular the story of his personality” (4). Establishing his criteria in this way, Lejeune justifies 
disqualifying memoirs, biography, personal novels, autobiographical poems, journals/diaries, 
self-portraits or essays from his definition (4). As with both Gusdorf and Pascal, Lejeune strikes 
from the genre of autobiography anything that does not focus directly on the self. These 
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definitions from early waves of autobiography theory were indeed exclusionary but purposefully 
and understandably so. As Smith and Watson note in their historical analysis of the criticism, 
“New Critics had eschewed [autobiography] as an inferior literary mode, … Remarkably, the 
highly influential 1966 study The Nature of Narrative by Robert Scholes and Robert Kellog also 
situates narrative only in the history of the novel, the epic, and the film, and nowhere alludes to 
life narrative” (197).  
Thus, these early attempts to construct a rigid definition were borne from a desire to 
make autobiography a legitimate genre worthy of academic attention. And indeed, as Smith and 
Watson go on to say, these attempts, in fact, worked. They note how “the master narrative set in 
motion by Misch’s landmark study has influenced subsequent studies of the genre – with 
significant effects in terms of the texts discussed and critical assessments of their cultural 
importance” (197). Yet, as this quotation suggests, while these early attempts at defining 
autobiography were successful in establishing autobiography as a literary genre in the eyes of 
scholars, it nevertheless also focused critics on particular kinds of texts and fostered a mindset 
that accepted some types of life writing and rejected others. Lejeune’s exclusion of memoir 
(among other forms of life writing), for example, was standard procedure amongst scholars in 
these early attempts to establish autobiography as a genre and illustrated the prevalence of the 
belief that autobiography (and the only form of life writing worth serious study) was strictly a 
narrative of the individual. 
Smith and Watson have noted that unlike autobiography “the memoir directs attention 
more toward the lives and actions of others than to the narrator” (198). The autobiographical-I in 
the memoir is constructed as more of an observer than a protagonist and the author of memoir is 
not concerned first and foremost with creating a coherent narrative of his or her own life. As 
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Misch made clear, the memoir writer writes as if he is a minor player taking part in major events. 
These authors will describe “how it was that they had opportunities of meeting people of 
eminence, watching notable persons at close quarters, and gaining confidential information” 
(Misch 15). The memoir, from the point of view of these critics, would be thus entirely at odds 
with the autobiographical project. 
As Julie Rak points out, though, “the Romantic underpinnings of autobiographical 
criticism” (“Are Memoirs” 308) along with the “problems that a wide variety of autobiography 
critics have had with popular writing” (306) have led to the devaluation of memoir in relation to 
autobiography. She observes that memoirs “have been linked to less valued aspects of life 
writing in autobiography criticism. Memoirs are usually described as texts that are ‘merely’ 
about public personae or historic events” (308). In the last twenty years, though, Rak and a 
number of other critics such as Shari Benstock and Leigh Gilmore have acknowledged the 
significance of the memoir as a space to articulate particular kinds of identities – what Rak calls 
alternate “constructions of subjectivity” (Negotiated Memory 11). Benstock, for example, 
observes that life writing texts such as “diaries, journals, and letters,” which are notably excluded 
from conventional definitions of autobiography, frequently do not convey a singular, coherent, 
individualistic identity. Rather, these texts “have no investment in creating a cohesive self over 
time. Indeed, they seem to exploit difference and change over sameness and identity” (148).  
Gilmore notes how autobiography makes demands for full disclosure and the reading 
public subject the authors of autobiography a “to a literal truth test” (14). Consequently, Gilmore 
argues, autobiography as a genre simply does not accommodate certain kinds of lived 
experiences and certain kinds of self-conceptions. She examines trauma narratives in which 
authors evade critical calls for objectivity and instead “seek grounds other than the explicitly 
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testimonial for self-representation. In swerving from the center of autobiography toward its outer 
limits, they convert constraint into opportunity” (14). I would suggest that memoir too along with 
the diary, the letter, and the essay illustrate what Gilmore calls the limits of autobiography.  
This is significant, particularly when taking into account that Braun, Funk Wiebe, and 
Wiebe all have their books marketed as memoir rather than autobiography. The Di Brandt book 
that I examine is a collection of essays but the more overt examples of self life writing, in which 
Brandt evokes an autobiographical-I, resemble memoir far more than they resemble 
autobiography in that they focus more on others than they do on the self. Miriam Toews’s book, 
meanwhile, is written very much as her father’s memoir. These books, then, are either sold as 
memoirs or, in using what Gilmore calls “the discourses of self-representation,” (2) contain 
many of the same features as the memoir.  
Julie Rak notes that the very act of defining memoir is a difficult one. Nevertheless, she 
observes that “memoirs blend private and public; they contain writing about the self and about 
others” (316). Furthermore, she writes, “it is about the self in relation to others, or even just 
about ‘others’ without being biography or history” (317). The distinction that Rak makes here 
between the memoir that posits a “self in relation to others” and the memoir that is “just about 
‘others’” is significant and very much speaks to what I consider the texts that I look at in this 
dissertation to be doing quite frequently. Rak, in my view, glosses over this distinction too 
quickly and, in fact, eliminates the texts that are “just about ‘others’” from the equation entirely 
when she sums up memoirs elsewhere in the essay as books that are “intended to combine public 
and private discourse as the stories of the writer entwine with the stories of others” (315). As I 
hope to show later in this introduction and throughout this dissertation, the distinction that Rak 
briefly touches on in this article demands a more thorough discussion. 
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A key point that Rak does raise is that while one aspect of the memoir can be to focus on 
“the lives and actions of others,” it is not to be confused with biography. In fact, quite strikingly, 
the term memoir is rarely ever mentioned by prominent life writing scholars in the same realm as 
biography yet it is frequently discussed in relation to autobiography. Memoir, then, is typically 
understood as a kind of autobiographical text – indeed, Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson include 
memoir in their list of “Sixty Genres of Life Narrative” in their book Reading Autobiography. In 
fact, as they would have it, biography is something altogether different, as they suggest that 
“While life writing and biography are both modes of narrating a life, they are not 
interchangeable” (5). Memoirs are autobiographical in that they require the author to construct an 
autobiographical-I subject – a demand not made of authors of biography – yet they can also be 
substantially about others.  
Ultimately memoirs can accommodate particular life experiences and models of self-
representation (and even models of non-self-representation, or what Gilmore calls “a 
nonrepresentative self” [21]) that autobiography cannot. For example, Mennonites who might 
have been raised in an environment that had significant doubts when it came to matters of self-
confession would have an understanding of identity that would be wholly incompatible with 
autobiography as it was understood by the major scholars in the field. This does not necessarily 
mean that Mennonites are entirely opposed to writing autobiographically, but rather, it suggests 
that certain Mennonites would have been resistant to the form of autobiography as it was defined 
by the early scholars of the genre. In fact, Canadian Mennonite authors have for a long time 
embraced an autobiographical style of writing despite resisting, to a large degree, autobiography 
itself.  
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One only need to look at the reaction to Rudy Wiebe’s first book as well as the critiques 
of Di Brandt following the 1987 publication of her first book of poetry, questions i asked my 
mother, which conveyed a personal struggle with the patriarchal structure of what was for Brandt 
a particularly conservative Mennonite family. These texts ultimately elicted negative reactions 
because they fictionalized or poeticized real life experiences. Other examples see Canadian 
Mennonite authors writing novels in the style of life writing. A Complicated Kindness, for 
example, which brought its author Miriam Toews significant national attention, is a fictional 
narrative told as a memoir. Canadian Mennonite authors, then, have never quite shied away from 
the autobiographical but they do often come to it in particularly guarded ways, and it is telling 
that for many years the personal stories about the self and the community were somewhat 
concealed by the form of fictional narrative or poetic writing. 
At the most recent conference for the International Association for Autobiography, Rocio 
Davis called attention to this particular style of writing. She observed that,  
The blending of fiction and autobiography is, of course, not a new phenomenon 
and substantial twentieth-century criticism on the fictionalization of memory and 
related issues exists. However, in the 21
st
 century, we have been encountering 
texts that privilege the word “fiction,” are marketed as novels, but make definite 
autobiographical gestures, on the level of plot or in thought. (1) 
Davis goes on to suggest that one possible reason why authors write autobiographically in a 
genre that could still be labelled as fiction is that it allows “them to negotiate ideas and positions 
without actually claiming authority over them. This liminality grants them a kind of freedom to 
propose theories without having to admit responsibility” (2). This notion of freedom without 
28 
 
responsibility is, I think, crucial, when considering both Canadian Mennonite fiction and 
Canadian Mennonite life writing.  
Despite the fact that texts like Peace Shall Destroy Many and questions i asked my 
mother caused an internal furore, they were nevertheless, respectively, fiction and poetry rather 
than life writing. While these texts did open up a private world to public attention, the private 
world was never marketed as an entirely real world. What Davis does not point out as a 
possibility, and what both of these books illustrate, is that while there may be a freedom in 
writing novels that “make definite autobiographical gestures,” this does not necessarily prevent 
the authors who write them from being rebuked by those for whom the texts are all too real. 
Nevertheless, Davis’s point remains an intriguing one and relevant when considering how often 
Canadian Mennonite authors have written about personal subjects without committing to life 
writing.  
Just as Davis suggests there is a freedom in approaching fiction in this way, I suggest that 
there is also a kind of freedom at work in the way that the authors that I look at in this 
dissertation make use of the booming trend of memoir writing. I am not making the case that 
Mennonite authors are cashing in on a current booming trend, just as I do not believe that one 
could simply say that Mennonite authors were cashing in on the “Mennonite thing” during the 
era of identity politics. While, of course, that can occur, I also want to suggest that literary 
booms and trends can also inspire creativity – they can make authors aware of avenues that they 
previously had not considered. In that sense, it is no surprise that some of the best-known 
Canadian Mennonite authors (Wiebe, Brandt, Toews) have more directly used the discourse of 
self-representation in their works in the last fifteen years. 
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Yet at the same time I am ultimately suggesting that these writers take a guarded 
approach to life writing and largely refrain from establishing themselves as being the central 
figure in a narrative in which others are only important insofar as they contribute to the 
development of the author’s life story and the development of his or her identity. As Georg 
Misch puts it,  
Finally, the man who sets out to write the story of his own life has it in view as a 
whole, with unity and direction and a significance of its own. In this single whole 
the facts and feelings, actions and reactions, recalled by the author, the incidents 
that excited him, the persons he met, and the transactions or movements in which 
he was concerned, all have their definite place, thanks to their significance in 
relation to the whole. (7) 
While it is the case that the authors that I look at in this dissertation do indeed frequently discuss 
the people they met as well as the significant moments in their lives, it is done in a much more 
interpersonal way than the method that Misch describes. Rather than describe people and events 
as peripheral figures and moments in the creation of the individual and the whole of his or her 
narrated life, these writers will frequently shift attention away from the individual self. Not only 
do they represent their identity in relation to family, community, or socio-historical events, they 
frequently privilege these other people and events. It is in this act of privileging where these texts 
challenge conventional scholarly analyses of relational identities in life writing. 
As early as 1980, critics began to consider models of self-representation that had been 
long ignored. Significantly, the first major contributions came from feminist life writing 
scholars. Mary G. Mason, in her 1980 article “The Other Voice: Autobiography of Women 
Writers,” was one of the first scholars to interrogate the conventional understanding of 
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autobiography, suggesting that the traditional definition was ultimately exclusionary. Mason 
argues that the Rousseauian model of “an unfolding self-discovery where characters and events 
are little more than aspects of the author’s evolving consciousness, finds no echo in women’s 
writing about their lives” (210). She suggests, then, that the conventional singular autonomous 
identity is a specifically male-friendly model of self-representation that fails to properly express 
female lived experience. In her article, Mason looks at four texts by women writers in order to 
examine how they created “a set of paradigms for life-writing by women right down to our time” 
(210). In some respects, Mason is problematically guilty of a reductive approach, suggesting that 
a good deal of what counts as women’s life writing are texts that specifically recycle the models 
established in the autobiographical texts written by Margaret Cavendish, Margery Kempe, Anne 
Bradstreet, and Dame Julian of Norwich.  
Yet while Mason’s discussion was somewhat restrictive in this respect, she nevertheless 
broadened the field in considering alternate modes of self-construction in life writing. In 
examining these four paradigmatic texts, Mason argues that they are uniquely different from 
male autobiography because these women authors understand identity “through relation to the 
chosen other” (210). In other words, their understanding of themselves and the attainment of 
their selfhood is a consequence of, and dependent on, their relationship with another. In the case 
of these older texts, as Mason notes, women achieve a kind of self-realization through a relation 
to their husbands, or to Christ, or to a spiritual community (231). Ultimately, though, she asserts 
that “The pattern most frequently adopted (and adapted) by later women has unquestionably 
been the solution recorded in the life and writing of Margaret Cavendish – the pairing of one’s 
own image with another, equal image” (231). Mason sees the identities developed in women’s 
life writing as relational and typically in relation to one specific other, though not necessarily 
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limited to that. In these texts, it is through the “recognition of another” (235) that one comes to 
have a sense of self. 
Following Mason, Susan Stanford Friedman further explored how relational life writing 
interrogates Western male conceptions of authentic identity. In her analysis, Stanford Friedman 
mostly critiques the Gusdorf model and states that “The emphasis on individualism as the 
necessary precondition for autobiography is thus a reflection of privilege, one that excludes from 
the canons of autobiography those writers who have been denied by history the illusion of 
individualism” (75). Stanford Friedman’s article reveals that the act of defining autobiography 
and giving it a narrow-range of characteristics has established artificial and arbitrary boundaries 
for what counts as an authentic life. With a somewhat broader scope than Mason, Stanford 
Friedman notes that these “individualistic paradigms of the self ignore the role of collective and 
relational identities in the individuation process of women and minorities” (72). Not only do 
these established conventions exclude women, she argues, but also cultural groups who have 
remained uninfluenced by European conceptions of individualistic identity. Despite this 
acknowledgement, Stanford Friedman concentrates specifically on the relational aspect of 
women’s autobiographical texts. Using the feminist psychoanalytical theoretical work of Sheila 
Rowbotham and Nancy Chodorow, Stanford Friedman re-evaluates women’s life writing in 
order to consider a particular form of relational identity. She argues that “Instead of seeing 
themselves as solely unique, women often explore their sense of shared identity with other 
women, an aspect of identity that exists in tension with a sense of their own uniqueness” (79). 
Stanford Friedman, then, offers a model that Mason does not entirely account for.  
Because Mason sees her four early texts as such influential models and because those 
texts are rooted in a rigidly patriarchal culture, she mostly considers texts that establish an 
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identity in relation to “projected male images (father, brothers, lovers, husbands, clergymen)” 
(232). However, Mason does allow that “For some women writers, it is not a man, or men, or a 
community but a woman, or women, who provide the other of identity” (234). Stanford 
Friedman, though, considers identity in relation to other women specifically to be a primary 
concern of female-authored autobiography. Inspired by Rowbotham and Chodorow, Stanford 
Friedman notes that a woman cannot “experience herself as an entirely unique entity because she 
is always aware of how she is being defined as woman, that is, as a member of a group whose 
identity has been defined by the dominant male culture” (75). As a result, because “woman” is 
essentially a category created by a patriarchal culture, women experience a kind of collective 
alienation. For Stanford Friedman, this particular experience, despite seeming negative, 
ultimately has transformative potential since it can lead to a kind of collective female 
consciousness and, consequently, to a “reclamation of identity” (78). Because she is concerned 
with how women’s autobiographical texts challenge masculinist cultural representations of 
gender through the exhibition of shared female experiences, Stanford Friedman sees relational 
identity in women’s life writing in terms of a woman’s relationship with another woman or a 
group of women. 
These early discussions on relational life writing, then, were part of an effort to redirect 
the study of autobiography – in some cases reinforcing what Rak sees as the devaluation of 
memoir by calling for an expanded definition of autobiography rather than reading these texts as 
something altogether different. Because of the very nature of the discussion, in which the 
singular cohesive independent self was largely understood to be masculinist in nature, the vast 
majority of work on relational life writing tended to focus on women’s texts. As quoted above, 
Stanford Friedman does spend some time suggesting that the conventional conception of 
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autobiography works to exclude minority groups (presumably writers with non-Western 
backgrounds) as well as women. However, the overwhelming focus of her study along with other 
works on relational identity typically reinforced the notion that relational identities in texts were 
female identities or the way in which women, specifically, could articulate a distinct selfhood. 
These studies not only opened up a space for feminist approaches to life writing but also in 
pushing the discussion of the field forward in general. By the mid-90s though, critics began 
commenting on the essentializing nature of thinking about relational life writing.  
Nancy K. Miller, in her 1994 article “Representing Others: Gender and the Subjects of 
Autobiography,” was one of the first to point out that while the “massive challenge to the regime 
of the universal subject” was necessary, the project concluded with the less than satisfying 
conclusion that “The universal subject, … was merely a man” (28). Beginning with this premise, 
Miller said, resulted in “the paradigms of gender polarities that oppose relatedness to 
separateness” (28). In other words, these studies seemed to rather problematically suggest that 
identity models that privileged individualism, singularity and wholeness were inherently 
masculine and identities that were relational and fluid were inherently feminine. Such 
essentializing only works to enforce along gender lines a similar principle uttered by Gusdorf 
when he noted that Gandhi would have to construct himself as a Western man in order to write 
an autobiography. In that vein, one might be curious to ask these early critics of relational 
identity whether or not a female author might be sacrificing her femininity by constructing her 
identity as independent and self-reliant. Miller concludes by noting that “We need a way of 
thinking flexible enough to accommodate styles of self-production that cross the lines of the 
models we have established. This would have to include a rethinking of gender like identity as an 
intrinsically relational process” (28). Miller’s call to rethink the way we read identity formation 
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in autobiographical texts by men and women was taken up, perhaps most stridently, by Paul John 
Eakin in his book How Our Lives Become Stories.  
Eakin, like Miller, understands that cultural constructions of gender do indeed account for 
differences in life writing along gender lines. With that in mind, though, Eakin likewise finds 
troubling the “unfortunate polarization by gender of the categories we use to define self and self-
experience” (48). Interrogating the male-female binary opposition of typical relational life 
writing scholarship, Eakin boldly asserts that “all identity is relational” (43). He suggests that our 
sense of self is always dependent on the culture in which we live, since the culture provides the 
“models of identity” (46) upon which we draw in order to position ourselves within the social 
world. In that respect, Eakin sees the relationship between the individual self and the relational 
self to be an interpenetrating one.  
Eakin borrows from Jessica Benjamin in order to articulate this relationship. He agrees 
with Benjamin who says that “at the moment of realizing our own independence, we are 
dependent upon another to recognize it” (52). For that reason, Eakin suggests that “because the 
assertion of autonomy is dependent on this dynamic of recognition, identity is necessarily 
relational” (52). In other words, our conception of ourselves as independent individuals is wholly 
dependent on our relationship with an other. For Eakin, self life writing reveals the traces that 
one’s conception of oneself is always “necessarily relational,” even in texts where the author 
does not stridently construct him or herself or think of him or herself in this manner. Given that 
this is the case, Eakin imposes a crucial boundary in order “to preserve the usefulness of the 
label” (69). In doing so, Eakin proposes a definition of relational autobiography that is useful to 
my own discussion of contemporary Canadian Mennonite life writing. He characterizes 
relational life writing as “autobiographies that feature the decisive impact on the autobiographer 
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of either (1) an entire social environment (a particular kind of family, or a community and its 
social institutions – schools, churches, and so forth) or (2) key other individuals, usually family 
members, especially parents” (69). Eakin provides criteria that would allow scholars not only to 
read contemporary texts that challenge the previous models of identity but also to re-evaluate and 
re-read older texts in order to show how they portray a relational self that had been overlooked 
by critics who only understood autobiographical identity (or the autobiographical male identity) 
to be inherently individualistic. 
Yet while Eakin offers this concrete definition “to preserve the usefulness of the label,” 
his later analyses suggest to me that relational life writing, as Eakin sees it, still far too broadly 
encompasses a variety of extraordinarily different sorts of textual lives. One of his examples is 
Leslie Marmon Silko’s Storyteller and he asks this crucial question: “what justification is there 
for understanding Storyteller as an autobiography? Certainly ‘I’-narrative is at a minimum in 
these pages and the portion of it that is directly identified with Silko herself is even smaller” 
(72). Silko’s book does make use of the discourse of self-representation and for Eakin, it 
articulates a relational identity. The problem for Eakin, though, is that Silko’s own identity is 
rarely apparent in the book. Instead, Silko relays stories about family members in Laguna 
Pueblo. Ultimately, though, Eakin argues that “Silko’s transmission of other people’s stories, 
stories that are in turn versions of a shared body of myths and legends, is properly understood as 
an act of self-definition” (73). Despite the fact that Silko rarely appears in her own text, Eakin 
still reads the book primarily in terms of the way that Silko constructs herself.  
This is, of course, a valid reading but what is curious to me is this precise act of turning 
away from the self towards the other while using a discourse of self-representation. Certainly, 
focusing on the stories of others can still very much be an act of self-definition but it is also, at 
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the same time, focusing on others. Eakin does acknowledge the phenomenon of the family 
memoir in which “the lives of other family members” can be rendered “more important than the 
life of the reporting self” (85). Yet Eakin’s own understanding of relational identity, as 
influenced by the theories of Jessica Benjamin, seems to be based on the understanding of a 
mutual dynamic between self and other and the interpenetrating relationship between self-
determination and relationality.  
In fact, despite Amy Culley and Rebecca Styler’s assertion that relational identities can 
convey “the relationships between the subject and his/her family, peers, religious and political 
movements, or intellectual discourses,” (237) critics have tended to examine relationality in 
terms of a fluid and mutual dynamic between the self and one particular other. A dominant sub-
genre of critical inquiry has been what G. Thomas Couser terms “narratives of filiation” (“Genre 
Matters” 151) or, as he suggests elsewhere, “memoirs of mothers” and “memoirs of fathers” 
which he respectively terms “matriography” and “patriography” (“In My Father’s Closet” 891)6. 
David Parker, likewise, focuses on the kind of relationality in life writing “in which the writer 
and some other, usually a parent, are more or less co-subjects” (140). In a similar vein, Susanna 
Egan builds on Eakin and Nancy Miller in order to develop the concept of “mirror talk.” Egan 
argues that “Mirror talk begins as the encounter of two lives in which the biographer is also an 
autobiographer. Very commonly, the (auto)biographer is the child or the partner of the 
biographer subject, a relationship in which (auto)biographical identity is significantly shaped by 
the processes of exploratory mirroring” (Mirror Talk 7). As Egan suggests, though, the particular 
other with whom the author shares his or her story is not always necessarily a parent. Holly 
Furneaux, for example, has examined how biographical works can reveal “the relationship 
between biographer and biographee” (244). 
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Eakin, in How Our Lives Become Stories, confirms the notion that relationality is 
typically understood to be a dynamic between self and one other. He observes there that “the 
most common form of the relational life” is “the self’s story viewed through the lens of its 
relation with some other key person, sometimes a sibling, friend, or lover, but most often a 
parent – we might call such an individual the proximate other to signify the intimate tie to the 
relational autobiographer” (86). I would suggest that because Eakin is very much indebted to 
Jessica Benjamin’s theories which assert the significance of “mutual recognition” (Benjamin 53), 
his notion of relationality ultimately best accommodates both texts and critical analyses of texts 
that tend to foreground an identity in relation to one other person. In this sense, the books that I 
look at, in which the authors often forge relations with numerous others, some wide-ranging in 
their scope, potentially fall outside the parameters conventionally established by theorists of 
relational identities. 
This is not to say that such theories do not allow for critical analyses of texts that 
construct selves in relation to larger groups. Arlene Leis, for example, has examined artist Jean-
François Rigaud and his “participation in, and membership of, an intimate community of 
painters, sculptors, and architects” (258). Ultimately, though, Leis characterizes Riguard’s 
relational dynamic between self and others as one of “interdependency and affiliation” (259). 
This notion of relational identities as being a fluid dynamic between self and other(s) is very 
much rooted in earlier conceptions of relational identities. In writing on women’s 
autobiographical selves, for example, Susan Stanford Friedman saw female identity as that which 
“does not oppose herself to all others, does not feel herself to exist outside of others, and still less 
against others, but very much with others in an interdependent existence that asserts its rhythms 
everywhere in the community” (79). I do think, then, that it is crucial to account for distinctions 
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between acts of self-construction in which the self is rooted in an interdependent relationship 
with others (as both Stanford Friedman and Leis suggest) and texts which privilege the story of 
others over the story of the self. In other words, there is a qualitative difference in strategies of 
self-representation between the authors who write about themselves as being part of a mutual 
dynamic with others and authors who, in many ways, conceal themselves in the name of 
focusing on others. And, it seems to me, that these differences are important and go somewhat 
ignored.  
It is in this sense that I think it is crucial to consider relationality as an interpretive lens 
for critics that can provoke certain questions while foreclosing others. This observation is one 
that is often overlooked. For example, in his article on relational lives, Eakin notes that “A book 
such as Michael Ondaatje’s Running in the Family (1982), which I used to think of as somehow 
peripheral, as ‘memoir’ rather than autobiography proper, now seems to me central, and I see 
relational paradigms prominently displayed in texts that I read otherwise in other days – I am 
thinking of The Autobiography of Malcolm X (1965) and Alfred Kazin’s A Walker in the City 
(1951)” (75).  
This quotation conveys two things. First, Eakin, like many critics before him, is again 
privileging autobiography over memoir. Running in the Family moves from the periphery, where 
he sees memoir residing, to the centre where “autobiography proper” resides and can now 
become a subject for autobiographical study. I hope to avoid such value judgements and I again 
use Rak here who states that “it may make more sense to see these books as their authors 
described them: memoirs that are intended to combine public and private discourse” (315). 
Throughout this dissertation, I will consider the books that I am studying not as “autobiography 
proper” but instead as autobiographical and examples of life writing that make use of the 
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discourses of self-representation. These texts are often marketed and should be treated as 
memoir. Indeed the strategies of self-representation at work in these texts position them at the 
margin or perhaps beyond the margin of autobiography.  
The other significant aspect of the quotation is Eakin’s contention that by reading texts 
through the lens of the “relational paradigm” he can find relational identities in autobiographies 
where previously critics saw only individuals. Yet just as the individualistic paradigm foreclosed 
examinations of identity in terms of the individual’s relation to others (indeed, as Eakin describes 
it, this paradigm was so pervasive and convincing that it was impossible to see these kinds of 
identities at work in the text), the relational paradigm likewise prevents crucial questions from 
being asked, such as why in a memoir do particular narratives of other people tend to dominate 
over narratives of the self. In that case, while I do think that scholars can look at texts like 
Silko’s for what they reveal about the self, I also think that in restricting ourselves to that sort of 
interpretation we run the risk of neglecting to explore the strategy of non-self-representation 
within what could still be called an autobiographical text, which is a unique phenomenon. 
This becomes crucial for me when looking at contemporary Canadian Mennonite life 
writing, for several reasons. One reason is that these authors position themselves in relation not 
just to an other but several others. And also, frequently, these authors are less co-subjects than 
background figures, despite their use of autobiographical discourse. In all of these books, in one 
way or another, these authors privilege the story of something or someone other than their own 
selves. In that sense, while one could very well adopt a critical frame that would read these 
authors’ identities strictly in relational terms, I suggest that definitions of relational life writing 
as I have mapped them out above are not entirely compatible with the texts that I examine in this 
dissertation.   
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I consider, then, what to make of the authors’ disappearances in the text or (if they appear 
frequently, as is the case with Katie Funk Wiebe and Rudy Wiebe) why they nevertheless still 
favour the stories of others. Frequently, these writers discuss Mennonite historical others (such 
as the experiences of Mennonites in early 20
th
 century Soviet Russia or even earlier historical 
moments), family members, communities and they do so in a way that specifically privileges the 
story of the others. This is not to say that the authors that I look at do not necessarily see 
themselves in relation to the other. In fact, in many ways, it is their status in relation to others 
that allows these authors to focus so much attention on them. As I will show, the chosen other 
that the authors focus on in these texts reveals a great deal about the very central role that 
history, family, and community play within their lives.  
I want to suggest the possibility that it is because of the historical and culturally 
entrenched discomfort over both worldliness, self-confession, and pride that we see so many 
Mennonite authors who write autobiographically yet largely about other people. Rather than 
considering these texts for what they tell us about the individual or even the individual in an 
interdependent existence with another or others, I think it is useful to explore these texts for what 
they can tell us about the overwhelming and dominating role that traditions, community, family, 
and history play within certain cultural groups and among particular writers. Recently, in her 
discussion on the newly published American Mennonite memoir Mennonite in a Little Black 
Dress by Rhoda Janzen, Ann Hostetler made claims that might appear to be something of the 
opposite of what I am arguing. Hostetler observes how texts like Janzen’s illustrate a “change” 
that “involves the creation of the self as a literary subject in writing from a Mennonite experience 
rather than using a voice that represents Mennonites as a group” (“The Self” 24).  
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On the face of it, Hostetler’s arguments might appear to contradict my own. However, 
Hostetler mostly suggests that Mennonite life writing should not have to include stereotypical 
representations of community. She writes,  
what if the ‘self’ doesn’t particularly care about the project of preserving and 
protecting Mennonite identity? What if the self treats the community like a 
backdrop, a backboard, a sounding board, her own particular version of the 
authoritarian straw man? What if the stories she has to tell compromise a coherent 
narrative of the community and open it up to critique? For women and outsider 
narrators, this kind of critique is almost imperative because they run counter to the 
master narratives of the group. (32) 
I do not disagree with Hostetler here and, in fact, do not see her observations about Mennonite 
literature to be in opposition to my own. Hostetler does not believe that Mennonite life writing 
should necessarily shy away from representing community (or, assumedly, family and history). 
Rather, Hostetler suggests that the autobiographical form can allow for a more personal 
representation of Mennonite life.  
For Hostetler, the personal narrative can “run counter to the master narratives.” She 
reaffirms this point later when she writes that “we also need the stories written by those who dare 
to examine the selves outside of the communal narratives, of reflecting back to the community its 
own shadow side, the sometimes-unintended consequences of its practices, the ways in which it 
can be a stranger to itself” (38). Here Hostetler calls, not for Mennonite life writing that merely 
privileges the self over community but, rather, presents a more personal view of community that 
might undermine the conventional communal story. Hostetler’s point reflects the state of 
Mennonite literary scholarship as discussed above that sees more and more authors refusing to 
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fall into the trap of representing the fashionable Mennonite exotic, and instead writing from their 
own personal milieus.  
What Hostetler appears to mean is that Mennonite life writing does not necessarily reflect 
the master narrative of Mennonite identity nor should it. And, indeed, my argument is patently 
not that these examples of Canadian Mennonite life writing do that. Each author that I examine 
brings his or her own particular perspective of Mennonite history, family, and community and I 
would not suggest that any of them re-present master narratives nor do they attempt to position 
their takes on history, family, and community as universal or all-encompassing. I suggest that 
while these texts are a consequence of certain traditions and entrenched beliefs, they nevertheless 
also reveal the individual filtration of those traditions and beliefs. In other words, Di Brandt in 
her book So this is the world may privilege historical others over the self, but the others that she 
chooses reflect her own way of thinking about history and community.  
Ultimately, though, I do not see this kind of individual filtration as being that which 
distinguishes life writing from other kinds of texts. Hostetler does not outright suggest that life 
writing is the singular form that reflects personal, individual views but she leans towards such an 
argument. She notes that “The memoir privileges personal experience over community in its 
narrative, which is why it can be a subversive genre indeed” (31). Elsewhere, Hostetler writes 
that “The old metanarratives no longer suffice. I must write myself, or find companionship with 
other selves that can braid together the complex strands of multiple selves created in the 
contemporary world” (38). Hostetler’s point here does take into account more recent 
developments in autobiographical theory in that she acknowledges the possibility of relational 
identities or, if not that, then non-unified individuals. However, she also appears to suggest a 
dichotomy here: either one writes autobiographically or one re-presents “The old 
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metanarratives”; given other statements, one might also assume she is suggesting that one can 
write autobiographically or one can privilege community over personal experience. But, of 
course, memoir can very well privilege community over personal experience. And, similarly, 
fiction can easily privilege the personal over the communal and can certainly reveal the personal 
way that an author thinks about his or her own community. Hostetler does not quite argue 
otherwise, but in insinuating this dichotomy, she neglects to fully appreciate the value of writing 
about others in autobiographical discourse. 
What ultimately intrigues me about all of the texts that I examine, then, is that they are 
autobiographical whilst simultaneously privileging others. In doing so, these texts, especially 
when brought together, represent a type of autobiographical writing that has been largely 
unaccounted for. Even as critics have engaged more with memoir, they have been more attuned 
to the notion of a relational self than a self that is de-privileged in favour of other narratives. I 
argue that these authors challenge the limitations or boundaries of relational approaches to life 
writing by pushing themselves into the background of their books rather than emphasizing a self 
that is in a fluid relationship with another or others. Thus, examples of contemporary Canadian 
Mennonite life writing such as those addressed in this study demonstrate the inadequacies or 
limits of the relational paradigm as a way to understand these particular lives and illustrate the 
necessity of thinking beyond the dichotomy of individualism and relationality. 
 As previously discussed, the term Mennonite denotes a people that has within it social 
groups with variously different historical backgrounds, traditions, and beliefs. Consequently, in 
order to give my study some kind of coherence, I have limited myself to Canadian Mennonite 
authors coming out of the Russian tradition. There are, of course, ties between the cultural group 
of Canadian Mennonites from the Russian tradition and Canadian Mennonites from the Swiss 
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tradition, and U.S. Mennonites from both traditions. Indeed, American, Russian Mennonite 
writer Rhoda Janzen’s memoir might fit nicely in this collection (and it should be noted that 
Janzen’s familial heritage is Canadian) in that she frequently focuses on family, history and 
community, to the extent that she ultimately ends the book with an appendix titled “A Mennonite 
History Primer.” That said, the identity that Janzen constructs for herself in the book is more 
conventionally relational and one could conceivably argue that the book is more about Janzen’s 
own struggle to overcome the traumatic experiences of being in an abusive marriage than it is 
about privileging the narrative of others or establishing a self in relation to a wide array of other 
people. By the end of the book, Janzen notes about herself, “you made it, land ho, sharks from 
this point on extremely unlikely” (224). Overall, the book is more about personal triumph over 
adversity than history, family, or community despite the fact that all play a crucial role in the 
book.  
Nevertheless, the book does have much in common with the five that I examine here as 
do, surely, many autobiographies or memoirs written by non-Mennonite authors which could 
probably be read in much the same way I read these texts
7
. Nevertheless, in the interest of 
coherency, I have drawn a line, which I acknowledge is one that could very well be interrogated, 
blurred, and deconstructed. The geographical limits within which these authors were born are in 
fact quite narrow: Di Brandt and Miriam Toews from Manitoba; Katie Funk Wiebe and Rudy 
Wiebe from Saskatchewan; and Connie Braun from British Columbia. I think that ultimately 
there is something to be said about the fact that these five texts by authors from the mid-West to 
Western Canada work well together to dramatically illustrate the limitations of the paradigm of 
relationality in the similar ways that they construct history, family, and community. Ultimately I 
have made the decision here that despite similarities, the vast historical differences that have 
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impacted cultural, national, and religious relationships outside of the Canadian Russian 
Mennonite tradition would make my inclusion of literature outside this tradition too sweeping in 
its approach.  
Also, because I want to fully explore how these authors negotiate the tension between the 
private and public, it is necessary to choose life writing texts that are conventional enough and 
published widely enough so that this negotiation would have to occur. The tension between the 
public and the private would not necessarily be a central concern in, say, self-published texts, 
private diaries, letters, or in much older texts written in German or Low German. I will also not 
examine texts that might be more properly labelled as autobiographical fiction or poetry. Despite 
the personal nature of Brandt’s poetry and Rudy Wiebe and Miriam Toews’s fiction, I have 
looked to works by these authors where the discourse that is used is more transparently 
autobiographical. Ultimately I am interested in engaging with the way these authors approach a 
discourse that traditionally demands both openness as well as a focus and foregrounding of the 
individual self writing, which autobiographical fiction and poetry do not necessarily demand in 
quite the same way. 
Di Brandt’s So this is the world & here I am in it is a collection of essays, some of which 
contain critical work and others discuss her relationship to Mennonite tradition and history. 
Connie Braun’s The Steppes Are the Colour of Sepia: A Mennonite Memoir, details Braun’s own 
attempt to piece together a family history that mostly focuses on the persecution of the 
Mennonites in Germany, Russia, Ukraine, and Yugoslavia from the late nineteenth century up to 
WWII. Swing Low: A Life by Miriam Toews is a book written in the autobiographical style but 
from the perspective not of Toews herself but of her father, Melvyn. The book is partly made up 
of Toews’s own notes that she took from her father’s oral recounting of his own past, but much 
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of the narrative has been creatively constructed by Toews herself who imagines what Mel “might 
have talked about if he’d ever allowed himself to” (4). Katie Funk Wiebe’s You Never Gave Me 
a Name: One Mennonite Woman’s Story is the chronicle of Funk Wiebe’s search for an identity 
outside of the patriarchal set-up of her marriage and of her religion. The book details her role as 
an English professor at a Mennonite college in Kansas where she gradually attempts to make the 
school more open to women and tries to do the same within the Mennonite church. Finally, Rudy 
Wiebe’s book Of This Earth: A Mennonite Boyhood in the Boreal Forest, recounts how the 
Wiebe family and their neighbours settled the land when Wiebe was a young boy growing up in 
Saskatchewan. The book focuses significantly on Wiebe’s family and community, as well as the 
Canadian Mennonite reaction to WWII. 
The structure of my dissertation is somewhat unusual. Whereas conventions dictate that I 
spend a chapter focusing on one or several primary texts before moving onto different texts in a 
subsequent chapter, I return to my texts throughout the dissertation. I discuss elements of Katie 
Funk Wiebe’s memoir in three chapters, for example. The reason why I made this decision is to 
show how in most of these books, the authors work to privilege the narrative of several others. 
Again, in opposition to typical examples of relational identities in life writing, the tendency of 
these authors is not merely to construct a self in relation to an other. Rather, in the case of You 
Never Gave Me a Name, Funk Wiebe tells the story of the self along with the story of her 
ancestors, her family, her colleagues, and a more general community of women. With the 
appearance of several of these books over multiple chapters, I hope to demonstrate not only the 
extent to which these authors focus on others but also how they demand a distinctly different 
kind of analysis than what is typically given in studies on relational identities in autobiographical 
texts
8
. 
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In my first chapter, I consider Mennonite life writing through the lens of Alison 
Landsberg’s work and her notion of “prosthetic memory” wherein a person “takes on a more 
personal, deeply felt memory of a past event through which he or she did not live” (2). The 
chapter will focus on the Mennonite self as bound to collective histories, using Connie Braun, Di 
Brandt, Rudy Wiebe, and Katie Funk Wiebe as examples. Braun’s book largely focuses on the 
experiences of her father in his youth and ultimately works to construct what she calls a “history 
of a people” (Steppes 2) Brandt constructs an identity that is entangled with a historical 
community that exists farther back in history than the chronological landscape of any of the other 
authors I look at. She sees herself as belonging to a group of women ancestors and, in focusing 
on intergenerational trauma, reveals how the self is intimately connected to historical groups that 
can be centuries old. This allows her to focus significantly on these historical others. Rudy 
Wiebe’s book like Braun’s touches on Mennonites who suffered as a result of Soviet repression. 
Finally, I examine Katie Funk Wiebe’s book which conveys the Mennonite historical legacy of 
rebelliousness, particularly amongst Mennonite women. 
Chapter Two looks at the role of family in these texts. Here, I consider Paul John Eakin’s 
observation that relational identity in life writing frequently “takes the form of the family 
memoir” (How Our Lives 85). The texts that I examine challenge conventional ways of thinking 
about family. Furthermore, the texts allow for a critique of some of Alison Landsberg’s points 
raised in Chapter One. Rudy Wiebe’s book highlights how he was simply one amongst a larger 
family collective unit. Katie Funk Wiebe, meanwhile, addresses how her identity was very much 
shaped both by her parents and then, later, by her husband and her children, and also co-workers 
whom she sees as family. Miriam Toews, meanwhile, demonstrates the significance of family by 
writing entirely from the perspective of her father. Pushing Eakin’s premise in a somewhat 
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different direction, I will look at all these texts to show how the individual self is often 
abandoned entirely for narratives of others within the writers’ families. 
My third chapter will focus on Lauren Berlant’s concept of “intimate publics” in order to 
examine the self as bound to place and community. Again, these texts challenge the traditional 
link between Mennonites and community as both authors that I examine markedly expand on 
conventional definitions of community. Katie Funk Wiebe establishes herself in relationship with 
a community of Mennonite females who have either attempted to gain an identity outside of the 
patriarchal structures of marriage and religion or who have seen those attempts repressed. In 
addressing a particular community, Funk Wiebe creates an intimate public based on shared 
experiences. And while Brandt constructs herself as part of the “defecting generation” (So this is 
125), she nevertheless contributes to an intimate public by revering the tradition of anti-
industrialists who have an “intimate relationship to land” (126).  
Finally, in Chapter Four, I will look at the current scholarly discussion of relational selves 
by more contemporary writers on relational life writing such as Amber K. Regis. I consider the 
significance of Regis’s term “intertextual relationality” which she notes is “the construction of 
narratives and subjects in response to existing, alternative versions of a life” (289). I explore 
Regis’s point in relation to Mennonite autobiography by examining the fact that Rudy Wiebe and 
Miriam Toews’s texts incorporate the work of others. Rudy Wiebe uses journal entries of his 
sisters in order to construct the story of his family during his youth. Toews’s book, meanwhile, 
relies heavily on the notes that her father took (very much on her advice) before his death. I will 
suggest that the use of other autobiographical texts within these narratives works to reinforce the 
notion of a self that is very much reliant on and bound to others and also allows for opportunity 
to focus and privilege the stories of others. 
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Chapter One 
Trauma, Affiliation, and Historical Others 
 In my introduction, I discussed how my dissertation argues that the texts I engage with 
reveal a gap in autobiographical theory regarding relational lives. These texts demonstrate less 
that they are involved in an interpenetrating relationship with an other than they do privilege the 
narrative of others. In this chapter, I look at Connie Braun’s The Steppes are the Colour of Sepia, 
Di Brandt’s So this is the world & here I am in it, Rudy Wiebe’s Of This Earth, and Katie Funk 
Wiebe’s You Never Gave Me a Name in order to examine how these authors privilege the 
narrative of historical others. Certainly, these authors do see themselves in relation to these 
particular others. In many instances, they see themselves connected to a historical past that they 
did not directly experience. As I will demonstrate, these authors frequently are attached to the 
past via the inter- or transgenerational transmission of trauma. That being said, these authors 
often focus less on their own relation to these others than on the importance of giving a narrative 
voice to these people. In an autobiographical context, this works to demonstrate the 
overwhelming role that history plays in these authors’ lives. By examining these texts in terms of 
how they work to focus on historical others over the self, I hope to speak to an aspect of life 
writing that has gone under-theorized. 
Connie Braun’s 2008 memoir The Steppes Are the Colour of Sepia deals explicitly with 
the horrors her father experienced, along with his parents and their family, in Ukraine, 
particularly during the period between the beginning of Soviet rule in 1917 and the end of World 
War II in 1945. Early in the book, Braun explains the central motivation behind writing the text. 
She writes that, 
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there is a time to forget, a time for the silencing of traumatic and painful 
memories. But there also comes a time to remember, and a time to speak, a time 
to tell the stories of loss, catastrophe, persistence and resilience – the stories of 
our past and of our heritage. Our stories are the evidence of our lives. They are 
also a passport to where we have come from, and stories permit even those of us 
who have never been there to return to this “elsewhere.” (18) 
Braun’s discussion conveys two facts. The first is that in noting that these “traumatic and painful 
memories” are “Our stories” that are “the evidence of our lives,” she is drawing a connection 
between herself and those who suffered firsthand from the trauma of Soviet totalitarianism. 
Braun also reveals, though, that she resides amongst those “who have never been” to this place 
of direct trauma, referring to such a geographical and temporal location as an “‘elsewhere.’” For 
Braun, the trauma that is such an intrinsic part of her story is a trauma that she did not directly 
experience. 
 Braun spends the overwhelming majority of her book dealing with the horrors of this 
historical time as it is understood and remembered by those who did experience the horror first 
hand. As she notes in her Preface, “The family story I tell is crafted mostly from remembered 
history” (xii). While Braun does construct her own identity in this text and writes 
autobiographically, the central focus of the book is nevertheless on others, namely the direct 
victims of Leninism and Stalinism, as well as Hitler’s fascism. Constructing a self in relation to 
historical others allows Braun to focus her attention on their narrative. Importantly, as the book’s 
subtitle suggests, this is not simply a memoir but a Mennonite memoir. Memoirs like Braun’s, I 
argue, call for a more nuanced discussion of relational lives, since here Braun’s life may be 
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constructed in relation to others but it is also largely eliminated from the text as a whole apart 
from a few moments throughout. 
  While Braun’s book is perhaps the most glaringly obvious example in my analysis of a 
self in relation to historical others, Di Brandt, Rudy Wiebe, and Katie Funk Wiebe all construct 
themselves as belonging to particular social or cultural groups rooted in a historical moment
9
. 
This allows each author to discuss events (frequently traumatic ones) that they themselves did 
not directly experience. These authors discuss not only the historical Mennonite groups that had 
once lived in Eastern Europe but they also address the broader and even more diverse historical 
groups of Mennonites and Anabaptists who date back to the 16
th
 century. In this chapter, I wish 
to examine how these writers work to construct themselves as being one amongst a larger, 
historical group. Importantly, these authors in many ways emphasize the story of these others to 
the extent that the story of the other (rather than simply the story of the self in relation to these 
others) is the one that is privileged. 
 Recent interest and updated theories on generational cultural memories by scholars such 
as Alison Landsberg and Marianne Hirsch have resulted in a new discourse being made available 
for life writing scholars, allowing them to consider Hirsch’s “postmemory” and Landsberg’s 
“prosthetic memory” in analyzing the strategies of self-construction used by authors who write 
autobiographical narratives. I would like to briefly address the theories on trans- and 
intergenerational memory formulated by Hirsch and Landsberg and consider their significance 
for life writing scholarship. Ultimately, I believe Hirsch and Landsberg’s conception of how 
memories are transmitted from generation to generation is useful in considering how the authors 
I look at think of themselves in connection with people and events from the past. 
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 Hirsch’s conception of trans-generational memory is particularly concerned with the 
passing down of traumatic memory. Her focus is specifically on how the Holocaust is 
transmitted to the subsequent generation. As Hirsch explains it in her book, Family Frames, 
Postmemory characterizes the experience of those who grow up dominated by 
narratives that preceded their birth, whose own belated stories are evacuated by 
the stories of the previous generation shaped by traumatic events that can be 
neither understood nor recreated. I have developed this notion in relation to 
children of Holocaust survivors, but I believe it may usefully describe other 
second-generation memories of cultural or collective traumatic events and 
experiences. (Family 22) 
Postmemory, then, involves the taking on of traumatic memories from “the previous generation.” 
Because postmemory is so tightly woven with trauma, the Holocaust figures most prominently in 
Hirsch’s analysis. Yet as she says here, children of other “traumatic events and experiences” can 
likewise be “dominated by narratives that preceded their birth.”  
Hirsch’s assertion is that those who experienced a traumatic event first hand do not 
necessarily have ownership over the event. Rather, she suggests in a more recent article, “The 
Generation of Postmemory,” there are those who have a “living connection” to the past who can 
claim some kind of ownership over these particular memories (104). It is, perhaps, then, no 
surprise that several of the authors that I examine in this chapter focus specifically on traumatic 
events or see themselves in relation to people who suffered through traumatic historical violence. 
This can be seen most strikingly in Connie Braun’s book but it can also be seen in Brandt’s 
connection to persecuted Anabaptists, Rudy Wiebe’s connection with WWII victims, and Katie 
Funk Wiebe’s connection with subordinated Mennonite women. 
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 According to Hirsch, a central way that memory is transmitted is through photographs. 
She notes, for example, how “Holocaust photographs, as much as their subjects, are themselves 
stubborn survivors of the intended destruction of an entire culture” (Family 23). Photographs 
serve as constant reminders and they also allow the subsequent generation to access and 
experience the past that they know has severely impacted their parents or forebears. While 
photographs play a large part in Hirsch’s discussion, they are not the only means by which 
postmemories are formed. Hirsch argues: “To be sure, children of those directly affected by 
collective trauma inherit a horrific, unknown, and unknowable past that their parents were not 
meant to survive” (“Generation” 112). Hirsch goes on to explain that the work of these children 
of survivors is a consequence of “the long-term effects of living in close proximity to the pain, 
depression, and dissociation of persons who have witnessed and survived massive historical 
trauma” (112).  
For Hirsch, trans-generational trauma can come as a result of the subsequent generation 
experiencing the after-effects of first hand trauma. Hirsch’s argument helps to explain Connie 
Braun’s connection to a traumatic past in The Steppes are the Colour of Sepia. Braun conveys 
that there were always traces, perhaps partially hidden, of a traumatic past that were made 
available to her. Early on, Braun writes, “When I was small, my father told only a few stories 
about his boyhood and I listened, enthralled, as though I were listening to him tell secrets, for his 
tales seemed veiled” (19-20). Both this and the abundance of photographs in the book, some of 
which Braun would have always had access to, allowed Braun and others like her to gain access 
to a lost world that carried with it the sadness of oppression and exile
10
.  
Braun comes to this conclusion near the end of the memoir when she describes her visit 
to a museum in Kiev during a family trip to Ukraine and Russia. She writes: “Along the wall, 
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beside this communion table is a gallery of photographs: families in traditional portrait poses, 
faces of mothers, faces of children, young sons in uniforms. These were the faces of life in this 
place, of war and of suffering. Each picture framed a silent narrative. It was as though another’s 
face became our other self” (218). These quotations illustrate the general preoccupation of 
Braun’s book with the stories and, indeed, the very identities of others. They also convey, 
though, how Braun feels connected to these stories and these people and why she makes use of 
autobiographical discourse to tell a story largely about others. It is here where Hirsh’s points 
regarding postmemory seem to be the most useful in examining the way that the authors I look at 
see themselves in relation to others, or even see their own story being dominated by the stories of 
others. 
Importantly, though, for Hirsch, postmemory is formed out of “events that can be neither 
understood nor recreated.” Hirsch offers a distinction between the kinds of memories that are 
recalled by those who experienced trauma firsthand and the kinds of memories recalled by those 
who did not directly experience the traumatic event yet are, in many ways, still very much 
imbricated in a cultural and collective suffering. She suggests that it is precisely the impossibility 
of full recovery or full remembrance of traumatic events that leads to postmemory. Indeed, it is 
this sense of not knowing that frequently motivates the authors I examine to write these 
narratives of past events. Braun, for example, notes that “my own family didn’t speak about” 
what she calls their “personal trauma” (Steppes 26). She concludes that her book is an “attempt 
of narrative to seek meaning and order from history’s chaos” (27). In many ways, Braun has 
been affected (perhaps traumatically affected in a different way) by the silencing of a history that 
her parents experienced; her book is an attempt to understand this history. 
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At the same time, it is important to avoid suggesting that the traumatic past is knowable 
and fully understandable even for the first generation. After all, as Cathy Caruth points out in her 
book Unclaimed Experience, trauma is “the response to an unexpected or overwhelming violent 
event or events that are not fully grasped as they occur, but return later in repeated flashbacks, 
nightmares, and other repetitive phenomena” (91). In other words, Caruth is arguing that the 
traumatic moment can only be named, understood, and felt as a trauma in retrospect. This, of 
course, means that the originary traumatic moment can never be entirely known, only recalled 
and repeated in various ways. It is crucial to note, then, what Hirsch, intriguingly, does not note, 
which is that a memory and a postmemory of trauma are similar in that neither allows for any 
kind of pure access to the original “violent event or events” that continue to haunt the victim of 
trauma. This is important because Caruth, in many ways, draws an even firmer connection 
between the two generations and this is helpful in explaining why the writers I engage with take 
on the memories of others so directly. 
Hirsch’s argument is also somewhat limiting in that postmemory appears to be available 
for a particularly small group – that is, what Hirsch calls “the generation after,” namely the 
children of those “who witnessed cultural or collective trauma” (“Generation” 106). Hirsch does 
discuss Jan Assmann’s notion of communicative memory which Assmann argues “is transmitted 
across three to four generations—across eighty to one hundred years” (“Generation” 110), but 
then she quickly dismisses it, noting that the “direct link to [this] past” is lost “in the case of 
traumatic interruption, exile, and diaspora” (111). Hirsch, then, considers the trans-generational 
aspect of postmemory but dismisses the possibility of intergenerational transmission of 
memories of the sort that Assmann proposes. Hirsch’s emphasis that postmemory, namely 
traumatic postmemory, is most acutely felt by the generation after seems almost unduly narrow, 
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particularly if photography, which is accessible to many beyond the generation after, allows us to 
access what might otherwise be “an irretrievably lost past world.”   
In Family Frames, Hirsch does acknowledge that the museum “needs to elicit in its 
visitors an imaginary identification – the desire to know and to feel, the curiosity and passion 
that shape the postmemory of survivor children. At its best, it would include all of its visitors in 
the generation of postmemory” (249). In this sense, then, Hirsch does suggest that museums 
(particularly ones with photographic displays) have the capacity to create postmemories for those 
who visit. Her wording, though, also strongly suggests that museums can typically allow visitors 
to form an understanding of postmemory and those who experience it, rather than experience 
postmemory themselves. Furthermore, the quotation also affirms that for Hirsch it is strictly a 
“generation” who can gain postmemories. By limiting these memories strictly to traumatic 
memories and by limiting these “others” to the next generation, Hirsch’s arguments cannot fully 
account for, say, Di Brandt’s and Rudy Wiebe’s felt kinship with some of the earliest Mennonite 
communities or with Katie Funk Wiebe’s connection to a more nebulous group of Mennonite 
women in history. 
 Alison Landsberg’s work, then, is crucial in exploring some of the nuances of 
intergenerational collective memories. She distinguishes her arguments from other conceptions 
of historical memory by pointing out how 20
th
 century technology changed the way that people 
can connect to the past. Landsberg argues that, 
modernity makes possible and necessary a new form of public cultural memory. 
This new form of memory, which I call prosthetic memory, emerges at the 
interface between a person and a historical narrative about the past, at an 
experiential site such as a movie theater or museum. In this moment of contact, an 
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experience occurs through which the person sutures himself or herself into a 
larger history, … In the process that I am describing the person does not simply 
apprehend a historical narrative but takes on a more personal, deeply felt memory 
of a past event through which he or she did not live. The resulting prosthetic 
memory has the ability to shape that person’s subjectivity and politics. (2) 
This process, she contends, is unique to modernity, because of the way that people come to have 
these experiences. In the wake of an “unprecedented movement of peoples” (1) as well as 
African-American slavery and the Holocaust (2), Landsberg suggests that there has been a 
breakdown in the traditional ways that one experienced the past. She writes that in each of these 
cases, “the links between individual persons and community – kinship ties – were broken, and 
alternative methods for the transmission and dissemination of memories were required” (2). For 
Landsberg, it is “Through the technologies of mass culture, [where] it becomes possible for these 
memories to be acquired by anyone” (2). Prosthetic memories are prosthetic because they do not 
merely reside within the people who experienced them first but are, rather, “transportable” (3)11.  
What makes Landsberg’s argument here unique is her contention that 20th century 
technology has allowed for memories to be transportable to a wider cultural group. With access 
to the cinema and to museums, it has become increasingly more possible to take on a “personal, 
deeply felt memory” of what would have at one point been considered to be very particular 
memories experienced by very particular socio-cultural groups. Prosthetic memories “challenge 
more traditional forms of memory that are premised on claims of authenticity, ‘heritage,’ and 
ownership” (2-3). Like Hirsch, Landsberg sees images as being crucial in transmitting memories 
to others. Yet Landsberg goes a bit further than Hirsch in that she suggests that anyone who has 
access to movie theatres or museums may take on memories of any period of the past that is on 
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display. And while prosthetic memories “often mark a trauma” (20), her analysis of transportable 
memories is not limited only to traumatic events.  
Landsberg’s work is useful in broadening the number of people who can collectively 
experience historical memories and she also expands the kinds of memories that can be 
experienced. Like Hirsch, though, her discussion does not neatly explain how the authors that I 
examine fully connect with the past. After all, these authors do not typically connect with the 
past only via modern, transportable technologies, which Landsberg notes “[make] ideas and 
image available to people who reside in different places and have different backgrounds, races, 
ethnicities, and classes” (18). Rather, as I will discuss below, these authors demonstrate their 
connection to the past not only via a variety of personal sources, like Hirsch’s photography, but 
also transmitted oral and written narratives that have survived many generations. They also 
connect to the past by way of more public sources such as historical documents and media 
sources. In some cases, they connect to the past through what appears to be a spiritual connection 
to the land. I see both Hirsch and Landsberg as helpful in explaining both how experiences of the 
past can be accessed by those who did not experience that past firsthand and how 
intergenerational memories can exist for those outside the sphere of the generation after. I also 
consider the primary texts I am examining as instructive in that they expand and modify both of 
these theories. 
Life writing scholars have for quite some time understood the significance of trans- and 
intergenerational memories. Articles by scholars like Ursula Kelly and Adrienne Kertzer have 
put to use Hirsch’s notion of postmemory in discussions of memoirs and, in the latter case, a 
Holocaust exhibit. Andrew S. Gross and Michael J. Hoffman, meanwhile, have looked somewhat 
critically at Landsberg to illuminate their discussion of Binjamin Wilkomirski’s discredited 
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Holocaust memoir, Fragments. Despite the fact that scholars of autobiography have engaged 
with these theories, there has been surprisingly little overlap between those who study relational 
lives in life writing and theories on intergenerational memories, even though such theories 
presuppose an identity that exists in relation to others. As Smith and Watson put it, “Memory is a 
means of ‘passing on,’ of sharing a social past that may have been obscured, thereby activating 
its potential for reshaping a future of and for other subjects. In sum, acts of personal 
remembering are fundamentally social and collective” (26). Nevertheless, scholars have not fully 
explored the potentials of intergenerational memory in autobiographical texts.  
A crucial exception can be seen in the critical discussion of Art Spiegelman’s Maus: A 
Survivor’s Tale. At the same time, this discussion on the comic by relational life writing scholars 
reveals the limitations of these discussions. Paul John Eakin, for example, discusses Maus in his 
chapter on relational lives in How Our Lives Become Stories. For Eakin, there are two 
interdependent stories at work in Spiegleman’s comic book: there is the story of Art’s father’s 
experiences during WWII and there is also what Eakin calls “the story of the story” which is “the 
story of the individual gathering this oral history (Art Spiegelman himself)” (59). Yet because 
his definition of relational life writing still privileges the primacy of the autobiographical subject 
rather than the story of the related other, Eakin reads Maus as being, first and foremost, the story 
of Art rather than the story of Art’s father Vladek. As Eakin notes, “If my reading is correct, it is 
the story of the story that has the upper hand. That is to say, for example, that Maus is in the last 
analysis Art Spiegelman’s autobiography” (60). As a result, Eakin does not view this text 
through the lens of postmemory or transgenerational trauma. That, after all, would itself suggest 
the very overriding significance of Vladek’s story in determining Art’s identity and could 
perhaps also run the risk of a pushing the text beyond the narrow confines of autobiography.  
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Nancy K. Miller, on the other hand, in her discussion of Maus as an example of male-
authored relational life writing, has suggested that Art is a “‘co-owner’ of his father’s trauma” 
(“Cartoons of the Self” 400). Miller observes that Spiegelman suffers from the inherited 
memories of his father. Yet while Miller acknowledges that Spiegelman “sets out to tell his 
father’s story” making “his own [story] subordinated to that purpose” (400) she also points out, 
like Eakin, that “the son’s struggle with his father proves to be as much the subject of Maus as 
the father’s suffering in Auschwitz” (389).  
In much the same way as Miller refers to Art as a “co-owner,” Candida Rifkind, in her 
2008 article on Maus, refers to the book as “collaborative auto/biography” (405). Rifkind’s 
analysis does not necessarily privilege one narrative over another though her focus is primarily 
on what she sees Art doing in the text, rather than what his father is doing – namely “the violence 
that his attempt to represent his own and his father’s stories can inflict on the subjects of 
collaborative auto/biography” (407). Rifkind does not necessarily argue outright, as Eakin does, 
that Art’s story has the upper hand. Nevertheless, she does make the point that Spiegelman 
“gravitate[s] towards an aesthetics of smallness” (401) as a way to represent “the son’s guilt in 
… representing his father’s past experiences and then making a profit from these 
representations” (418). In other words, in Rifkind’s analysis, the very design of Maus works to 
tell us something significant about Art rather than Vladek.  
I certainly do not quibble with these readings of Maus. Rather, I use these examples in 
order to point out that while the study of relational lives can certainly account for particular 
stories of trans- or intergenerational memory, it does not necessarily account for what is at work 
in texts that appear to, in some way, privilege the story of the other while at the same time 
remaining autobiographical. An analysis that does not acknowledge that the story of the other 
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may have the upper hand over the story of the self does not easily lend itself to a discussion on 
the way in which stories of trauma can have a dominating impact on the lives of others who did 
not experience that trauma firsthand. Is it not possible for an author to have been so affected by 
the Holocaust that his or her parents experienced that even when he or she chooses to write 
autobiographically, the narrative that is privileged is that of the parents? 
What I am interested in is exploring how Connie Braun, Di Brandt, Rudy Wiebe and 
Katie Funk Wiebe construct themselves as being entangled with a historical community that 
existed well before or well outside their lived experiences. These authors frequently shift 
attention away from the self and place it onto others and reveal the dominating role that these 
historical narratives and historical communities play in these authors’ lives. All four texts that I 
look at in this chapter do this in various ways for various reasons. Connie Braun’s book focuses 
specifically on the trauma of her parents’ and their parents’ generation for the central reason that 
she feels a responsibility to tell a story that runs the risk of evaporating from history altogether – 
namely the story of the Mennonite communities who stayed in Russia past the 1920s, following a 
period of emigration that allowed many Mennonites to escape the worst of Soviet violence. 
Braun’s subjects, on the other hand, suffered immeasurably. As she notes, though, these events 
have gone fairly underreported. Braun argues that, 
Their story has been largely overlooked, even by other groups of Mennonites. It 
arises from the margins of the collective history of Mennonites in Russia. It is 
also a story from the margins of World War II history. And at the present time, it 
is a story that belongs among those, only now, emerging from the periphery of the 
former Soviet Union’s history. This story is uniquely situated at the intersection 
of each of these marginal histories. (3) 
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Braun, as the daughter of a man who survived this era, is compelled to develop the narrative of 
this heretofore untold story. And while her focus in the book is frequently on her family, Braun 
is quick to point out that “the story of this family represents the stories of many others” (xiii). In 
other words, her family operates in the book synecdochally, standing in for a larger Mennonite 
community. This is why Braun sees herself in relation not just to family members but to a whole 
group of Mennonites. Furthermore, this is what allows The Steppes to be called specifically a 
Mennonite memoir, rather than merely a family memoir. 
As Braun suggests in her article “Silence, Memory and Imagination as Story,” the 
necessity to write this book comes not only from the fact that it has been left out of dominant 
historical narratives but also because of the kinds of details that the story conveys. She writes 
that “The Canadian children of Mennonite immigrants are returning to the stories of their 
forebears – writing narratives arising from childhood memories formed over six decades ago – in 
order to give voice to the experience of suffering through war and dispossession” (1). For Braun 
and others from the next generation, it is crucial to address these stories because they bear 
witness to an unaddressed trauma. Braun’s book is not simply a work of recovery; it is also a 
testimony of untold suffering from a period that occurred before the birth of the author.  
The impetus behind Braun’s book is not entirely uncommon. As Marianne Hirsch and 
Nancy K. Miller put it in their introduction of their book of collected essays Rites of Return, 
“The emotional effects of diasporic dislocation and relocation also have led many of us in the 
twenty-first century to recapture, in writing, family memories and stories, in order to rescue lost 
legacies, to restore connections suspended by time, place, and politics. This is especially true of 
descendants of groups that have been subjected to extermination or expulsion” (10). Braun’s 
book indeed falls into this particular category of life writing as Hirsch and Miller describe it. The 
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Steppes are the Colour of Sepia indeed works to document a community that was largely 
destroyed in the wake of Stalinism and tells their formerly lost story. 
 Braun does represent herself in this text in much the same way that Spiegelman 
constructs himself in Maus. She is the recorder and compiler of a story that has been silenced 
even within the boundaries of her own family who had kept secret the story of historical 
suffering. She writes: “My father did not elaborate beyond his few adventure tales. And I, with 
my own husband and children, became occupied by my present life. Years would pass before I 
began to recover the words and stories inside this family photograph” (27). Braun makes 
appearances throughout the memoir, mostly in the role as she describes it here, as she pulls the 
story from her father and visits family members to track down photographs and get a fuller story 
from the documents that she uncovers.  
Her attempts to create a meaningful and truthful story from what she later refers to as 
“the gaps and silences” (211) of her family’s history betray a central paradox at the heart of 
trauma. Leigh Gilmore argues in her book The Limits of Autobiography, that 
Crucial to the experience of trauma are the multiple difficulties that arise in trying 
to articulate it. Indeed, the relation between trauma and representation, and 
especially language, is at the center of claims about trauma as a category. 
Something of a consensus has already developed that takes trauma as the 
unrepresentable to assert that trauma is beyond language in some crucial way, that 
language fails in the face of trauma, and that trauma mocks language and 
confronts it with its insufficiency. Yet, at the same time language about trauma is 
theorized as an impossibility, language is pressed forward as that which can heal 
the survivor of trauma. (6) 
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Gilmore suggests here that trauma is that which is beyond language – an event that was so 
horrifying or so troubling that it could not be put into words in any authentic way. At the same 
time, language is crucial if one is to work through trauma. This paradox is on display several 
times in Braun’s memoir. Referring back to the Greek word for trauma (wound), Braun echoes 
Julia Kasdorf’s desire for “‘the wound [to become] a mouth that finally speaks its testimony’” 
(qtd. in Steppes xi). Nevertheless, Braun confronts the very real difficulties that always 
accompany testimony. 
In one example, she recounts a story from her Aunt Mary who obliquely reveals what 
Braun assumes to be an untellable story of sexual assault: “‘Early one morning when I awoke, I 
saw a few of the girls from our brigade stumble back into the camp…. During the night the 
soldiers in charge of us had dragged them off.’ I know she means the soldiers raped them, but 
she avoids using the word, for the act is unspeakable. The ugly word cannot encapsulate the 
experience of violation” (101). Braun is certainly correct here in observing the silences that mark 
her Aunt Mary’s story. This moment reveals that a historical account of a traumatic event will 
inevitably be incomplete. Yet importantly, in this moment, Braun fills in the silence, suggesting 
the desire on Braun’s part to speak the unspeakable. 
Braun, herself, reveals that she is self-conscious about being able to properly articulate 
the events she is describing. At the end of her book, she admits that “My ancestral story has at 
times proved almost too difficult to write” (222). Despite the difficulties in putting this traumatic 
history into words, Braun nevertheless continues as she privileges the kind of work that narration 
does. Importantly, telling this story has, to a certain degree, helped Braun herself. Namely, 
knowing her ancestral history has helped her come to a fuller understanding of who she herself 
is. She notes that “narrative becomes a step in a sequence of lives, of past, present and future 
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generations, providing connections to flesh and blood, place and heritage” (222). Finally, she 
concludes that “I have presented this story, and in it, I have tasted the sweetness of my present 
life” (222). Despite the fact that Braun positions herself as the story’s central interpreter and the 
fact that bringing the past into some sort of clarity is essential in Braun’s own self-actualization, 
the overwhelming focus of the book is nevertheless on others.  
The Steppes is a testament to historian Marlene Epp’s observation that “For those 
families that remained in the Soviet Union after the large emigration in the 1920s, the next 
decade represented a new cycle of famine, repression, and terror” (Mennonite Women 54). Most 
of Braun’s book is devoted to specifically illustrating this environment. In doing so, she turns the 
attention away from the self who is compiling the narrative to the historical others who suffered 
under Stalin’s regime. Braun uses a variety of sources to illustrate the horrors of this era. On the 
one hand, she conveys what she herself refers to as documented “historical facts and figures,” 
revealing that “under Stalin’s ‘economic plan’ ten million people died. Some figures cite fifteen 
million people. It is incomprehensible that multitudes died of starvation or disappeared, unjustly 
branded enemies of the state, coreligionists, intellectuals and writers, farmers” (63).  
Horrifying as this sounds, it does not compare to the more personal anecdotes that Braun 
relays throughout the book. One scene describes a particularly appalling incident that was 
viewed by Braun’s father, Peter. The story describes how Peter witnessed the aftermath of a train 
accident, wherein a freight train crashed into another train of refugees attempting to escape 
during the Russian-German conflicts in 1943. Braun relays Peter’s remembrances thusly: “‘I can 
still see it,’ my father says. Tangled steel rail, debris, and bloodied bodies strewn about the 
station yard with people moaning, skin lacerated – gashes in flesh like crooked red mouths. 
Some people are covered with angry burns, scalded, on impact, by boiling water that splashed 
66 
 
from boxcar stovetops. Parents, anguished, discover their child is dead” (134). This moment and 
others illustrate the struggle faced by Peter and his family and the kinds of violence witnessed by 
those living under wartime totalitarianism. 
As Braun points out several times throughout the memoir, though, the Mennonites 
suffered in a particularly unique way under Stalin’s regime. The central issue for Braun is 
precisely this Mennonite experience. Her concern is not only with the “twenty-three thousand” 
Mennonites who “disappeared” trying to flee the Soviet Union but also with “Twelve thousand 
Mennonites” who “successfully immigrated to Canada, the United States, or South America” 
(213)  in the late 1920s, after which time the “iron curtain” had firmly closed. Braun points out 
the distinctive way the Mennonites experienced Stalinism. She writes: “When war broke out in 
the Soviet Union, the colonists of German descent … were regarded as enemies. The 
Mennonites, as conscientious objectors to war, were no exception. In the past they had provided 
non-combatant service, but such status would not be recognized now. Instead, they were taken, 
not to perform alternative service, but to labour camps, imprisonment and death” (100). While 
the German background of the Mennonites made them automatically distinct, it was also their 
cultural and religious background, which emphasized pacifism, that made them a particularly 
problematic group, especially during war-time.  
As historian John B. Toews points out in his book Journeys: Mennonite Stories of Faith 
and Survival in Stalinist Russia, the pacifist stance of the Mennonites had previously “allowed 
no compromise with the state” (2). Indeed, it is not surprising that the German language and the 
pacifist stance that kept the Mennonites apart from worldly society in Russia would be what 
would make the Mennonites so suspect within a totalitarian government structure. Toews 
continues by pointing out that under Stalin, “Mennonite cultural-religious survival was at stake 
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and increasingly that struggle was being lost” (5). What the Mennonites faced under Stalin was 
cultural erasure.  
Braun demonstrates throughout the book not only how Mennonite values were being 
specifically targeted by Soviet power but also how these values were being abandoned by some 
of the Mennonites themselves in the name of survival. She suggests that as “Stalin’s purges 
continued” it was “the Mennonites” who “were particularly suspect, considered subversive 
because of their German-ness” (85-86). Moreover, she admits that “even some Mennonites cast 
aside the principle of non-resistance” (114-15) in order to defend themselves against the 
brutality. Braun discusses the ultimately double-edged decision by several Mennonites to fight 
for the Nazis who were initially understood amongst the community as “liberators” (161).  
In raising these points, Braun shows how the story she is telling is not simply a story of 
those who suffered under Stalin. Nor is this simply the story of her father. Rather, it is a story of 
Mennonite suffering. As she herself writes, this is a book that “entails the history of a people 
who have been important contributors to religion and culture since the Protestant Anabaptist 
break with the Catholic Church in the Reformation” (2). The pictures that Braun places in the 
book titled “Mennonite refugees on the Great Trek, 1943” (26) and “Refugees in Freital, Lager 
93, near Dresden, 1944” (139) serve to reinforce the fact that the book is giving a narrative not 
only to Braun’s father and his family but to a wider range of Mennonites who suffered during 
this period.  
In positioning herself in relation to a historical community, Braun both reaffirms and 
challenges the points raised by Hirsch and Landsberg. Braun is not simply affected by the stories 
of her parents but by her parent’s parents and a larger community. At the same time, though, the 
fact that Braun receives these memories by way of her father attests to the fact that prosthetic 
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memories may very well be a consequence of the kinship ties that Landsberg says become 
broken in cases of diaspora. Ultimately, in crafting this narrative as a story of Mennonite trauma, 
Braun emphasizes her relational position to her subjects since she constructs herself as belonging 
to a group that has suffered.  
As a recorder of and listener to these stories, Braun is already situated in a relational 
position with the victim of firsthand trauma. Dori Laub makes a point about this dynamic in his 
article “Bearing Witness or the Vicissitudes of Listening.” Here Laub illustrates the 
interdependent relationship between the witness who experienced the trauma and the person who 
fills the role of the listener. He suggests that “The testimony to the trauma thus includes its 
hearer, who is, so to speak, the blank screen on which the event comes to be inscribed for the 
first time” (57). In other words, once the victim of trauma is able to bear witness to his or her 
experience by articulating that experience in some form of narrative, the person listening to the 
narrative becomes a participant in this experience.  
Laub goes on to note too that not only does the hearer play a vital role in the testimony to 
the trauma but also, in hearing, experiences to some degree the trauma that affects the speaker. 
He contends that  
the listener to trauma comes to be a participant and a co-owner of the traumatic 
event: through his very listening, he comes to partially experience trauma in 
himself. The relation of the victim to the event of the trauma, therefore, impacts 
on the relation of the listener to it, and the latter comes to feel the bewilderment, 
injury, confusion, dread and conflicts that the trauma victim feels. (Laub 57-58) 
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What Laub says here, in many ways, reinforces the points raised by Hirsch in her discussion of 
postmemory, though, for Laub, the listener extends towards anyone who is what Laub calls “a 
witness to the trauma witness” (58).  
 Braun certainly enters into this kind of relationship with the speakers in her book. Braun, 
though, is quick to point out that she is not a victim, at least not on the same level as those who 
experienced the violence of Stalin’s regime firsthand. In Braun’s article, she says that “one must 
never attempt to compare one’s own experience of suffering with that of another – especially 
with genocide” (“Silence” 3). Of course, Braun never directly compares her own life experiences 
with those that she is recording. Laub likewise suggests that there is always a crucial distinction 
between the listener and the victim. He writes: “While overlapping, to a degree, with the 
experience of the victim, [the listener] nonetheless does not become the victim – he preserves his 
own separate place, position and perspective” (58). In other words, the listener may very well 
experience a reaction to the story of trauma that is similar to the witness’s own reaction to the 
traumatic event, but his or her experience is nevertheless always different. 
 While Braun explicitly avoids conflating the nature of her own experiences with those of 
her subjects, she nevertheless reveals her connection both to the people who suffered and to their 
symptoms. Not only does she have difficulty articulating this story, as was mentioned above, she 
also reinforces her relation to the traumatic events by constructing an identity for herself that 
extends far beyond her own birth. In her preface to the book, Braun discusses what is ultimately 
for her a kind of spiritual connection to both a place and a time in which she did not exist. 
Writing about the Russia of her ancestors, Braun observes the following: “It seems as though the 
soil of that distant place is under my fingernails as my father tells about living there, and I am 
struck with this thought: the soil of the steppes and the river are the flesh and blood of our 
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heritage” (x). Braun writes of the historical landscape as if it is part of her own body, as if the 
soil remains under her fingernails. Noting that “the steppes and the river are the flesh and blood 
of our heritage,” Braun reveals that this place is a crucial part of her own sense of self, especially 
insofar as the location plays a particular role in Braun’s own understanding of the Mennonite 
culture to which she herself belongs. 
 Braun’s identity, therefore, is connected not only to this place but also to the identities of 
other Mennonites who lived there. This relational identity allows Braun, also, to forge a 
connection to the traumatic events that occurred there. She observes: “Russia, a land of wheat 
and fields of sunflowers aglow with golden halos. To Canadian-born children, this other place 
was, and is, at once distant and within. We taste its sweet nostalgia now and then. But there is 
darkness, too. It lies somewhere between our eyes” (19). The darkness that she speaks of is 
obviously the stories of horror that are to follow in the book. Importantly, though, in this 
quotation the darkness is felt specifically by the “Canadian-born children,” revealing the 
prosthetic nature of her ancestor’s trauma.  
Braun suggests that she and (according to this quotation) all descendants from this 
historical group, are so connected to the place and the people that the trauma the historical group 
experienced firsthand has been passed down. Much like Hirsch and Laub, Braun emphasizes her 
own difference from the Mennonites who lived in Russia, suggesting that “this other place was, 
and is, at once distant and within” for those born in Canada. Ultimately while this comment 
reveals Braun’s separate place and perspective, it also reinforces how the trauma that was 
experienced by others is nevertheless passed on to Braun as “personal, deeply felt” (2) memories, 
to borrow Landsberg’s phrasing. Hirsch and Miller refer to this strategy of self-construction as 
“‘affiliative self-fashioning,’” which, they note, “becomes a useful tool for creating alternative, 
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transpersonal models of selfhood that take on meaning in relation and in what we might think of 
as a diasporic kinship based on shared desires” (14). Braun certainly does see herself affiliated 
with this historical group, because, like many of her parents’ generation and also her own, she 
has been affected to some degree by the negative consequences of Stalin’s purges. 
This better explains the quotation at the beginning of chapter one where Braun refers to 
these events as “our stories.” Indeed, she goes further at one point after locating a photograph of 
her great-great grandparents who were the first in her family to live in Russia. Braun’s discovery 
of the photo comes early on in her process of putting together the story that becomes her memoir. 
She observes of the picture that “The silent unsmiling mouths seem to hint at the narrative I have 
yet to recover. So little of a past life in Russia has survived or been preserved, but this 
photograph spans the old world to the new, and becomes my story’s beginning” (13). Referring 
to this as “my story” is revealing, especially since so little of this story seems to actually be about 
her at all.  
What this suggests, in fact, is that ultimately Braun’s autobiographical story is 
overwhelmingly about the story of a historical group whose suffering she wishes to rescue from 
the margins of history. The book remains autobiographical as Braun understands the Russian 
Mennonites who lived under Stalin as a group to which she in some way belongs. Despite the 
silences in both the public and private sphere that have kept this story obscured, the memories of 
the events are nevertheless alive enough that future generations still feel their effects. These 
crimes, she tells us, happened to an entire group and continue to manifest themselves in 
subsequent generations. And while these future generations may not quite experience these 
crimes in the same way, they do experience them enough for Braun to step “into the lives of 
[grandparents] Jakob and Maria and their children, if only for a time” (xii). In doing so, she 
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manages to talk about herself even when she focuses on others. She constructs, then, an 
affiliative identity by positioning herself in relation to a historical community.  
In some sense, then, Braun’s book replays what Hildi Froese Tiessen has described as 
“The trope of ‘forever summer, forever Sunday’” (“Between Memory” 629). This trope, Froese 
Tiessen argues, emerged following the publication of Forever Summer, Forever Sunday in 1981. 
The book collected photographs of Mennonites in Russia from 1870 to 1917. Froese Tiessen 
argues that the influential book “began to capture the Mennonite imagination” (629) and allowed 
many contemporary Mennonites, who were largely disconnected from Mennonite histories and 
traditions, to imagine themselves as being part of a historically continuous community. As 
Froese Tiessen puts it, the book allowed “many members of the ‘Russländer’ audience—no 
matter how disenfranchised from their cultural and religious heritage they had come to feel—the 
possibility of realizing themselves ‘as historical subjects with a common past.’” (629-30). 
Indeed, one might be tempted to see Braun’s book in this light as she ultimately connects herself 
with the story of the Mennonite experience in Soviet Russia. 
Importantly, though, it is the story of the community, particularly the community who 
experienced the traumatic events firsthand, that Braun privileges. While Braun devotes some 
space to discussing her own relationship to these events as well as her role in bringing these 
particular stories to light, she is nevertheless largely in the background of her own memoir. This 
is a deeply felt, personal story, without a doubt. Yet ultimately it is a personal story largely about 
others. Robert Zacharias has recently argued that the history of the Russian Mennonite’s 
“dramatic collapse in the aftermath of the Russian Revolution” from “the great heights of its 
prosperity at the turn of the twentieth century” works now, for many writers “as a mythological 
beginning or origin story, for the Russian Mennonite community in Canada” (4). The Steppes are 
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the Colour of Sepia, as a memoir, illustrates the profound impact that the story of the Mennonite 
collapse in Russia has had. Indeed, in this text, it is the story of the traumatic events in Russia 
that trump the story of the self or even the self in relation to those events. 
The other texts that I examine in this chapter do not focus on historical others to quite the 
same degree as Braun’s book does. That being said, Di Brandt, Rudy Wiebe, and Katie Funk 
Wiebe all consider their textual identities in very similar ways at certain points in their 
autobiographical texts. Brandt, though, is more interested in constructing a self in relation to a 
much earlier historical community. In So this is the world & here I am in it, Brandt forges 
connections with the earliest Mennonite societies, as well as their Anabaptist predecessors of the 
sixteenth century. Brandt wishes to address “the collective heritage of our Mennonite people’s 
long history of persecution and, yes, cruelty” (94). In doing so, as I will show, Brandt constructs 
an identity for herself that allows her to consider her own selfhood as bound to a historical group.  
 Historians have noted the particularly brutal way in which Mennonites and their forebears 
were treated during the Radical Reformation and the decades and more following. Like the later 
victims of Stalin that Braun discusses, Mennonites and Anabaptists were targets because of their 
desire to largely exist outside the constraints of state power and authority. As historian Stephen 
L. Longenecker writes in his book Shenandoah Religion:  
Sixteenth-century Anabaptists jeopardized German political and social cohesion 
by rejecting infant baptism, refusing to swear oaths, and declining to bear arms, 
whether to protect the town from military crisis, defend its herds from wild 
animals, or merely patrol walls. Authorities responded with anger predictable 
from those who felt their social foundation threatened, and early Mennonites 
endured so much imprisonment, banishment, beheading, burning, hanging, 
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torture, and drowning that a compilation of their martyrdom by their eighteenth-
century brethren produced a thick book, the Martyr’s Mirror. (41) 
Longenecker speaks here of the kind of depravity that Brandt herself is preoccupied with 
throughout many of the personal essays in So this is the world. Moreover, Brandt is equally 
concerned with the cultural-historical group of Mennonite women who, in particular, suffered 
doubly as victims not only of authoritarian state power but also of an increasingly patriarchal 
internal structure within the Mennonite religion.  
Marlene Epp observes that the number of women in the Martyr’s Mirror that 
Longenecker speaks of above has suggested to historians that Anabaptist “women were active 
leaders in the early stages of this radical religious movement” (Mennonite Women 15). Despite 
this, though, Epp goes on to suggest that “an affinity for biblical literalism has also been used by 
Mennonites to support women’s subordination and silence within churches and homes” (16). 
Brandt indeed speaks to both of these histories of women’s leadership and their subsequent 
suppression as she describes the cultural shift that saw women being “free-spirited … before we 
were made to tremble under the wrath of God, the vengeful One, and his long-armed, heavy-
handed henchmen, our bishops and fathers” (4). 
Importantly, Brandt also reveals the ongoing legacy of historical violence and repression 
the Mennonites faced and suggests the direct intergenerational transmission of these traumatic 
events. In the first essay of her book, Brandt says: 
There was another memory, too, hidden in my blood, my bones, that sang out to 
me sometimes in that place of newly broken prairie, an older memory of a time 
when the women of my culture had voices and power and freedom, and their own 
forms of worship, across the sea, out of the green hills under the moon, in the 
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Flemish lowlands of northern Europe, a sturdy peasant life, deeply rooted, before 
the persecutions, the Inquisition, the Burning Times, the drowning times, the 
hanging times, before we became transients, exiles, hounded from one country to 
the next, seeking refuge from wrathful authorities who hated our adult baptisms, 
our democratic communities, our refusal to bow down to priests and kings. (3) 
In this lengthy passage, Brandt establishes her relationship to a historical Mennonite community 
that she sees as being both rooted in an agrarian and communal lifestyle and a target of violence 
because of that chosen lifestyle. Just as Connie Braun talks of the Russian soil being under her 
fingernails, Brandt likewise stresses a bodily-felt connection to the past. In noting that these 
memories are “hidden in my blood” and “my bones,” Brandt appears to suggest that these 
historical moments are rooted in her very biological structure and certainly play a crucial role in 
her own sense of self.  
 Furthermore, Brandt is not simply discussing history in this quotation; significantly, she 
is discussing these historical moments as being part of her own memories as if she had, in fact, 
been there to experience these moments herself. The trauma of the early Mennonites, she tells us 
here, is explicitly prosthetic. Brandt echoes this point later in the book when she writes that “We 
remember that fact with vividness, do we not, how we were persecuted in large numbers in 
northern Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, tortured and burned at the stake, and 
drowned in rivers, and hounded out of our mother countries for precisely these reasons” (83). 
Crucially here, Brandt tells us that, for her, the traumatic events of Mennonite persecution are 
experienced as vivid memories. 
Brandt, though, posits an alternative to Landsberg’s notion of memories as transmitted 
through modern technologies. In Brandt’s own article, “The Uses of Poetry,” she states that “Our 
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bodies carry the truth about our experience, and wish it to be spoken, even if we don’t want to 
listen. … [Experiences] stay in the air, as old grievances, for other people to take up, be haunted 
by, chased, insistent in the atmosphere until they find voice in human consciousness and 
expression” (46). It is difficult to say exactly from where or from whom these memories are 
transmitted in order to explain, as Brandt does, that “the violence of the persecutions got 
internalized in our psyches” (So this 3). The answer may be difficult to pinpoint for Brandt too as 
she suggests that traumatic experiences are, in many ways, linked to the natural world when she 
notes that past experiences may be left “in the air.” This is a point that Brandt raises again in So 
this is the world when she senses unwritten Métis history and memories “lingering in weeds, in 
grassy ditches, on the edges of fields” (3) in the Prairie land that many Canadian Mennonites 
came to occupy. 
 For Brandt, then, memories are transportable in ways that are unaccounted for even in the 
dominant theories of trans- and intergenerational memory. Yet Brandt’s discussion of memory is 
not entirely unique. Intriguingly, other Mennonite writers (as I will note with Rudy Wiebe 
below) and scholars have come to make similar points about the transmission of memory. In 
Surplus at the Border, for example, scholar Douglas Reimer suggests that Mennonite poet 
Patrick Friesen’s discussion of European oppression in the 1600s leads “to the understanding that 
the soil of the earth – even soil of the Canadian prairies – holds a secret knowledge of all 
suffering and strength” (61). Brandt suggests very much the same in So this is the world. Despite 
the fact that there is little empirical reason for Brandt to have access to these memories that she 
did not directly experience, she is nevertheless “haunted” and “chased” by them.  
The memories are so personal and deeply felt that she locates this trauma within her own 
body. As is the case in her poetry, Brandt uses the body as a site of frequently unspoken 
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historical trauma in order to address the legacy of violence against Mennonites as a whole. She 
refers, for example, to the,  
historic era [that] was passed on in our collective memory in stories of the clever 
but tragic figures who, alone and in groups, tried to evade the judgment of the 
sixteenth century Spanish Catholic Inquisitors and local state officials, as 
members of the grassroots Anabaptist religious political movement that was 
wildly popular throughout Europe. Many of these heroes ended up as martyrs, 
drowned in rivers or burned at the stake in hundreds of town squares across the 
continent. I am trying, in this account to stay close to the embodied, living, oral 
version of this heritage. (107). 
Again, here, Brandt refers to the memories of these historic events as both “embodied” and 
“living.” Furthermore, she suggests that these stories have stayed alive and, presumably, 
continue to reside in present bodies, because of the oral transmission of these stories. This is a 
tradition that Brandt herself suggests she is attempting to continue with her own testimony of 
these events. 
In many ways, then, Brandt positions herself as belonging to what literary critic Grace 
Kehler calls a “community of interpreters who shared [the] perspectives” of “the martyrs” and 
felt an “imperative to speak against injustice and exclusionary tactics” carried out by “the 
Catholic community” (172). Kehler observes that these interpreters who existed at “the origins of 
Anabaptist-Mennonite history” revealed “a longing to connect with community” (172). It is 
significant that Brandt should herself be connecting with this historical community by giving 
testimony to injustices that occurred hundreds of years ago. Furthermore, by locating trauma in 
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the body, Brandt suggests that this violence is inextricably linked to everyday traumatic 
experiences in the present.  
 Indeed, Brandt herself is concerned in this book with how the trauma faced by the 
Mennonites during the early modern period has come to repeat itself throughout the centuries. 
She laments how “we began inflicting [violence] on each other” (3) once the historical violence 
done to Mennonites had become internalized. Indeed, Brandt herself perceived a condemnation 
as a result of revealing too much in her poetry about the patriarchal authority and violence 
embedded within her own community. As Natasha G. Wiebe has written, “Brandt stems from a 
separatist, patriarchal religious community and says she was exiled from her home community 
because of her poetry” (“Di Brandt’s Writing” 481). Throughout So this is the world, Brandt 
offers us some glimpses of this condemnation. She notes how she has experienced “so much 
criticism from my family and the Mennonite community for abandoning the culture” (73).  
 Brandt constructs herself as something of a nonconformist in the book, referring several 
times to her own “independence of spirit” (209). Yet while this position initially appears to set 
Brandt at odds with her Mennonite community, Brandt nevertheless understands her own 
particular identity as being related to and deeply connected with others, namely her ancestral 
forebears. She points out the similarity between the nonconformist nature of her own character 
and the nonconforming Anabaptists and early Mennonites. She observes:  
I arrived in urban Canada in the heyday of the ’60s counter culture, and leaped 
enthusiastically from the Middle Ages into the psychedelic world of peace 
marches and sit-ins and folk festivals and experimental European films and hippie 
communes and free love, all of which suited my lurking anarchist rebel genes just 
fine. I am after all a descendent of Anabaptists, who were reviled and hunted all 
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over Europe in the sixteenth century for their sectarian exuberantly utopian views. 
(209) 
Brandt’s self-representation is certainly in line with the historical understanding of particular 
Mennonite communities. James M. Stayer has pointed out the communitarian nature of early 
Anabaptist societies who promoted the “ideal of Christian community of goods” (14). Royden 
Loewen meanwhile has discussed Mennonite “efforts to build cohesive, agrarian, pacifist 
communities, and their many migrations to secure these aims” (334). More than just their 
religious practices, then, certain Mennonite cultural practices would have also put them at odds 
with the increasingly more industrialized and capitalist Europe.  
 Of course, these descriptions do not explain the behaviour and ideology of all 
Mennonites. Brandt herself notes how she is “offering a slightly different genealogy of our 
Mennonite cultural affiliations than the one typically written about by Mennonite historians” 
(82). Brandt suggests that there were many Mennonites who historically “had become 
enthusiastic industrialists” (82). Certainly, the fact that Brandt should choose to concentrate 
specifically on the Mennonites who defied the major industrial developments speaks to her own 
particular interests. By focusing on the “sectarian” and “exuberantly utopian views” of the 
sixteenth century Anabaptists, Brandt is surely revealing as much about herself as she is about 
Mennonites in history. That being said, what interests me here is not so much that Brandt is 
being self-revealing but that by drawing connections between herself and a particular aspect of a 
historical group, she is able to both write autobiographically and focus on this group of historical 
others. 
Brandt’s own experience of rebellion is not entirely different from what she sees as her 
ancestors’ experiences in that she describes both as rejecting conformist, and commerce-driven 
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attitudes in favour of a more communal lifestyle, allowing for deeper human relationships based 
on mutual recognition rather than competition. When Brandt herself begins to list the 
characteristics of her ancestors, she notes their distrust of authority, pacifism, and civil 
disobedience, as well as their “delight in physicality, sexuality, practicality and dirt; emotional 
and artistic expressiveness in music and poetic language; and a deep belief in the spiritual 
economy of ‘love’” (80). Brandt here could very well be describing herself, particularly given 
her penchant for peace, free love, and communes, as mentioned above. Importantly, though, in 
this instance, her focus is not on herself but on the historical community. 
In my third chapter, I discuss how Brandt constructs an identity for herself that is in 
relation to agrarian, pro-environmental, and anti-capitalist communities that extend beyond mere 
cultural affiliation. I will not, then, dwell on the subject here except to say that Brandt relates her 
own anxieties regarding contemporary capitalism and its effects on both the environment and 
communities to an earlier, ancestral Anabaptist community. She notes, for example, her own 
personal fear that “we’re not doing enough to stop the ‘mad drive toward death’ inherent in the 
push toward ever greater, faster technologization and violent colonization of what few 
independent local cultures and economies still exist on this planet, that even though we are 
concerned about the future now, we don’t seem to know how to turn this dynamic around” (106). 
Her opposition to modern “technologization and violent colonization” as well as contemporary 
capitalism in general is rooted, she tells us, in her ancestral past.  
After briefly discussing her own worries about the destruction of communal and agrarian 
traditions she discusses her ancestral forebears and how their similar resistance to the projects of 
modernity placed them in contradiction to “the sixteenth century Spanish Catholic Inquisitors 
and local state officials” (107). She writes: 
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Our ancestral ways included various folk customs to celebrate and sustain the 
intergenerationally woman-centered extended family, village committees to look 
after the sick and the poor, and gender-equitable inheritance, land acquisition and 
farming practices. We specifically did not believe in huge idealistic ahistorical 
leaps from one landscape and cultural history to another. Neither did we believe 
in expansionist enterprise. (109-10) 
Again, here, Brandt inserts herself into this history by referring specifically to “Our ancestral 
ways.” While Brandt’s focus in this passage is to emphasize the crucial role of women in early 
Anabaptist societies, she nevertheless also stresses how these communities largely opposed the 
“expansionist enterprise” of modernism and, instead, had a more traditional (as well as 
communal) approach to both social welfare and farming practices. Brandt suggests here, then, 
that she is much like her ancestral forebears (in fact, she belongs to them and is part of them) in 
that both oppose the same central ruling economic structure in favour of a more equitable and 
traditional system.  
In So this is the world & here I am in it, Brandt constructs for herself an identity that is in 
affiliation with historical others. However, the life writing sections of the book are by no means 
exclusively about historical Mennonite communities and Brandt certainly does not spend the 
majority of her focus on the subject as Braun does. As subsequent chapters will suggest, Brandt 
sees herself in relation to several cultural and social groups. What Brandt does do in her book, 
though, is suggest that she is so connected to this historical community of Mennonites that their 
lived experiences become her own lived experiences as well. Both the early Anabaptist and 
Mennonite ideals as well as their subsequent traumatic experiences have been passed on in such 
a fashion that Brandt connects with them in a deeply personal way.  
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Brandt affirms several key points raised by Hirsch and Landsberg but she also transforms 
them to suggest that the body can be site of transmitted historical trauma. What is important, 
though, is that while Brandt does suggest her own place in this history as well as her connection 
to it, she spends a great deal of focus on others rather than her own self. Her ongoing attention 
and repeated references to early Anabaptist communities throughout the book stress the 
importance of giving testimony to a trauma that occurred hundreds of years before Brandt was 
born. Drawing a connection to this group ultimately allows Brandt to devote space to others 
within a form that is still ostensibly self life writing.  
 Like both Braun and Brandt, Rudy Wiebe in his memoir Of This Earth suggests an 
unequivocal connection to a history that he himself did not personally experience. Wiebe draws 
connections between himself and early Mennonite origins and he is also affected by war stories 
that he hears about Mennonites fighting in World War II. Like Braun, Wiebe’s own sense of self 
appears also to develop from traumatic events as he is certainly affected not only by the stories 
of violence that he hears about the Mennonite past in Russia, from which his parents left in 1929 
before Wiebe was born, but also by stories of historical events as they are unfolding. 
Furthermore, Wiebe demonstrates his connection to historical Mennonite mythology that, for 
him, remained largely unknown during the childhood years that he writes about in this book. 
 Near the end of Of This Earth, Rudy Wiebe writes about his travels throughout Europe. 
While there, he experiences the re-awakening of what have been, for him, dormant prosthetic 
memories. He writes:  
I have felt remembrance beyond words when I returned to the boreal place where 
my sister is buried, where my mother conceived and bore and fed me. But such 
remembrance also happened when, after six decades of life, I walked in places 
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where I had never before physically been: in Russia, the former Mennonite village 
once called Number Eight Romanovka, north of the city of Orenburg, driving up 
the great steppe hills that stretch into horizons, the village cemetery where my 
parents met beside my grandmother’s grave and where gravestones overgrown by 
grass and lilac bushes still say ‘Wiebe’ in both German and Russian; … and in the 
town of Harlingen on the North Sea coast of the Netherlands where my blood 
forebears were forced to begin their wandering … (367-68) 
Wiebe, here, like Braun and Brandt, establishes his deep connection to the land of his forebears 
despite the fact that, by his own admission, he “had never before physically been” there.  Wiebe 
conveys that it is precisely memory that allows him to forge this link despite the fact that his 
memories are of events that he did not directly experience. Nevertheless, by beginning this 
discussion with references to events he lived through, such as the death of his sister, which act as 
a point of comparison to other events such as the meeting of his parents, Wiebe highlights the 
very real and material connection he has to these places and events. 
 Like Brandt, Wiebe goes on to suggest that memories can be passed down and registered 
in the body many generations later. He notes that “It may be that our bodies, despite our minds, 
retain what we have neglected to notice; or even undermine our ability to forget what we long 
not to know about ourselves. … Even when all facts seem lost, the bodily effects remain” (369). 
Importantly, just as Brandt suggests that memories can be located “lingering in weeds,” Wiebe 
similarly becomes aware that prosthetic memories can be awakened when he connects with a 
particular location. As Hirsch and Miller put it, “Perhaps places do not actually themselves carry 
memory, but memory can be activated by the encounter between the visitor and the place” (17). 
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Certainly for Wiebe in the above quotation, the body registers ancient memories that he could 
only fully become aware of when visiting the homeland of his parents “after six decades of life.” 
Perhaps more than Brandt, Wiebe is able to directly pinpoint the source of these received 
memories, though in many ways his explanation is similarly nebulous. On the one hand, Wiebe’s 
affiliation with a historical community is a consequence of generational transmission. In Of This 
Earth, Wiebe frequently discusses how the values, beliefs, customs, and traditions of a widely 
dispersed culture have maintained themselves despite centuries of exile and wandering. The 
book begins with a scene of the Wiebe family travelling on a horse-drawn bobsled through the 
boreal forest. Wiebe describes himself as a child listening to his family singing a song that is 
rooted in cultural tradition: “They are singing. My father’s favourite hymn, which they have 
carried with them from their Mennonite villages on the steppes of Ukraine and Russia to sing in 
Saskatchewan’s boreal forest” (2). This moment is significant because it conveys the notion of 
“carrying” that runs throughout the book where cultural traditions and stories from a distant 
elsewhere in the past are carried into the present and taken up by the next generations.  
Wiebe tells us repeatedly that the past survives and is transmitted from one generation to 
the next. Critics have previously noted how, for Wiebe, the past plays a crucial role in the present 
as well as in informing one’s own sense of self. In his analysis of Wiebe’s book Sweeter Than 
All the World, Maurice Mierau writes: “Look at this, says Rudy Wiebe, look how we are rooted 
in our past, rooting in it like pigs in shit, how we never get away from it, how it holds us and 
traps us appearing on every channel” (79-80). Similarly, according to Heinz Antor, Wiebe tells 
us that “It is important to have a history in order to know who one is and to be able to place 
oneself in the world, to feel at home in it” (130). As critics have noted, then, it is a significant 
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element in Wiebe’s work that the past, including past traditions, is not only inescapable but it 
also plays a vital role in one’s own sense of identity.  
In Of This Earth, Wiebe demonstrates how it is the traditions and the past of others that 
help inform one’s sense self. Wiebe writes, for example, that “Before I was born my mother’s 
blood and breath formed me to know that God is everywhere” (122). Not only are beliefs 
imparted to the next generation but so too is a firm sense of place and history which come by 
way of stories. He notes that “For Russian Mennonites who don’t drink or dance, storytelling is 
the heart’s core of visiting and my generation, the first born in Canada, was imprinted with story 
in our mothers’ wombs” (218)12. He goes on to note that the stories that this older generation 
tells are frequently of “the magnificent Ukrainian and Russian steppes” (218). Wiebe points out 
here the significance of storytelling in the intergenerational transmission of history. The stories 
that Wiebe hears as a child are particularly important in this case because, for someone born in 
Canada, the stories of the Ukrainian and Russian steppes give one a firm sense of a time and 
place that are irrevocably gone. As Wiebe himself notes, “I sat on the floor in the heater corner 
or under the kitchen table and listened to this, a world I did not know and would never see” 
(219). Wiebe, here, calls attention to how diasporic conditions can work to develop postmemory.  
In Family Frames, Marianne Hirsch notes how “The children of exiled survivors, 
although they have not themselves lived through the trauma of banishment and forcible 
separation from home and the destruction of that home, remain marked by their parents’ 
experiences: always marginal or exiled, always in the diaspora. ‘Home’ is always elsewhere” 
(243). Hirsch is talking strictly about the Jewish diaspora and the “sudden violent annihilation of 
the Holocaust” (242) here but a good deal of what she says applies to a Mennonite community 
who were persecuted and violently driven from their homes on multiple occasions throughout 
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history. As Heinz Antor puts it, “Mennonites, we are told, have no home on this earth. If 
anything, they can only have a transient sense of home on a cultural level” (134).  
Hirsch notes that “This condition of exile from the space of identity, this diasporic 
experience, is a characteristic aspect of postmemory” (Family 243). For Hirsch, children of 
exiled parents suffer because of their inability to ever experience firsthand a world that plays 
such an indelible role in their own identity. Wiebe himself confronts this when he experiences 
memories of a world he “would never see.” He reinforces this point more succinctly later in the 
book when he suggests that “when you have lost the place on earth where you come from, when 
your ancestral name has been ground out of existence, you suffer damage” (369). Wiebe 
frequently paints a picture throughout his memoir of a culture (and a self) that has been 
undeniably damaged by a long history of exile which led ultimately to the diaspora of 
Mennonites throughout the world. 
Returning to the land of origin, despite the fact that (because it was violently destroyed), 
it can never fully be the same land that the parents or their ancestors knew, can have a significant 
effect, as this place functions so crucially in one’s sense of self. As Daniel Mendelsohn has said,  
when you grow up in an immigrant family, you’re always hearing about the 
country of origin. So it does feel like going back. … Certainly if you’re a certain 
generation of American Jew, people always talk about ‘going back,’ even though 
it’s not a place you’ve been – it’s a locution that, if anything, goes to the heart of 
the strong sentimental role that the country of origin plays in the lives of even 
distant descendants of immigrants. (Hartman et al. 112) 
Wiebe’s return to Russia at the end of Of This Earth, where he in fact does go back to a place 
that he has never been, speaks to Mendelsohn’s point. Wiebe’s memories of former Mennonite 
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villages that he experiences upon visiting Russia are a result of postmemory and a consequence 
of his being “imprinted with story” in his childhood. 
Much like his mother’s recipe for “baked golden Tweeback, our ancestral double-decker 
buns” that was “carried for centuries across three continents” (174), the historical past and the 
memories from it can be brought forward into present lives. This is particularly true of what 
Wiebe calls “Sad family stories that fade but never vanish, hard edges that remain irrefutable as 
fossils” (75). Wiebe’s use of the term “fossils” is noteworthy since fossils in many ways 
symbolize the enduring survival of that which existed potentially centuries earlier. Furthermore, 
fossils serve to remind us of our own connection to the past. Wiebe’s discussion of sad stories 
brings us back, too, to a discussion of trauma. The book conveys Wiebe’s connection to a 
traumatic past that is transmitted via stories.  
He recounts moments in his past where he would overhear the conversations of recent 
immigrants from Russia now living in his community of Speedwell. They describe for him in 
fairly gruesome detail the horrors of Soviet Russia. He writes: 
Speedwellers had lived in Russian Mennonite colonies thousands of kilometres 
apart; they had escaped to Canada in many different ways between 1923 and 
1930, but they all had stories to tell that were stunning in their own way: of 
starvation, cholera, murderous bandit raids, beatings, fire and theft, vicious Red 
and White Army battles of advance and retreat and again advance; of torture, sons 
forced at gunpoint to torture their fathers, the slaughter in villages of every male 
over fifteen with not a shot fired … (220) 
Wiebe is haunted throughout his childhood by these stories of violence. He details how his youth 
and lack of knowledge served to give him a confusing though nightmarish understanding of 
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World War II as events were unfolding overseas. He notes that he was “The youngest in the 
family” and “had to learn everything from everybody” (186).  
The information he does get, though, does not fully register and this appears to increase 
the terror. When he hears about “groups of men attacking, killing other men” he admits that he 
“could only think of the Martens dogs and Carlo, naked teeth…I could not imagine it. Don’t try, 
my mother said, don’t think about it. That was, of course, impossible. The war stared at us every 
minute we were in school” (178-79). The horrors of WWII are both incomprehensible and 
impossible for him to avoid, particularly when he was faced at school with flags, world maps, 
and pictures of world leaders which serve, for Wiebe, as reminders of a war that saw the threats 
of global domination as a consequence of rampant nationalism. At times, Wiebe departs from the 
narrative in order to relay facts about historical events that he did not experience nor was fully 
aware of at the time:  
I am certain Miss Anne Klassen, who arrived to teach us in January 1944, could 
not have told us anything about Canada’s RCAF Bomber Group which was 
sending great fleets of four-engined Stirling and Lancaster and Halifax bombers 
across the English Channel every evening in massive night bombing of German-
cities. … no civilian could then know that more than 10,000 Canadians would die 
in those raids – pilots, navigators, bombardiers, tail gunners … no one would ever 
know the number of children – say those my age at the time, eight or nine or ten – 
who were killed by burning or explosion or flood or crushing when those fleets of 
relentless planes dropped their ‘eggs’ on a terrified city; to say nothing of 
knowing their names. (208) 
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Much like Connie Braun, who writes the narrative of her parents in order to make sense of 
history’s chaos, Wiebe devotes space to historical events that he could not know in any clear way 
at the time that they were happening. Also like Braun, Wiebe finds it crucial to report on such 
incidences because elements of the story, like the children’s names, continue to exist as historical 
gaps. 
Furthermore, as Wiebe notes, both he and other Mennonite families in Canada had a 
personal connection to the war, even if they were not directly involved in it, as Germany began 
attacking Russia. He recalls how “everyone worried about all those relatives we all still had in 
Russia, whom everyone had prayed for for years” (182). Once again, Wiebe notes how he 
eventually took on the traumatic memories of others through their stories. Despite being far away 
from “that Land of Terror,” those who were lucky to emigrate earlier nevertheless “would 
eventually hear about those events; decades later, personally from the few aunts and uncles and 
cousins and friends who had endured it all and yet survived, somehow. Though often with their 
bodies, and minds, torn beyond fathoming” (182). What we see repeatedly then is the 
transmission of traumatic suffering to an other – in this case, Wiebe himself - so that these stories 
can in some way survive and can continue to be passed down. And because, for Wiebe, stories 
can be imprinted “in our mothers’ wombs,” there is a sense here that the stories of others become 
an intrinsic part of one’s own identity to the extent that the stories of “them” are also the story of 
“I”; hence the frequent turn in Wiebe’s memoir to stories that preceded his own existence.  
What is, perhaps, even more affecting are the stories that Wiebe does not hear. He 
frequently portrays a home where members of his family – particularly, his parents – are quite 
visibly suffering from the ongoing terror of the Soviet Union. Occasionally, though rarely, 
Wiebe brings up the subject of his mother’s brother Johann, “whom Stalin’s police have 
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disappeared” (43). He relays how he would see his mother praying for him “in High German, 
and weeping” (43). Wiebe himself notes that, at the time, he knew very little of the story of this 
uncle as well as another uncle, Heinrich, who, in fact, fought as a Red Army soldier. 
Nevertheless, Wiebe, as a child, bears witness to his mother’s own silent suffering on multiple 
occasions (43, 220).  
 Here and elsewhere, Wiebe illustrates what were at one point the gaps in his own 
knowledge about his own historical past. Like Braun, Wiebe as a child is prevented from hearing 
particular aspects of a horrifying Mennonite history. Overhearing stories from friends in his 
Speedwell community about life under Stalinism, he observes that “No one ever said the word 
‘rape.’ I knew the word jewaultijch, which meant God, All-powerful and Great and Capable of 
Anything, but never did I hear the word vejewaultje – to be overpowered, or forced, as in 
sexually violated. No Mennonite child in Canada needed to hear that such a word existed, oh 
God have mercy” (219-20). Elsewhere, he reveals that his own father largely ignored “the 
inexplicable brutalities of his past” (238). While Wiebe never heard these particular stories as a 
child, his recollections reveal that he was innately aware of the silencing that was taking place 
and that there were unspoken words and stories out of his reach.  
Scholars on trauma theory have suggested that this very lack of knowledge can lead to 
intergenerational trauma and, therefore, unintended connections between parent and child. Anne 
Whitehead has noted how “symptoms are transmitted from one generation to the next when a 
shameful and therefore unspeakable experience is barred from consciousness or kept secret. The 
trauma is communicated without ever having been spoken, and resides within the next generation 
as a silent presence or ‘phantom’” (14). A reading of Of This Earth does not suggest that Wiebe 
considers himself in any way to be a victim of traumatic experiences, though he does suggest 
91 
 
that the historical suffering of the Mennonites has been passed down to him when he notes that, 
“for me, nothing could be more serious than life itself” (238) and suggests that this seriousness is 
a consequence of his community’s earlier confrontation with violence. He observes that “Life is 
serious, especially for Mennonites having fled a world destroyed by Communism; God’s divine 
revelation only underscores the heavy, mostly murderous history of mankind” (237). The 
environment in which Wiebe was raised, which, he notes, included a great deal of “happiness 
and laughter and good work and play” (238), nevertheless also instilled within him a particularly 
dark understanding of the world that is rooted in suffering. Furthermore, Wiebe’s own 
acknowledgement of missing information throughout the book and his desire to retrace 
Mennonite history as Braun does in her book, suggests a need borne out of personal attachment 
to give some testimony to what he calls the “massive burden of stories” that “neither my parents 
nor my community” could share (229). 
Wiebe also laments the lack of knowledge within his own community of his own 
particular ancestral Mennonite roots dating back to the 17
th
 century. He writes:  
Certainly no one in Speedwell could have told me of a genius named Wybe 
Adams, or Adam Wiebe, the Frisian ancestor of all Russian Mennonite Wiebes, 
who in 1616 sailed from Harlingen on invitation by the Free City of Danzig to 
become its water engineer, and who protected Danzig from the ravages of the 
Thirty Years War, … by building a high, thick wall of earth around the entire city 
which was impenetrable by cannon balls. (229)  
Yet while Wiebe notes that such historical information was lacking in these formative years, he 
nevertheless appears to feel connected to these events and to Adam Wiebe. Surely, in claiming 
that this man was “the Frisian ancestor of all Russian Mennonite Wiebes,” Wiebe is calling 
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attention to his own familial connection to this historical figure. Wiebe, though, forges an even 
more direct link with his ancestor near the end of the book, upon visiting Wybe Adams’s 
hometown, Harlingen. He writes: 
And then, when I step back out onto narrow Noorder Haven Street in Harlingen, I 
have a sudden overwhelming sense that this water glittering in this canal passing 
this hotel door and being pumped up into the North Sea, is, molecule for 
molecule, cycle for cycle, the very water my ancestor Wybe Adams van 
Harlingen last saw here in the town of his birth, when he sailed away to Danzig in 
1616. (368-69) 
This moment, where, for Wiebe, the natural world allows for a connection to a seemingly though 
not quite vanished past, brings us back to Brandt.  
Like Brandt, Wiebe appears to be suggesting that a connection to the natural world can 
put us in touch with our past and allow us to understand identity as the condition of being 
affiliated with historical others. He reinforces this point earlier in the book when he observes that 
“my bare feet on bare earth made me feel as if I knew, that my body already remembered what 
happened everywhere on the globe” (227). For Wiebe, it is nature that allows one to re-connect 
with history and remember past events in a deeply felt, personal way. This is not entirely 
unprecedented in Wiebe’s writing. In Janne Korkka’s reading of Wiebe’s book Playing Dead, he 
observes how Wiebe’s portrayal of the relationship between man and the Arctic incites “the 
erasure of any boundary between a geographic, historical space and an interior, narrative space” 
(104). Korkka argues that in that book what connects the interior space to the historical is an 
understanding that both will always “remain unknowable” (104). In Of This Earth, Wiebe 
suggests the opposite – that history is knowable through a personal connection to the land. This 
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is crucial given what Hirsch refers to as the “the need” amongst those whose diasporic 
experiences result in post memory, “not just to feel and to know, but also to re-member, to re-
build, to re-incarnate, to replace, and to repair” (Family 243). In Of This Earth, Wiebe is able to 
remember and, in some sense, recreate the history that informed his own identity via transmitted 
stories. 
Rudy Wiebe suggests that we do not take on the memories of others only through 
storytelling. In fact, while both Wiebe and Brandt reinforce Hirsch’s and Landsberg’s points 
regarding trans- and intergenerational prosthetic memories, they modify their arguments 
significantly. Wiebe and Brandt’s work, together, challenges traditional ways of understanding 
the process of memory-making in order to suggest what is, possibly, a more spiritual form of 
prosthetic memory. For Hirsch, postmemory occurs when a victim of trauma transmits his or her 
experiences directly to his or her children. For her, the transmission of memories does not seem 
to extend beyond this “generation after.” For Landsberg, prosthetic memories are typically 
formed when one experiences the past when it is presented through a medium of 20
th
-century 
technology like film. Brandt and Wiebe, though, appear to be suggesting that the natural world is 
a source for accessing the memories of historical others. Ultimately, Wiebe’s affiliation with 
these historical others is revealed in the book through the interweaving of his own narrative with 
the narratives of family and historical figures.  
 In You Never Gave Me a Name, Katie Funk Wiebe also establishes an identity affiliated 
with historical others. By considering family as a link to a genealogical history, Funk Wiebe 
places the autobiographical-I in this book in a constant fluid relationship with others located in 
an ancestral past. This allows Funk Wiebe to consider her narrative, which includes information 
on a familial history that she herself did not experience directly, as autobiographical. Critic Doug 
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Heidebrecht has previously made a case regarding Funk Wiebe’s relational status in her book. 
He notes “Katie’s autobiography self consciously seeks to establish her identity, which finds 
expression not only within her personal story but also within the journey of the Mennonite 
Brethren” (119). Heidebrect concludes that the book illustrates “the interwoven nature of 
personal and communal narratives” (125). Yet while Heidebrect notes the parallels that Funk 
Wiebe draws between herself and “the journey of the Mennonite Brethren,” he does not fully 
address specifically how Funk Wiebe aligns herself with historical figures in her book. 
You Never Gave Me a Name is far more traditionally autobiographical than Connie 
Braun’s book in that a good deal of attention focuses on Funk Wiebe’s own struggle to gain 
recognition as a writer, and to clear a path for a stronger female voice both within the academic 
institution in which she worked as well as in the Mennonite Brethren church. Despite the fact 
that a significant portion of the book focuses on these particular struggles, Funk Wiebe 
nevertheless highlights the significance of the historical past in her self-formation. Indeed, Funk 
Wiebe frequently reveals how her own narrative always contains traces of the past and suggests 
that historical others inform her sense of self.  
At the beginning of the book, Funk Wiebe has an imaginary conversation with her father 
wherein she complains to him that he saddled her unfairly with a Mennonite faith and heritage in 
which she finds “nothing but narrow authoritarianism and ecclesiastical pomposity” (13). She 
suggests that she was doomed from the beginning because she was given a traditional Mennonite 
name. Her imaginary father retorts:  
“I did give you a name, Katie, child of the prairies, child of the Russian steppes, 
child of many wanderings. But your name, being the gift of others, must be made 
your own. You didn’t select your parents, your nationality, or your name, but you 
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have to choose what you make of these experiences of your parents and of their 
parents and of all those who searched for freedom of faith. Sometimes that search 
ended in failure for them. Sometimes it succeeded. It was a triumph of the spirit 
when those people accepted the gift of their heritage – the weaknesses, faults, 
mistakes, and the strengths, conquests, and joys – and gleaned from them what 
was needed to move ahead with courage.” (14) 
This passage reinforces Funk Wiebe’s understanding of her own identity as being tied to 
historical others. Here, she is not only a “child of the prairies” but she is also, at the same time, a 
“child of the Russian steppes” (a place that she, in fact, never directly experienced as a child) as 
well as a “child of many wanderings.”  
Funk Wiebe emphasizes these historical affiliations elsewhere in the book. She suggests 
that it is specifically through knowledge of the past, which for her frequently means an ancestral 
past that she did not directly experience, that one comes to have self-knowledge. She writes that 
“The story of my family started for me when, during the 1920s and 1930s, letters from Russia 
where Mother’s parents and many siblings still lived arrived at my childhood home in Blaine 
Lake, Saskatchewan. These letters spoke of intense hardship, cold, and hunger” (248). 
Importantly, here, for Funk Wiebe, the story of her family starts only when she begins to 
understand her connection to a larger collective family unit.  
These letters re-establish a bond and an ancestral heritage broken by migration and exile. 
They are, in a sense, a gateway that allows Funk Wiebe to understand her own relation to another 
time and place. As she goes on to note, “These letters and other information passed on to me 
over the decades taught me about lineage” (248). For her, self-understanding comes by way of 
having a firm understanding of one’s roots. She argues that “A family does not begin with a 
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marriage certificate, range, refrigerator, and a mattress on a bed or the floor. Family begins with 
parents and grandparents and great-grandparents, and with the preceding generations and what 
happened to them and what they did to life. Each leaves a legacy of some kind” (252-53).  
Funk Wiebe’s use of the term “legacy” is revealing here, because it betrays her own 
belief that the present is always bound up with traces of the past. Consequently, in several 
instances, Funk Wiebe focuses specifically on the past. She writes, 
Grandfather and Grandmother Johann Funk and their seven children lived on the 
hill at the edge of the village of Rosental near the windmill. Before that there was 
another windmill in Osterwick. Before that a family on a horse-drawn wagon with 
many other wagons rumbled down the rutty road from Prussia to the Ukraine[.] 
And before that? Always movement and wandering in search of a better 
livelihood, greater freedom of religion, and opportunity to better the family. (253) 
Here Funk Wiebe illustrates the connections between past and present. She works her way back 
through time, suggesting a historical lineage or link by pointing out how these generations are all 
joined together in the same narrative of “movement and wandering” – a narrative, as I will 
explain in chapter three, that Funk Wiebe sees herself as belonging to as well. At work in this 
text, then, is not just Funk Wiebe’s own individual identity. Rather, what we discover is that 
Funk Wiebe considers her own self in relation to a collective and fluid, ancestral history. She 
notes that “I tell my children and grandchildren we are part of a deeply flowing river with one 
generation moving on the scene to be replaced by another” (253). The book – in particular Part 
IV – is Funk Wiebe’s attempt to highlight that particular understanding of her own selfhood. 
It is in this section where Funk Wiebe gives the most detail about ancestral others. She 
writes, for example, about both of her grandfathers who died before she was born, noting that “I 
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learned one had died of typhus caused by poor sanitation and lack of medical assistance after the 
Russian Revolution, the other of starvation and undiagnosed illness during Stalin’s rule” (248). 
Funk Wiebe relays how her desire to gain access to the past becomes an obsession. A good deal 
of the final third of the autobiography is a mixture of the family stories that Funk Wiebe 
collected over the years as well as her attempts to locate these stories. From an aunt visiting from 
Germany whom she had never met, Funk Wiebe receives stories “about war, illness, death, 
famine, exile, hard work, and separation from loved ones as well as stories of good times” (250). 
Yet, as she goes on to conclude, “even successfully putting together what seemed like disparate 
stories didn’t satisfy my hunger to know more about my family left behind in the steppes of the 
Ukraine” (251). As these quotations reveal, storytelling has its limitations for Funk Wiebe, even 
though for her the stories of historical others are an important source of self-understanding, as 
they are for Connie Braun and Rudy Wiebe.  
As is the case with Rudy Wiebe, though, it is a particular connection with a specific 
geographical landscape that awakens a sense of self rooted in history. For Katie Funk Wiebe, this 
comes during a trip to Ukraine and Siberia. She recounts: “To walk the streets of Rosental where 
my parents had once walked and to see the building where my sister Anne was born, the spot on 
the hill where the Funk windmill once stood, and the edge of the ravine where possibly my 
Grandfather Funk had eluded his political captors brought me into even closer touch with my 
past” (251). Funk Wiebe does not necessarily experience memories here in the same way that 
Rudy Wiebe and Di Brandt do in that she does not entirely appear to take on directly the memory 
of historical others, but importantly what she does do is refer to this history as “my past.”  
For Funk Wiebe, the personal stories of others are also her own stories. She reaffirms this 
point again later when she conveys one of the purposes behind the book, writing that “I give my 
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children our past in this autobiography” (255). By once again claiming co-ownership of 
historical events and by calling attention to her own intentions to convey these stories as 
autobiographical (though by my own definitions the book is more correctly a memoir as it is 
categorized in the front matter of the text), Funk Wiebe reaffirms the point that her sense of an 
affiliated identity allows her to take on the story of her ancestors as her own. This effectively 
allows Funk Wiebe to redirect attention toward the stories of others within an autobiographical 
text. 
She devotes a good amount of space, for example, to the story of her “Aunt Neta and her 
family” who, she notes,  
had been forced to work at hard labor in the lumbering or other heavy industry in 
another part of Siberia after World War II for 11 years. At the Treaty of Yalta and 
the division of Germany, all Russian-born German people caught in the Russian-
controlled zone were forcibly returned to the USSR. Thousands of these hapless 
people caught in the Russian net were loaded onto cattle cars and shipped off to 
live out their days in the harsh winters of Kazakhstan. My aunt and her four 
children survived the ordeal. Many didn’t. (253-54) 
This section of Funk Wiebe’s book, importantly, describes not just Funk Wiebe’s own distant 
relatives but also the “Thousand … hapless people” of German descent who continued to suffer 
under Soviet rule after World War II. Funk Wiebe’s perceived connection to this past and her 
understanding of her own identity as belonging to a “deeply flowing river” allow her to view her 
own actions in relation to the actions of historical others. Furthermore, she emphasizes the 
importance of conveying the historical narrative of Mennonite oppression by giving space to it in 
her memoir.  
99 
 
Funk Wiebe not only gives textual space to a historical group that suffered under 
Stalinism but she also writes about the early significant accomplishments of Mennonite women. 
A good deal of the book recounts Funk Wiebe’s work in breaking down barriers in order to 
encourage women (particularly Mennonite women) to pursue roles outside of the domestic 
sphere. She draws awareness to her own work as a writer and a teacher as an example for other 
women. She always calls for more openness and inclusivity within the Mennonite Brethren faith 
and encourages women to pursue a spiritual life which, in her time, she observes was a path 
largely closed off to women. Her position puts her rather dramatically at odds with the prevailing 
beliefs of her church: “How could any woman break the long line of women who remained true 
to traditional ways to serve God? How dare she?” (195-96). She concludes somewhat mournfully 
that the “Mennonite Brethren have usually dealt with the issue of women’s roles reluctantly, 
often with great pain and discomfort on the part of all concerned, because it is enmeshed in 
firmly entrenched cultural mores. We are not a church that has learned to deal gracefully with 
conflict” (196). Funk Wiebe’s opposition to these traditions could work to establish her as a 
fiercely independent individual. Much like Di Brandt, though, Funk Wiebe uses this opportunity 
to view her own actions as a rebel as being intimately bound to the historical actions of her 
ancestors. 
In one respect, Funk Wiebe parallels her own experiences living in a patriarchal culture 
with similar historical experiences of other Mennonite women. She observes that when she was 
going to college, a prevailing cultural assumption was that “Men were heads of family and of the 
church; women should know how to cook, take care of the children and husband, and, if needed, 
work in the local Sunday school” (32). If this is the kind of environment Funk Wiebe 
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encountered, it is noteworthy, then, that she should devote attention later in the book to 
Mennonite women who had historically been placed into a similar role. She writes, 
My mother told me that women in the Ukraine had dresses sewn before marriage 
to accommodate an expected pregnancy and breastfeeding. A man married wife 
after wife as each one died, often in childbirth complications. Some men sired 
from eight to eighteen children. Did anyone every [sic] murmur? I can only speak 
for the under-the-breath mutterings I hear even now when the number of children 
one woman bears seems too many. But women didn’t and couldn’t restrict the 
number of births if she was submissive. It was her role. (219) 
The obstacles that Funk Wiebe describes for herself are, by no means, the same as the ones that 
she describes for other Mennonite women in history. However, what is similar is that both Funk 
Wiebe and the women she described faced the obstacle of a society that largely placed women 
into the role of submissive caregiver.   
 Yet if Funk Wiebe aligns herself with historical Mennonite women in this respect, she 
also aligns herself with historical others by fighting against these obstacles. In her preface, she 
notes how “My ancestors had not been complacent, accepting blindly what others told them to 
believe about God, life, and themselves. They had chosen. Mother and Dad had chosen a new 
way of living in a new country. That was their gift to me. I too could choose” (14). We learn at 
this point, then, that Funk Wiebe’s own independent spirit, which guides her throughout her 
difficult life as a writer, a teacher, and a speaker on women’s rights in the church, is largely a 
consequence of what she sees as the Mennonite historical legacy of rebelliousness, and some 
Mennonite women’s refusal to accept the authority of others.  
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Funk Wiebe’s own rebelliousness against the authority of her Church, then, is rooted in a 
deeply felt connection to a cultural past and to historical others who likewise took part in 
rebelling against dominating religious belief systems. In fact, she later goes on to say that, “we 
Anabaptists” come “from a long line of protestors” who “started out being against something” 
(221). Furthermore, in considering her own actions as a feminist within the Mennonite Brethren 
church, she writes how she “had descended from a long procession of women who made 
tremendous contributions to their world which had never entered the memories of present church 
members” (207).  
Significantly, Funk Wiebe devotes space to discussing these accomplishments. She 
writes: 
In those early years in Russia, the women’s individual contributions were vast but 
unrecorded officially. They served to the limit of what was allowed them and 
some stretched the limits. They were advisers and secretaries to church-leader 
husbands. They offered hospitality for house churches and itinerant ministers and 
others, not a small matter in those days without household conveniences. They 
served as missionaries or supported missions and sewing circles; cared for the 
sick and hungry, especially during the revolutionary years; and looked after their 
own families but also other people’s children orphaned when parents were exiled 
or died of typhus and starvation. (206) 
Funk Wiebe, here, describes Mennonite women from an earlier era who largely pushed the 
boundaries of gender normative behaviour. As Funk Wiebe puts it, these were women who 
“stretched the limits” of “what was allowed them.”  
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Here Funk Wiebe draws our attention to how her sense of self is bound to a larger, 
collective historical group of others who rebelliously stepped outside of their culturally imposed 
role. Importantly, though, Funk Wiebe demonstrates what is, for her, the importance of these 
historical others by focusing on them in the way that she does. In quotations like these, Funk 
Wiebe does not talk about herself but instead focuses specifically on this historical group and she 
does so specifically because their story was “unrecorded officially.” Funk Wiebe can tell this 
particular story of these particular others within her memoir because of the link that she draws 
between herself and them. Katie Funk Wiebe’s book, then, illustrates the profound importance 
that history has in informing her sense of self, in that she devotes a good deal of space within her 
own book to uncovering the stories of historical others that have largely gone unwritten. 
The lives represented in these four books are remarkably different from each other and 
each author represents a different past in different ways, from the freer Anabaptist societies 
represented by Brandt to the Russian Mennonite victims of Stalinist aggression that we see in 
Braun’s book. These differences in many ways speak to the remarkable cultural diversity 
amongst self-identifying Mennonites. Nevertheless, one aspect that connects these authors to 
each other is that they all suggest having a deeply felt connection to past events and places that 
they did not directly experience. Hirsch’s notion of postmemory and Landsberg’s theories on 
prosthetic memories are helpful in explaining how the past can be transmitted to future 
generations. Indeed, these texts often convey how the legacy of trauma can be passed down to 
the extent that one connects intimately to the traumatic experiences of their forebears. 
Storytelling, too, in these books, has the kind of power to create memories. These books, though, 
go beyond Hirsch and Landsberg by considering how an intimate connection with particular 
places and landscapes allows one to gain access to the past.  
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Ultimately what we see in this chapter is that one of the ways these particular authors 
understand themselves is in relation to a collective, historical group. In positioning their own 
identity as being bound to historical others, these authors manage to write autobiographically 
whilst simultaneously focusing on others, sometimes temporarily, but sometimes for the majority 
of their own text. These books, I argue, reveal a gap in autobiographical theories on relational 
lives. For one, these theories, typically, do not take into account the impact of historical others or 
the role that history (particularly history from before the author was born) plays in the life of an 
autobiographical author. Furthermore, these theories rarely take into account texts that privilege 
the other in the way that these texts do. These books do not merely talk about the past in order to 
convey a fluid relationship with others, although they do that too. Importantly, though, these 
authors also talk about the past because they feel it is crucial to give that past a voice. I will next 
examine the role of the authors’ immediate families in these texts and how these books often 
privilege familial others over the self.  
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Chapter Two 
The Family Plot 
In Chapter One, I discussed four authors who construct their autobiographical selves in 
relation to a larger historical collective. Sometimes (though not always) this collective is familial 
in nature. Ultimately, though, I hope to have made the point that in those texts the authors that I 
examined frequently privilege the narrative of a historical, collective other. Connie Braun was 
not simply narrating the history of her relatives. Rather, from the beginning, Braun notes how the 
book is “a story about Mennonites” that “entails the history of a people” (The Steppes 2). Di 
Brandt, likewise, does not merely inherit the history of her ancestors, but she also carries in her 
body the traces of a historical collective of Mennonite women. In this chapter, I would like to 
examine more closely the relationships that the Canadian Mennonite authors I have chosen to 
foreground in this study establish with their immediate families. These texts frequently deviate 
from the classic autobiographical act of self-construction in order to focus attention on other 
family members.  
I will be looking at three books: Rudy Wiebe’s Of This Earth, Katie Funk Wiebe’s You 
Never Gave Me a Name, and Miriam Toews’s Swing Low. Each book uses autobiographical 
discourse yet, at the same time, privileges the narrative of family or particular family members 
over the narrative of the individual self. These authors frequently challenge the conventional way 
in which “family” is defined by autobiographical theorists, in particular theorists on filiation 
memoir. Rather than simply write memoirs about a father or a mother, these texts frequently 
focus on the whole family or reconceive of family to consider other models of kinship beyond 
the traditional familial structure. Perhaps more importantly, though, is that in privileging the 
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narrative of others, these texts challenge conventional ways of examining family memoirs as 
examples of relational identity. 
In Of This Earth, Rudy Wiebe gives as much attention to his family, especially his sister 
Helen, as he does to himself. In that case, Wiebe’s autobiographical self is largely connected to 
the relational others that informed his identity in his childhood and a great deal of his memoir 
focuses specifically on these others. In a more extreme example, Miriam Toews’s book Swing 
Low adopts autobiographical discourse in order to tell the life story of her father from his own 
perspective. I will look at both Toews’s and Wiebe’s books, along with Katie Funk Wiebe’s, in 
order to suggest that these texts not only convey the overall significance of the family in 
informing these authors’ own sense of self, but also to illustrate how the concept of the family is 
so overwhelming for these authors that the story of the personal frequently gives way to the story 
of the familial. 
In his book How Our Lives Become Stories, Paul John Eakin argues that “an important 
variety of relational autobiography” is “the family memoir, in which the lives of other family 
members are rendered as either equal in importance to or more important than the life of the 
reporting self” (85). Importantly, Eakin suggests the possibility that a relational autobiographical 
text, and particularly a familial narrative, could in fact privilege the story of others rather than the 
story of the “I” who records the events. It is these moments of privileging others that I am most 
interested in. These moments also make me consider why writers invoke autobiographical 
discourse in order to focus on the story of familial others. Eakin suggests his own particular 
reasons why the family memoir is of particular importance. He writes that texts that convey an 
identity in relation to familial others suggest that “the key environment in the individual’s 
formation is the family, which serves as the community’s primary conduit for the transmission of 
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its cultural values” (85). Eakin’s point resonates with several of the texts that I look at, which 
position the family, or at least certain family members, as instrumental in the construction of 
one’s selfhood.  
At the same time, though, these texts reveal what I consider to be the problematic 
conflation at the heart of Eakin’s claims regarding relational identities. As I mentioned in my 
introduction, Eakin’s conceptualization of relational identities is very much indebted to 
psychoanalyst Jessica Benjamin who, he notes, considers the “intersubjective dimension” (qtd. in 
Eakin 52) of identity formation. Indeed, a crucial aspect of Benjamin’s argument in her book The 
Bonds of Love (the same book Eakin relies on) is her claim “that the balance within the self 
depends upon mutual recognition between self and other” (53). It is this very notion of “mutual 
recognition” that runs through a good deal of Eakin’s own analysis13.  
Yet if mutuality plays such a significant role in the concept of relational identities, and if 
earlier theoretical work by scholars such as Susan Stanford Friedman support this, then I am left 
unsure of how autobiographical identities in texts that render family as “more important than the 
life of the reporting self” can be entirely conflated with autobiographical identities that treat the 
family as being equally important. It seems to me as if the latter is far more in keeping with 
relational lives as Eakin typically describes them even though he allows for the former in his 
discussion. What I want to suggest is that the texts that I look at allow us to recognize that there 
is a difference between these two types of identities in that they provoke different sorts of 
questions, such as what accounts for the privileging of family in these autobiographical texts. 
That the family figures so heavily in these texts is significant particularly when one takes 
into account Alison Landsberg’s claims regarding prosthetic memory that I discussed in the 
previous chapter. Landsberg asserts that since the 20
th
 century, traditional means of transmitting 
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memories have changed, not only because of the advent of “new technologies like the cinema” 
(2) but also, she claims, because immigration, exile, and subsequent diasporas have resulted in 
“ruptured generational ties, rendering the traditional modes for transmitting cultural, ethnic, and 
racial memory – both memories passed from parent to child and those disseminated through 
community life – increasingly inadequate” (2). These “ruptures” as Landsberg calls them led not 
only to people relying on film for memory, whereas before they could rely on family and 
community, but also to prosthetic memories, as the past could be transmitted to a larger group of 
people. The texts that I look at, though, do not necessarily suggest this. Landsberg is indeed 
helpful, as I discussed earlier, in showing how the past can be felt by those who did not directly 
experience events. Nevertheless, as I also discussed, these texts modify Landsberg’s point in that 
the authors do not necessary gain access to this past via 20
th
 century technology.  
In fact, while these texts affirm Landsberg’s points regarding the prosthetic nature of 
memory, they also in many ways challenge her observations regarding family, community, and 
technology, demonstrating less the rupture of generational ties than they do the ongoing strength 
of familial identities. Recent autobiography theory on exile narratives reinforces the point I am 
making here. Some critics have addressed the position of liminality and instability that 
accompanies states of diaspora. Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, for example, have characterized 
exile memoirs as “inscrib[ing] a nomadic subject, set in motion, for a variety of reasons and now 
inhabiting cultural borderlands, who may or may not return ‘home’ but who necessarily 
negotiates cultural spaces of the in-between” (269). The autobiographical subject in exile, for 
Smith and Watson, is one that inhabits an ever-conflicting and shifting space.  
At the same time, though, Marianne Hirsh and Nancy K. Miller have noted how “Memoir 
… has become an increasingly productive form for exploring the meaning of family, 
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generational identity, and ethnicity, as well as for researching a past marked by historical 
calamity – the losses caused by the vicissitudes of violence, war and genocide” (10). Hirsch and 
Miller conclude that certain memoirs of exile reaffirm “the power of the personal voice and of 
the family as vehicle in the transpersonal writing of historical return” (10). In Chapter One, I 
demonstrated how the family and connection to historical others functions as a way to investigate 
moments from the past before the ruptures of violence and war. These texts demonstrate the still 
very necessary role that family plays in the memoirs of writers who are descendants of exiled 
cultural groups. 
In this chapter, I investigate less about how the texts by Katie Funk Wiebe, Rudy Wiebe, 
and Miriam Toews highlight the importance of family as a vehicle for the historical return to a 
pre-exiled space. Instead, I look to these books as evidence that, while the family remains crucial 
for these writers in terms of forming an autobiographical identity, it is the family narrative itself 
(or the narrative of one close family member) that is frequently privileged over the personal 
narrative. Contrary to Landsberg’s argument, I see these texts as evidence that the family (rather 
than modern technology) is essential for these authors in identity formation, storytelling and 
memory making. Indeed, for many of the writers I look at, their early formative period of 
growing up in an isolated and separated community meant that the cinema was outside of their 
experience. Di Brandt recounts how she only encounters “experimental European films” (209) 
after her departure from her community. Similarly, Rudy Wiebe describes going to the cinema as 
a unique experience which could have only happened while his family was away from the 
Saskatchewan boreal forest, visiting family in Vancouver. He notes, “I had never seen a movie 
before, … I’d never heard the clicking flicker of a projector, seen the beam of light in a shuttered 
room and shadows twitch and tumble over a screen” (321). When he does see movies he notes 
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how he has “forgotten them” and suggests the reason why is because the stories of his going did 
not circulate within his family since his parents might have “forbidden” him from going had they 
known (322). This remark suggests that, for Wiebe at least, family plays a far more vital role in 
bolstering memories than the worldly films he watches. Here, and elsewhere, family ties still 
remain strong.  
Indeed this is not entirely surprising given the prominent role that family has played in 
some Mennonite societies. According to historian Marlene Epp, “the Mennonite family, either 
nuclear or extended, was a central institution for organizing community life and transmitting 
beliefs” (61). Epp goes on to note that “The Mennonite family functioned as an economic unit, a 
migration unit, and was the building block for village and settlement formation” (62). Significant 
here is Epp’s observation that family continued to play a crucial role for Mennonites even as they 
were being uprooted or uprooting themselves in order to begin new settlements elsewhere
14
. Epp 
suggests what Landsberg does not entirely account for in her book: that while “traditional 
modes” for transmitting memory (such as family and community) may very well have been put 
under pressure as a result of migration, they were not necessarily eliminated altogether. In the 
case of many Russian Mennonites who emigrated before the Iron Curtain slammed shut in 1929, 
these traditional modes were often refashioned in some form elsewhere.  
It may be useful to consider, in this context, the work of Maurice Halbwachs, who wrote 
in the early 20
th
 century and whom Landsberg herself largely dismisses in her text. Like 
Landsberg, Halbwachs, too, sees memory as being collective in nature. Halbwachs argues that 
“The individual calls recollections to mind by relying on the frameworks of social memory” 
(182). For Halbwachs, according to Patrick H. Hutton, “the images of memory are always 
fragmentary and provisional” (78). Individual memories only take shape and only begin to have 
110 
 
any real kind of meaning if they are embedded within a “framework of social memory” which 
produces a common collective memory that is consistently shaped by all the individuals who 
exist within the framework. Halbwachs suggests, then, that memories can only “hang together” 
when they are placed “within a totality of thoughts common to a group” (52). In other words, our 
memories simply disappear unless others remind us of the events that the group as a whole 
considers to be worth remembering.  
As Lewis A. Coser puts it in his introduction to Halbwachs’ book On Collective Memory, 
“we will surely realize that the greatest number of memories come back to us when our parents, 
our friends, or other persons recall them to us” (38). Because memories become concretized in a 
social setting and are legitimized “within a totality of memories,” what becomes clear, according 
to critic Patrick Hutton, is that Halbwachs is suggesting that our individual memories typically 
reflect the “social mores, values, and ideals … of the social groups to which we relate” (Hutton 
78). This does not mean, necessarily, that the individual has no say in what he or she remembers. 
Rather, his or her personal memory largely contributes to the memory of the group as a whole. 
For Halbwachs, one of the three crucial social frameworks (along with religion and the traditions 
of the social classes) is family. He writes, “In the case of the family group the similarity of 
memories is merely a sign of a community of interests and thoughts. It is not because memories 
resemble each other that several can be called to mind at the same time. It is rather because the 
same group is interested in them and is able to call them to mind at the same time that they 
resemble each other” (52). Families, then, operate as a social collective wherein each member 
contributes to what becomes a common set of interests and customs. This, in turn, shapes the 
kind of social memories that the member gathers.  
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Indeed, for Halbwachs, we typically experience moments of remembrance as a result of 
traditions and commemoration, and it is certainly the case that “family possesses traditions that 
are peculiar to it” (74). A family, according to Halbwachs, will have particular rituals and will 
commemorate certain events that preserve and concretize the recollections of the individuals 
within the family unit. I might suggest further that within families stories can circulate that keep 
certain memories alive. A family trip, for example, might elicit particular stories that the family 
members tell and re-tell to each other to the point that years later those particular stories – the 
stories that the family as a whole decided were important – are all that is recalled of the trip. 
Importantly, too, Halbwachs notes that the memories that are created by the social framework of 
family maintain themselves both when the individual lives within the framework and also when 
the individual leaves the framework.  Even as members leave the family (perhaps to begin their 
own family, or perhaps as a result of an emotional break) traditions can “echo” (77) to borrow 
Halbwachs’ term. As a result, “older memories will take a position within a new framework” 
(77). For Halbwachs, then, the memories that are constructed by the family unit typically exist in 
some form or another throughout a person’s life, reinforcing how formative and enduring these 
particular social frameworks are. 
That Halbwachs should suggest that family is a key framework of memory is crucial for 
my own analysis of these texts as examples of life writing. After all, Smith and Watson assert, 
“Memory is thus the source, authenticator, and destabilizer of autobiographical acts” (22). To be 
sure, our very sense of self and our ability to construct an identity for ourselves is dependent on 
having memories. Memory confirms that we have had experiences, and experience, for Smith 
and Watson, “is the very process through which a person becomes a certain kind of subject 
owning certain identities in the social realm, identities constituted through material, cultural, 
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economic, and psychic relations” (31). As critic Joan W. Scott points out, though, merely 
understanding lives by their experiences conceals how experience plays a key role in how 
identities are ideologically constructed. She notes that “the project of making experience visible 
precludes critical examination of the workings of the ideological system itself, its categories of 
representation … its premises about what these categories mean and how they operate, its 
notions of subjects, origin, and cause” (25).  
As Smith and Watson put it, Scott argues “how our notion of meaningful experience is 
socially produced” (31). Their use of the term “meaningful experience” is apt. Scott calls into 
question specifically what counts as experience, and presumably, what counts as something to be 
remembered. Given the historical (and perhaps mythological) import of the family, both within 
consumer capitalist frameworks and within certain Mennonite cultures, it is perhaps no surprise 
that family memories tend to be a crucial part of what counts when the authors that I look at 
construct their autobiographical identities and their life narratives. Halbwachs is important in this 
regard as his arguments regarding familial collective memory help me to illuminate why these 
authors consider their own identities as being bound to familial others. 
This does not mean that the books that I am looking at here, by any means, suggest that 
the identities that the authors construct for themselves are entirely a consequence of familial 
influence. As Smith and Watson suggest above, there are many competing and frequently 
intersecting networks of relations out of which identities are constituted. As already noted, 
Halbwachs himself argues, according to Patrick Hutton, that there are several frameworks of 
social memory that are always at work and there are several social groups that “compete for our 
allegiances” (79). Indeed, the authors that I am looking at certainly consider their own 
subjectivity as informed by (and, in these cases, often obscured by) a variety of relations, several 
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of which are discussed in other chapters. Nevertheless, I intend to show here that certainly family 
plays a pivotal role for these authors in terms of how they conceive of their own particular 
identities. 
It is for this reason that I challenge Landsberg’s assertion in her introduction to Prosthetic 
Memory that “the forces of modernity and the changes wrought by modern mass culture have 
made Halbwach’s notion of collective memory inadequate” (8). I do suggest that Landsberg is 
correct when she argues that “memories and images of the past” can “circulate on a grand scale” 
(18), though I question whether the age of rampant commodification necessarily swept everyone 
up to the extent that she suggests it does. After all, what do we make of the various sub-cultures 
who, whilst never entirely outside the influential sphere of the modern consumer capitalist age, 
nevertheless largely maintained humble lives, often in geographical locations that were not 
nearly as penetrated by industrial development as other spaces were.  
It seems to me, though, that it is ultimately unnecessary to choose between Landsberg 
and Halbwach since they are talking about two very different kinds of memory. Landsberg is 
mostly concerned with how one gains access to memories of a past that one did not directly 
experience, while Halbwachs is concerned with how social groups generate memories of the past 
in the present. In his discussion of the family, at least, Halbwachs is not concerned with the 
notion of family members taking on memories of events before they were born, but rather with 
how their own personal memories of their own familial past have been generated by the family 
unit collectively. Ultimately, then, I would like to recover Halbwachs’s point, not to undermine 
Landsberg’s own claims regarding the prosthetic nature of memory, but rather to suggest another 
key way that people (especially people not particularly affected by kinship ruptures and the age 
of commodification) might access memories. 
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That the family plays a key role in one’s self-identification has been long acknowledged 
by scholars of life writing, as the quotation above from Eakin suggests. Nevertheless more work 
needs to be done in theorizing family memoir as a sub-genre. In their book Reading 
Autobiography, Smith and Watson discuss the filiation narrative, which they define as a text that 
“seeks to memorialize the relationship to a parent, sibling, or child, someone with whom one has 
had a long-standing affiliation” (270). It is this sub-genre of the filiation narrative as Smith and 
Watson describe it, rather than the family memoir, that has been effectively theorized. The term 
itself was coined by life writing scholar G. Thomas Couser. Like Eakin and others,
15
 Couser 
argues that autobiographical stories of filiation are largely relational narratives. He suggests that, 
The term ‘filiation’ has two distinct but related meanings that are pertinent here. 
First, it refers to ‘the condition or fact of being the child [not necessarily the son, 
though the root is the Latin filius, son] of a particular parent (not necessarily a 
father); second, in law, it refers to ‘judicial determination of paternity’ (American 
Heritage Dictionary). By calling the texts in question narratives of filiation, rather 
than merely memoirs of fathers, I seek to highlight their relationality, their 
rootedness in a sense of entitlement and their intent to enact some kind of 
engagement with the father, whether living or dead. (“Genre Matters” 151) 
While Couser is clearly far more interested in stories about fathers written by children 
(particularly sons) here, he expands the sub-genre of filiation narratives in a subsequent article to 
include both patriography and matriography (“In My Father’s Closet” 891), memoirs of both 
fathers and mothers, respectively. This quotation also reveals that Couser places certain limits on 
what constitutes a filiation narrative. For Couser, filiation narratives are not simply about other 
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family members but are, rather, implicitly relational in conveying a one-to-one relationship. 
They are stories that highlight the dynamic between child and parent.  
 Couser also places limitations on the sub-genre by suggesting that all filiation narratives 
are borne out of a common necessity. It is for this reason that Couser dismisses the possibility 
that “all memoirs of fathers … constitute narratives of filiation” (“Genre Matters” 151). On the 
contrary, “only those written out of a certain sense of need or lack” (151) can be appropriately 
classified under the umbrella term that Couser constructs. Couser’s point was largely reaffirmed 
by scholars who contributed to the 2004 volume of the journal Auto/Biography Studies that was 
devoted specifically to intergenerational life writing. John D. Barbour, for example, observed 
that 
In many recent family memoirs, ‘unfinished business’ between parents and 
children structures the narrative as the author delineates personal identity largely 
in relation to a parent. Usually because of some suppressed, shameful, or hidden 
aspect of the parent’s past life, the parent was absent or emotionally distant during 
the autobiographer’s childhood. Writing a memoir helps the author come to terms 
with and redefine the problematic relationship to a mother or father. (19) 
Roger J. Porter similarly suggests in his article “Finding the Father” that “These authors are often 
desperate to discover what they hope is ‘hard’ evidence in the face of parental barriers thrown in 
their way. These authors are often desperate to discover what they suspect but cannot prove, or 
what has baffled them about their parent(s) for a long time” (101). The common consensus, then, 
is that filiation narratives are largely spurred on by an absence or lack of proper closure – the 
“‘unfinished business’” as Barbour would have it or the inability of the author to fully grasp the 
reality of a parent’s life.  
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 I want to suggest that this work on the filiation narrative is helpful in considering how the 
authors who are the subject of my commentary consider their identities in relation to their 
families. That being said, I find it unfortunate that the terms “filiation narrative” and “family 
memoir” have been conflated to the extent that they have. After all, Barbour, in the quotation 
above, takes family memoir to mean stories about parents by their (now grown-up) children. The 
concept “family” though is complex, and it seems to me that the discussions regarding the family 
memoir have not fully taken account of the flexibility of this term. Family of course can entail 
the relationship between a parent and a child but it could also suggest the relationship between 
siblings, the relationships between partners, and it could entail the stories of parents about their 
children, rather than the other way around. Furthermore, the word “family” could be applied to 
co-workers and those who serve in the military where paradigms of family are also in circulation. 
I do think, then, as my analysis of the first two books in this chapter will show, that the 
discussions of family memoir could stand to be expanded somewhat given how individual 
authors consider the term. For my purposes, I want to look at these texts as family memoirs 
because they often (though not always) come out of a similar absence, but also, and more 
importantly, because the authors’ identities are so very much tied to their family life as they 
understand it. 
 Rudy Wiebe in his book Of This Earth understands family to be not just his parents but 
also his two brothers, four sisters, and siblings’ spouses. The book demonstrates how family 
assists in forming Wiebe’s collective memories and also helps shape his own self-understanding. 
Appropriately, Wiebe begins the acknowledgements section at the end of the book with the 
statement that “Childhood memory is always a family affair, especially in an immigrant 
Mennonite family” (389). Wiebe here asserts the importance of family in his particular 
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Mennonite upbringing and also the importance it continues to have in shaping his own 
remembrance of the past. Wiebe’s belief that his childhood memories are collective in nature is 
put into practice in the overall structure of the text.  
Often Wiebe relies not only on his own memories but also the memories of his other 
family members to shape the family story he is telling. Early in the book, for example, Wiebe 
talks to his sister Tina who recalls how their mother was embarrassed about being an older 
woman and pregnant (with Rudy) when her eldest daughter was also pregnant and considerably 
less affected by the weight of the baby (33). Elsewhere, Wiebe recounts the story of the family’s 
move from Kelstern to Speedwell which occurred before Wiebe himself was born. In order to do 
this, he relies on memories from other family members. He notes, “My mother remembered the 
exact day that our family, for the first time, drove north along this road. May 9, 1933, she told 
me when I was writing Pah’s obituary; in a small rented truck. They wanted to be farmers, but 
after three years in Canada they did not own a single animal, not a cow, not so much as a dog” 
(71). Wiebe’s brother, Dan, fills in more details: “When I ask Dan why, of all possible places, 
they hauled themselves to stony Speedwell, he relies, ‘There was really no work in the south, and 
Mam and Pah wanted their own land to work’” (72). This episode suggests several important 
things. First, it affirms what is for Wiebe the significance of collective familial memory. Here, he 
tells a family story based on the memories of both his mother and his brother. Wiebe, in a sense, 
takes on their memories here as he tells the familial narrative. Important, too, is that Wiebe 
should choose to tell this story in his memoir, given that it occurs before he is born. 
 These moments also serve to reveal how this book is not simply the story of Rudy Wiebe 
but the story of Rudy Wiebe’s family. Wiebe simply constructs himself as being one amongst 
many and ultimately we understand him through his relation to the collective and relatively 
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harmonious identity of the Wiebe’s. The point is made quite literally from the very beginning of 
the book when Wiebe describes his family as singing together in harmony: 
In the crystalline cold my mother’s soprano weaves the high notes on ‘Pi-il-ger’ 
back and forth into my father’s tenor like wind breathing through the leaves of 
summer aspen. My oldest sister, Tina, is married and my oldest brother, Abe, in 
Bible school, they are not there, and Dan is standing at the open back of the 
sledbox, tall and silent; but we four younger siblings are humming inside our 
layered clothes under the covers, Mary especially because she can already thread 
alto between Mam and Pah’s voices, make three-part harmony, and if only Dan 
would open his mouth, as Mary tells him often enough, we could have a family 
quartet even if Helen and Liz and I are too little for anything yet except melody. 
(2-3) 
As this quotation suggests, the collective familial identity does not deny individual behaviours 
and characteristics. After all, as Wiebe notes here, the three youngest children cannot entirely 
contribute to a harmony but rather sing the melody and brother Dan is a silent participant. The 
point, though, is that they are participating in this moment together with each member bringing a 
part of themselves to the familial whole. Even the ones that are missing, Tina and Abe, are 
present in Wiebe’s memory for their absence and, moreover, that their absence is so obviously 
felt is only further evidence of the importance of the overall unity of the familial identity. Here 
the familial overwhelms that personal, a point that is reinforced glaringly considering that Wiebe 
barely mentions himself at all.  
He notes elsewhere how an important part of being Mennonite, according to his family, 
meant that he would “listen to sermons and sing, sing, sing. Always full harmony” (216). 
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Intriguingly, this moment fits nicely within Wiebe’s oeuvre. Focusing in particular on the 
function of both singing and knitting in Wiebe’s novel Sweeter than all the World, Edna Froese 
writes that “singing, in the context of the rich harmonies of those who sing together, evoke – in 
all of Wiebe’s novels – the protection afforded by family and community” (“Adam” 21). Jane 
Hostetler Robinett, in her own discussion of Sweeter makes a similar point when she suggests 
that in Wiebe’s book, harmonious singing can signify “the fundamentally spiritual nature of love 
and its relationship to the idea of home” (43). I suggest that Wiebe uses singing in much the 
same way in his autobiographical writing. As Wiebe recounts the family singalong at the 
beginning of Of This Earth, it is evident that this memory is meant to convey his belonging to a 
protective family unit as he pictures himself “in blue darkness and covered by blankets” (1).  
 This is a memoir, then, about the self as inextricably linked to familial others. We end up 
focusing as much if not more on the family than we do on Wiebe as an individual. Critic Malin 
Sigvardson has gone so far as to suggest that there are moments in the book where the story 
seems to be told by “a spectator rather than by a participator” (136). Sigvardson suggests that 
Wiebe’s distanced descriptions of his several “homesteads” in the book reveal that the author’s 
“sense of home” cannot be located in a single and essential space (136). I think, though, that 
Sigvardson is ultimately able to read Wiebe’s position as a spectator because he regularly pushes 
himself out of the autobiographical spotlight.  
That Wiebe sees this book as the story of a family rather than the story of the self is 
readily apparent in the several passages in the book devoted to stories of other family members. 
In one example, Wiebe tells a long story about his sister Mary and her husband Emmanuel. He 
writes:  
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Mary was not happy at having married Emmanuel. The man she really wanted … 
was one of his John Lobe cousins. … But the Lobes had also left Speedwell … 
and something had happened, or hadn’t happened that should have, and Mary 
suddenly agreed, on the rebound as it might have been whispered, to marry 
Emmanuel who had tried to woo her for a long time and whom she just teased, 
laughing. She liked certain ways of laughter, very much, and he was forever 
telling jokes – not really witty or ironic, more folksy sayings or long, slow build-
up stories that were sometimes okay but at other times she would simply snort her 
disdain and walk away, her lovely lips curled” (169-70) 
Again, Wiebe tells a story here that has very little to do with himself. His personal connection to 
the story is strictly that it involves his sister and her husband. The lengthy passage is indicative 
of the fact that Wiebe is privileging the family narrative over his own in the sense that he relays 
stories of family members to which he has only a tangential connection. 
While these moments serve to illustrate how crucial family and family memories are for 
Wiebe in this book, Wiebe does not fully romanticize or even entirely trust these memories. The 
reader, for example, gets glimpses into events from the lives of Wiebe’s parents. We learn that, 
Money had nothing to do with how they met. In 1897 Russia, in the cemetery of 
their Orenburg Mennonite Colony village, tiny Katerina Knelsen stood weeping 
as the coffin of her mother Susanna Knelsen nee Loewen, aged twenty-five, was 
lowered into the muddy ground. And then Abram Wiebe, the Jakob Wiebe boy 
from the farmstead across the village street from the Knelsens, came beside her 
and comforted her. She was two years old, he nine. (97) 
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In this moment, Wiebe does not participate at all because, of course, he was not there when his 
parents met. We receive this particular story though because it is a crucial origin story in what is 
ultimately the narrative of the familial identity that Wiebe constructs throughout the text. This 
moment is as important to Wiebe’s sense of self as anything that happened in his life because it 
is the beginning of the family that informs Wiebe’s identity in the book. In other moments, like 
the sing-a-long previously discussed at the beginning of the text, Wiebe participates but only as a 
piece of a larger familial network. 
 What is perhaps most remarkable about this origin story, though, is how unstable it is, 
since it strikingly contradicts the depiction of Wiebe’s parents that Wiebe gives us throughout 
the book. Essentially, we learn that Wiebe’s father “had no backbone” (106) while Wiebe’s 
mother is “stern and loving” (19), always “afraid of sin for her children” (19) and also a crucial 
model of strength for Wiebe. He notes that “In our family, our mother did what needed to be 
done, always. For us small children the thought of Mam not knowing what to do on the farm was 
incredible; that she would not do whatever was necessary we could not imagine” (61). Indeed, it 
is Wiebe’s mother to whom Wiebe appears to look as a source of inspiration for how to act rather 
than his father, whom he describes as “hopeless, perhaps even a coward” (105). This image that 
we get of Wiebe’s parents is repeated throughout the book, which makes this origin story so 
vexing. In this moment, the roles that Wiebe constructs for his parents are reversed – Pah 
becomes the source of comfort to his mother who is experiencing a moment of weakness.  
Wiebe himself questions the authenticity of this story. He writes: “Our family beginning 
here has few explications: did my father pick my mother up, crying hysterically, or did he stand 
close beside her, perhaps take her hand, warm it between his own in the autumn air? What 
Mennonite village boy of nine would call such attention to himself, surrounded at a funeral by 
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everyone he knew?” (97-98). Finally, he concludes that this moment conveyed a “warmth and 
tenderness” which he did “not, in my childhood, remember between my parents” (98). In this 
sense, then, Wiebe does not shy away from exposing the very instability at the heart of this 
familial identity. He reconfirms Smith and Watson’s observation that “identities are not fixed or 
essentialized attributes of autobiographical subjects; rather, they are enacted and reiterated 
through cultural norms and discourses, and thus remain provisional and unstable” (214).  
Yet, as Maurice Halbwachs points out, the collective memory that comes out of familial 
bonds (which, in my view, sustains a relational and familial identity) is always unstable. 
Ultimately, for Halbwachs, it is in the very act of recalling moments from the past when “we 
distort that past, because we wish to introduce greater coherence” (Halbwachs 183). This point of 
view leads Patrick Hutton to suggest that “memory invent[s] a skewed pattern of the past” 
(Hutton 77). Moreover, though, as Lewis Coser observes, “everything [in Halbwach’s work] 
seems to indicate that the past is not preserved but is reconstructed on the basis of the present” 
(39-40). From this we can conclude that, for Halbwachs, the past is always in flux. Our 
memories of events are contingent on where we are and who we are in the present. It is 
important, then, that Wiebe should acknowledge that while his family and collective family 
memories are a crucial factor in his own self-understanding, it is nevertheless also the case that 
this identity is never fully secure.  
I suggest that it is precisely for the reason that the past is in flux that Wiebe wishes to 
concretize particular family memories in his memoir. The front matter of the text contains a 
Russian Mennonite proverb that appears both in Low German and in English: “That was so long 
ago, it is almost no longer so” (ix). In other words, in the face of gradually fading or possibly 
changing memories, the past as Wiebe understands it is in danger of disappearing. This is a 
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particularly difficult possibility for Wiebe, given the significant role that his sister, Helen, played 
in his youth.  
As Wiebe notes very early in the book, “Helen will be the first of us to die, in late March 
when World War II in Europe is at last coming to an end” (26). Helen, for Wiebe, played a 
crucial role in the family unit as a contributor to collective family memories and, consequently, a 
contributor to Wiebe’s own sense of self. Indeed, the book relies substantially on Helen’s own 
diary entries as a way for Wiebe to recall his shared past. Because so much of Helen’s writing 
appears within Wiebe’s memoir, I discuss her importance to Wiebe and to the book in my fourth 
chapter on intertextual relationality. Suffice it to say for now, Helen appears as a central figure in 
the book and that Wiebe focuses so much attention on his sister who died in 1945 is very much 
indicative of the kind of anxieties that come with confronting a past “that was so long ago, it is 
almost no longer so.” 
 The photography that appears throughout the memoir reinforces this sense of 
concretization of a fading or disappearing past. As in the rest of the book, though, Wiebe’s use of 
photographs demonstrates the impossibility of getting an entirely accurate narrative. Moreover, 
the photographs highlight Wiebe’s privileging of familial others. Timothy Dow Adams has 
previously noted the kinship shared by life writing and photography in his book Light Writing 
and Life Writing. He writes,  
Just as autobiographies are obviously artificial representations of lives, so 
photographs are clearly manufactured images: sitters are artificially posed and 
lighted, made to conform to the laws of perspective and the ideology of the 
photographic culture, reduced in size, reproduced on a flat plane often without 
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color – and yet there is something undeniably different about a photographic 
representation of a person as opposed to a painting of that same person. (5) 
Dow Adams notes here how photography, like life writing, is mediated and shaped, offering 
mere “artificial representations” of reality. 
Marianne Hirsch, in her book, Family Frames, discusses how photography works to 
shape a particular narrative about family. She writes that “photography quickly became the 
family’s primary instrument of self-knowledge and representation – the means by which family 
memory would be continued and perpetuated, by which the family’s story would henceforth be 
told” (6-7). In Of This Earth, photography certainly assists Wiebe in making sense of the past 
and also making sense of familial relationships. Investigating one family photo he writes,  
[My sister] Tina stands at the back, so slender between Abe and Dan, her face 
tilted down and it seems her eyes are closed. Or it is possible, to judge from the 
angle of her head, that she is looking down over Mam’s shoulder at me, and it 
comes to me that memory in these images is like the ineffability of the love she 
and I gave each other, … a love we felt that needed no comment or overt 
demonstration. (29) 
In this moment, Wiebe is very much reading the ambiguous image (are Tina’s eyes shut or are 
they not?) and drawing a conclusion that works to reinforce a kind of familial connection and 
unity, namely an unspoken bond between him and his sister. 
 In noting that the “memory in these images” is ineffable, Wiebe is stating that the 
photographs are communicating something that the written text may not be able to communicate. 
At the same time, though, the similarities between the written text and the photography are 
striking. The photographs suggest, in much the same way as Wiebe does in print, that the past is 
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never entirely retrievable. At one point, Wiebe asks, “is there a yeast in memory that grows, knits 
our past into the timeless shapes we desire? Or do I now know events and times only from what I 
see in accidentally retained pictures, the exact Kodak instant focused on crimped paper” (332-
33). Wiebe acknowledges the possibility here that collections of photographs create the sense of 
a knowable and accessible past. Hirsch suggests, though, that “As photography immobilizes the 
flow of family life into a series of snapshots, it perpetuates familial myths while seeming merely 
to record actual moments in family history” (7). Collections of family photographs, then, create 
very particular memories and work to construct a very particular kind of past. This is something 
that Wiebe himself appears to recognize when he confronts the possibility of only knowing of 
events and times as a result of a collection of scattered frozen moments. 
 The book then works to concretize the family of Wiebe’s past while at the same time 
recognizing the impossibility of doing so. Frequently when Wiebe discusses a family photograph 
with Helen in it, he also references her subsequent early death even though the photo itself does 
not appear to warrant the remark (15, 26).  In making these comments, Wiebe reinforces the fact 
that the photographs captured and recorded Helen’s life in some manner before it was too late. If 
it is the case that Wiebe recalls the past via “accidentally retained pictures,” it is meaningful then 
that photographs of Helen should survive over the years. At the same time, though, Wiebe 
includes a photograph of Helen as a baby where her face has largely been blurred out. Wiebe 
observes the picture and sees “Helen crooked tight in Mam’s arm, her face already blurring 
before life’s iron reality” (192). In this moment, Wiebe conveys what Hirsch notes is the ability 
of the photograph to “bring the past back in the form of a ghostly revenant, [while] emphasizing, 
at the same time, its immutable and irreversible pastness and irretrievability” (20).  
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In anticipating Helen’s death, the photograph serves as a nagging reminder of what 
Wiebe cannot retrieve. Other photos in the book emphasize this as well. While Wiebe can be 
quite descriptive of the people who are in the photographs and what they are doing, it is 
ultimately fairly difficult for the reader to make out much of anything. In several instances (14, 
92, 162, 173, 333, 334) the subjects of the photo are standing so far back that it becomes 
impossible to see anyone. In other cases, the subjects are either too difficult to see or it is 
impossible to tell if there are subjects at all because of lighting or the focus of the camera (270, 
280, 349). The photographs, though, ultimately play a significant role in that they reinforce the 
kind of family narrative that appears in the written text and emphasize that the overall focus of 
the book is not Wiebe himself despite its being his memoir. Remarkably, given that the book is 
marketed as a memoir of a “Mennonite boyhood,” only four out of forty-four pictures feature 
Rudy Wiebe alone. Instead, Wiebe appears with others in sixteen photographs, fourteen of which 
include him with other family members. Wiebe does not appear at all in twenty-two photos. 
There are a total of seventeen pictures of other family members (either family photos or 
individual family members) that do not include Wiebe.  
Of This Earth works to reaffirm what David Parker refers to as “the ethical imperative” 
of the family memoir. Parker argues that the author of the autobiographical text will frequently 
suggest in his or her text that “If I don’t remember and tell [the stories of familial others] then no 
one else will. … [O]nly I can prevent their potentially empowering voices and stories from 
vanishing forever” (150). Parker’s point certainly holds true for Wiebe in his book. He laments 
near the end of his memoir that “With every passing day our memory is what we can still find in 
it, or cannot avoid, … there are many [memories] we would wish never to lose: the more precise 
they are, the more they comfort us” (372). In his memoir, Wiebe presumably attempts to 
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represent his memories as precisely as possible. Wiebe produces a text about a time, place, and 
people who played an important role in the development of his own personal understanding of 
the past and, thus, in informing his own sense of self as tied to that past.  
At the same time, though, Wiebe interrogates what Marianne Hirsch calls “familial 
myths” by conveying how genuinely imprecise these memories can be. What is significant here 
is how much Wiebe relies on the memories of others and how often the familial stories are about 
other family members. Ultimately, then, Of This Earth is a family memoir in which the narrative 
of the family takes precedence over the narrative of the self. Because of this, the book pushes the 
limitations of the theoretical discussions on relational identities in life writing. 
Similar to Rudy Wiebe, Katie Funk Wiebe expands the conventions of the family memoir 
to include a wider family unit in her book You Never Gave Me a Name.  While it is true that 
Katie Funk Wiebe does focus a great deal on her parents as being crucial figures in her own self-
understanding (the “You” in the title, after all, is directed specifically towards her parents), she 
also devotes ample space in the book to her children, co-workers, and perhaps even more so in 
the first part of the book, her husband. In this sense, the first part of the book appears, on the 
surface, to confirm Mary G. Mason’s early argument about relational identities in women’s life 
writing. Recall that Mason argued that women’s autobiographical texts conventionally convey 
women positioned in relation to men. Mason does acknowledge that “For some women writers, it 
is not a man, or men, or a community but a woman, or women, who provide the other of 
identity” (234). Despite these acknowledged exceptions, though, Mason clearly suggests that 
“The pattern most frequently adopted (and adapted) by later women has unquestionably been the 
solution recorded in the life and writing of Margaret Cavendish – the pairing of one’s own image 
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with another, equal image” (231). The other “equal image,” for Mason, is typically what she 
calls the “marital other” (231), a point that is reaffirmed in Mason’s example texts16. 
Funk Wiebe certainly does give a great deal of textual space to her “marital other,” 
Walter, in the first hundred pages of the book. Walter dies quite early in the marriage following a 
narrative wherein he and Funk Wiebe have four children and move repeatedly throughout 
Canada, eventually ending up in Hillsboro, Kansas in the United States. The space that Funk 
Wiebe devotes to Walter suggests a relational identity and indebtedness to his influence on her 
life in a way that follows the tropes of early, conventional women’s life writing, as Mason 
describes them. Nevertheless, her departure from this kind of identity in the following two thirds 
of the book serves, I argue, to comment on these conventions as well as to provide an alternative 
model of identity for Mennonite women outside of the patriarchal structure of marriage.  
This is not to say, as I will show, that her post-marriage identity is fully autonomous and 
independent. Rather, Funk Wiebe constructs a different kind of relational identity (one that is 
frequently still a familial identity) which is an expression of a new kind of self that was largely 
submerged by her marriage. In displaying the shift from one identity to another, Katie Funk 
Wiebe demonstrates the possibility of change and growth from the kind of identities that women 
in earlier autobiographical texts seemed bound to perform. Ultimately, though, the book shows 
Funk Wiebe as having a relational identity with those whom she considers to be family, whether 
it is her parents, her husband, her children, or even her colleagues.  
Funk Wiebe establishes a familial collective identity in several ways. The beginning of 
the book reveals how her sense of self was largely influenced by her parents. A good deal of the 
memoir concerns her feeling uncomfortable with the name that her parents gave her. She writes, 
“The name my parents gave me was Katie, a plain German-Mennonite name. I didn’t like it 
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growing up because it didn’t sound sophisticated enough to suit my ambitions. To me, it brought 
up images of Schlorre (simple footwear), drab clothing, and dull living of another country and 
era” (11). This aspect of “Schlorre” that Funk Wiebe evokes is repeated throughout the book. 
According to Funk Wiebe, “My Russian-born father understood the meaning of shoes as a 
symbol of belonging. He grew up wearing Schlorre, a wooden sole with a leather band over the 
toes. … As a young boy, my father yearned for a pair of shoes” (158). Funk Wiebe uses the 
Schlorre/shoes dichotomy in her memoir in order to explore both her sense of belonging to a 
creative writing community as well as her own sense of comfort within a Mennonite cultural 
community. 
As the quotation above indicates, Funk Wiebe connects her own Mennonitism, at least 
Mennonitism as she experienced it early in her life, with a simplicity that she largely rejects 
because she recalls it being the primary obstacle in her desire to become a writer. She 
acknowledges “the deep rut, theologically, I was falling into by accepting without question the 
thinking that women had only one role in life – that related to her anatomy, not her mind” (26). 
The book, then, in many ways charts Funk Wiebe’s own growth from Schlorre to shoes. As she 
eventually tells us, “now I always wear shoes” (159). This transformation from Schlorre to shoes 
means several things to her.  
Given that Funk Wiebe understands shoes to be “that symbol of acceptance as equals” 
(158) and Schlorre to be “simple footwear,” the transformation indicates her acceptance into the 
world of writing (in fact, she has a chapter called “How I received shoes as a writer”), as well as 
her shift from a more simple (or, as Funk Wiebe characterizes it, traditional, “drab,” and “dull”) 
life to something far more modern. Though she does not entirely suggest this, the transformation 
also indicates her growing acceptance of her own identity as a Mennonite. One might assume 
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that her former equation of Mennonitism with simplicity would negate this possibility. Instead, 
Funk Wiebe tells us about how, in her later years, she has re-conceived her relationship to the 
Mennonite Brethren as well as her understanding of what Mennonitism could be.  
In one of her final chapters, tellingly titled “Sticking with what you’re stuck with,” Funk 
Wiebe asks herself the question: “Why am I Mennonite Brethren when some MB congregations 
lean strongly toward fundamentalism?” (264). She answers this question by highlighting the 
“Changes in theology, changes in social mores, changes in life goals, changes in attitudes” (267). 
Her point here is to say that ultimately she desires the Mennonite Brethren world to be as 
accepting of her as the creative writing world eventually was. She is more comfortable within her 
religion specifically because it has become more tolerant and more inclusive. The religion itself 
has transformed, in some small way, from Schlorre to shoes, to borrow Funk Wiebe’s own 
analogy.  
Funk Wiebe’s own desire to make this transformation personally as well as to encourage 
transformation elsewhere is rooted in a familial identity. Funk Wiebe says that, “I see myself in 
my father who longed for leather shoes instead of the unrelenting Schlorre. He wanted to be a 
fully accepted member of Russian Mennonite society, highly socially stratified at the time” 
(159). Importantly, here and throughout the entire Schlorre/shoes dichotomy, Funk Wiebe’s 
father plays a crucial role. Not only does she relate her own struggle for acceptance to her 
father’s struggles but she also suggests that her father played a key role in ensuring that she 
inherited this struggle by giving her the name Katie.  
This is a point that Funk Wiebe makes quite clear from the beginning of the memoir. In 
her imaginary conversation with her father, she states: “‘Dad, you made me a Mennonite when 
you gave me the name of one, Katie. You had the chance here in Blaine Lake to pass us off as 
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Russians or Germans, but you didn’t take it. You loaded your Mennonite background on us 
children” (13). Funk Wiebe is not only “loaded” with a cultural and religious background by her 
father but she is also, as a consequence of these things, loaded with similar desires for acceptance 
and a desire to escape a life she characterizes as being far too traditional. These concerns, 
though, as her remarks about her father illustrate, are familial and not simply restricted to Funk 
Wiebe as an individual. Ultimately, while Katie Funk Wiebe does not necessarily present a 
family collective like Rudy Wiebe’s that sings together in harmony, she nevertheless constructs 
an identity that is bound to familial others, in particular her father. While there is a sense that she 
wants to largely divorce herself from this binding relationship, she ultimately concedes that she 
“embraced [her] roots” (14). She reaches this conclusion after several attempts to refashion her 
identity by re-naming herself Kay.  
This act of re-naming came out of an effort by Funk Wiebe to disconnect from the 
familial and cultural collective identity that her own name, Katie, reflected. She concedes, 
however, that “Over a period of years Kay disappeared and Katie returned. … I had an obligation 
to my parents to fill the name they gave me with worth and integrity. It didn’t matter who I was 
or wasn’t named after” (13). This quotation strikingly illustrates Funk Wiebe’s journey as she 
constructs it throughout her book, wherein she becomes more comfortable with an identity that is 
bound to others. Here she reverts back to the name Katie specifically because of her obligation to 
her parents who gave her the name as a result of their own Mennonite heritage. Funk Wiebe’s 
identity, then, is bound to her family in numerous respects. She carries not only the traditions 
that her parents gave her but, in doing so, she is also bound to replay a common familial trait of 
attempting to find a better alternative to their traditions.  
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There are more glaring examples of Funk Wiebe’s focus on familial others when she 
discusses her husband, Walter. Funk Wiebe conveys to us repeatedly the profound influence that 
Walter had on the overall direction of her life. She illustrates early on how tradition dictated that 
her life as a married woman would be largely controlled by a patriarchal structure that would 
keep her subordinated within the private domestic sphere. She writes: “I was married. I had said 
yes to becoming a wife and homemaker and expected to spend the rest of my life happily 
ensconced in our home-to-be. I was intent on becoming the best possible Christian homemaker. 
Abundant happiness beckoned me” (43). Here Funk Wiebe reveals that she gains subjectivity via 
what Althusser would call hailing. According to Althusser, “ideology hails or interpellates 
individuals as subjects” (49). In saying this, he means that individuals are called upon to fulfil 
certain roles and to perform particular identities that require a certain amount of conformity in 
terms of what one does and what one believes.  
For Althusser, “an individual is always-already a subject, even before he is born” (50). 
There are certain expectations of what kind of role a child will perform upon being born. One 
only needs to consider gender expectations, for example. Ideology largely sustains itself because 
subjects respond to the hail and fulfil the role accordingly, largely unaware that they are being 
interpellated by an ideological system. He notes how, typically, “subjects recognize what they 
are and behave accordingly” (55). Indeed, the above quotation from Funk Wiebe suggests that 
she largely worked to fulfill a role that was created for her by others. When she notes how she 
“said yes to becoming a wife,” she is in effect responding to the hail interpellating her as a 
subject. She notes too that the identity of “wife” that she takes on carries with it particular beliefs 
and behaviours. Becoming a wife means also “becoming the best possible Christian 
homemaker.”  
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Yet while she initially goes into this arrangement with a great deal of positivity, 
“behaving accordingly” as Althusser puts it, Funk Wiebe quickly learns that her life becomes 
largely informed by her husband. She laments that “I wanted something more than being the one 
who ironed his shirts and pajamas and met his physical needs” (55). Finally, Funk Wiebe 
concludes that “Husbands were their wives’ status symbols in a preacher-conscious world. 
Wives found their identity in their husband’s identity. I chuckle to think how important it was at 
the time and how trivial it seems now” (78). This quotation illustrates the problematic 
consequence of the relational identity that Mason discusses in her article wherein she sees 
women’s identity as being constructed mostly in relation to men. Funk Wiebe establishes a 
relational identity in the early part of her book in order to reflect on how her own individuality 
was largely submerged as a result of her marriage. This does not, of course, mean that Funk 
Wiebe depicts Walter in an unflattering light. Rather, the identity that Funk Wiebe constructs for 
the first third of the book is one that was conventional for the temporal and cultural context in 
which she lived. As the quotation above indicates, the idea of wives finding “their identity in 
their husband’s identity” was not a unique aspect of her own marriage but rather the status quo as 
Funk Wiebe experienced it.  
Marlene Epp confirms Funk Wiebe’s impressions in her book Mennonite Women in 
Canada. She suggests that Mennonite women, by the mid-20
th
 century, had frequently come to 
occupy a subordinated role in the family unit. Epp argues that “ideals of submission, especially 
of women to their husbands, were taught in explicit ways, most public perhaps in the sermons 
and writings of church leaders. Teachings on Mennonite marriages followed the order of 
benevolent patriarchy – considered God-ordained – in which husband and wife had specific and 
well-defined roles and in which the husband was clearly the head” (Mennonite Women 112). Epp 
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suggests here and elsewhere in her book that the subordination of women in marriage was 
essentially a cultural norm that was taught as a crucial factor in the successful structuring of a 
family.  
Given that Funk Wiebe, like other women at the time, understood her own identity 
through her husband’s identity, it is no coincidence that she focuses so much attention on Walter 
in the early part of the book. She writes how,  
[Walter] designed book covers for his father’s poetry and music. He experimented 
with becoming a vegetarian after suffering kidney problems. He kept a scrapbook 
and spent hours copying parts of poems and writings by great writers expressing 
noble thoughts. His handwriting was carefully crafted. He indulged himself in 
calligraphy. He took long, long walks in the moonlight by himself and with 
friends, sometimes quite discouraged. He saw his life as a failure, going nowhere. 
His inner searching led him to write letters of apology to people he might have 
hurt in the past. He longed for a deeper spiritual life with purity of body and 
mind… (47) 
Here, and elsewhere, the text frequently threatens to become a biography. In fact, there is a 
section of the book devoted to giving historical details about Walter’s parents. She notes, for 
example, how “Walter’s father, Peter P. Wiebe, was neither a farmer nor a good manager. His 
great passion was arranging and directing music and writing poetry, not digging the soil. Yet the 
government expected homesteaders to become farmers. He became an outstanding choir director 
for the Borden MB church, which gave him his identity as farming did not” (44).  The way that 
Funk Wiebe prioritizes Walter’s life narrative (including his own filiation narrative), at times, 
reflects the way in which the husband’s role was prioritized in conventional Mennonite 
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marriages in Funk Wiebe’s cultural milieu at the time. As this quotation suggests, Funk Wiebe 
represents Walter as a man who is perpetually striving for a kind of emotional and spiritual 
fulfillment that he never entirely finds. Funk Wiebe’s role in her short marriage is to largely 
follow Walter on his quest for fulfillment.  
 After Walter dies, we read about how Funk Wiebe gradually begins to find an identity for 
herself as a writer. Importantly, though, she reveals how the patriarchal society in which she 
existed made it so that she inevitably had to rely on her husband, as well as other men, in order to 
become a writer, recounting how her first significant job came by way of Walter’s own position 
as editor of a Mennonite Brethren publication called The Youth Worker. She writes: “This small 
multi-graphed publication was sent out eventually to about 400 addresses with ever more 
requests. Youth work was just beginning in the churches as a separate ministry. As Walter 
became busier with his teaching and other assignments, I assumed more and more of the editorial 
responsibilities. I wrote articles and signed his name to them” (76). In what is the ultimate 
example of establishing her own identity through her husband’s, Funk Wiebe signs her 
husband’s name to her own work.  
 Later in the book, though, Funk Wiebe successfully breaks away from an identity that 
had been, for the most part, obscured by her husband’s. Nevertheless, she always constructs her 
identity as being linked to others. The book then is not simply her attempt to display her growth 
into a fully autonomous individual but into an individual who comes to the point where she can 
choose for herself the network of relations that work to produce her own sense of self. Funk 
Wiebe is certainly indebted to Walter for her career but she makes sure to write that she is not 
only indebted to Walter. Later in the book, she acknowledges,  
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I wear the shoes of a writer because of editors who encouraged me and gave me 
assignments. Among them are Daniel Hertzler, editor of Christian Living and 
Gospel Herald; Frank H. Epp of The Canadian Mennonite; Orlando Harms who 
first asked me to write a column for The Christian Leader and those who followed 
him: Wally Kroeker, Don Ratzlaff. I risk mentioning a few other names knowing 
I am leaving others out: Paul Shrock, Harold Jantz, Michael A. King, and others. 
(172) 
This quotation reveals two things. It demonstrates that Funk Wiebe’s sense of her own identity is 
very much tied to her role as a writer but, also, that she understands her role as a writer as being 
largely borne from her relations with many other people. The quotation reveals also the lack of 
female role models for women who wanted to work outside the home, or wanted to write, since 
all the people she describes here are men. 
Note here also that this quotation comes later in the book when Funk Wiebe shifts her 
identity to be far more than the conventional and traditional Mennonite wife. At this point she no 
longer acknowledges, as she does earlier in the book, the role her husband played in her eventual 
vocation. I do not believe that this is meant as a purposeful slight, nor do I think that she does not 
mention him because she already gave him his due earlier in the book (after all, she 
acknowledged Daniel Hertzler and Orlando Harms earlier in the book too
17
). Rather, Funk 
Wiebe is illustrating, once again, her departure from a traditional relational identity available to 
women. Rather than reaffirm her relation to her husband, Funk Wiebe instead shows the many 
networks of relations she has belonged to as a result of not being beholden to such a restrictive 
identity. 
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 Once on her own as a widow and a mother, Funk Wiebe revises her understanding of 
family and her role within a family unit in order to fashion a new identity for herself. Initially, 
because her identity had been so thoroughly tied to Walter’s, she writes that his death rendered 
ambiguous her own possibilities in life: “Much of the fifteen years we had been married, Walter 
had been studying, preparing for a literature ministry. I had supported him in every way I could. 
His death hung like a huge heavy curtain between me and the future” (103). She concludes later 
in the book, “With no husband, who was Mrs. Walter Wiebe? I had lost my identity” (237). 
Indeed, at this point, Funk Wiebe’s own self-understanding is largely a consequence of her role 
as a wife and supporter of Walter. Returning to Althusser, her very subjectivity had been 
constituted by being hailed into this role of “wife and supporter.” Walter’s death, then, works 
initially to void Funk Wiebe’s own identity. At first, she mostly maintains the role that she had 
been given, noting that “Motherhood was at the top of my priorities” (112). However, rather than 
depend on the identity given to her, Funk Wiebe illustrates instead her desire to construct a new 
identity outside of the sphere of the patriarchal marriage.  
She continues to write creatively and accepts a teaching position at Tabor, a Mennonite 
Brethren college in Kansas. Describing her experiences at Tabor, Funk Wiebe writes, “An 
institution, especially a small one like Tabor, is like family. It, too, has its own DNA, passed on 
by a process of osmosis through generations of students, faculty, parents, alumni, and supporters, 
holding the entity together” (122). This quotation is noteworthy in its description of the college 
as both a “family” and an “entity” wherein both students and faculty work as a support network. 
Importantly, then, in her independent act of self re-construction, Funk Wiebe takes on a new 
relational identity where she becomes part of a different kind of family and, in the process, 
challenges the conventions of the family memoir. 
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 Funk Wiebe’s construction of herself as being one amongst a larger entity allows her to 
again focus attention on others. This is not to say that she disappears from the narrative entirely. 
In fact, she does tell us about her own personal experiences at Tabor College, noting, for 
example, her near-dismissal as a result of a student who “complained about my choice of 
literature for a Christian school” (137). Yet while we are privy to some of these personal stories, 
Funk Wiebe’s construction of herself as member of a familial identity allows her to place a great 
amount of focus elsewhere as she writes about school and faculty politics as well as the strengths 
and weaknesses of the school. She sketches out, in some detail, the biography of her co-workers, 
notably President Roy Just, whom she describes as “a man of enthusiasm, with a measure of 
charisma and great zeal for evangelism and missions” (129).  
Funk Wiebe also describes incidents at the school wherein she played a minor if not 
wholly outsider role. There are several examples where this occurs but perhaps the most 
prominent one takes place when she describes how the faculty were encouraged to invest in a 
real estate venture called the Antelope Valley Project. She recounts how several faculty members 
bought into the venture largely because they had faith that “God would bless” a “Christian 
institution” that “was offering investment possibilities with Christian principles” (135). The real 
estate project eventually resulted in “huge losses” (135) and Funk Wiebe concludes that this 
event was a “dark blot” in the history of the college (135). Importantly, though, she reveals that 
she “kept [her] distance from the whole affair and was never approached” (135). In other words, 
she seemingly has almost nothing to do with this story personally. Nevertheless, as she suggests, 
it was a rather negative moment historically for Tabor. Because Funk Wiebe’s identity is so 
bound with the Tabor familial entity, she ultimately tells Tabor’s story, rather than simply her 
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own. Constructing her identity as being connected to this larger network ultimately allows her to 
spotlight other stories in which she plays a less significant role. 
Funk Wiebe neither romanticizes nor mythologizes the notion of family or home. Rather, 
she questions the traditional familial enterprise as patriarchal and repressive. In fact, J. Alicia 
Dueck suggests that authors like Katie Funk Wiebe “look at the gendered nature of biological 
distinctions attached to women, in the sense that they point to the particular norms and 
expectations attached to some women because of their ability to bear children” (52). 
Furthermore, in re-defining family and locating alternate networks of relation that sustain a new 
identity, Funk Wiebe illustrates in the very way the text is structured the departure from 
traditional models of relational identity as discussed by Mary G. Mason, to a more contemporary 
and expanded understanding of relationality that has occurred in Mason’s wake. 
 Ultimately, while Funk Wiebe refuses to romanticize the notion of family, she 
nevertheless constructs family as a social framework that works to produce her own memories 
and, consequently, her identity. The fact that she recounts the past of familial others (her 
comments on her father’s peasant upbringing, her description of Walter’s parents’ early 
experiences in Canada as Russian immigrants, her discussion of the real estate venture) suggests 
that her own understanding of her past is very much shaped, in part, by the memories of those in 
her collective familial unit. This is not to say that Funk Wiebe tells the story of the family at the 
expense of herself. In fact, as I will demonstrate in the following chapter, Katie Funk Wiebe in 
many ways privileges the narrative of the community to which she belongs above all else.  
Furthermore, Funk Wiebe does not shy away from listing her own accomplishments in 
the book. There are many sections that detail her significant lifetime achievements (although, 
again, many of these are tied to notions of community). Nevertheless, family is a crucial network 
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of relation in the book. Unlike Of This Earth, though, Katie Funk Wiebe occasionally privileges 
the familial narrative in order to critique it. Walter Wiebe plays a dominating role in the early 
part of the book’s narrative but this, in many ways, illustrates the way in which women’s 
identities were largely shaped by their husbands or by the institution of marriage as it was 
conceived within Funk Wiebe’s cultural milieu. There are, of course, other times where Funk 
Wiebe shows a great deal of reverence for family. That she admits to having felt loaded, in her 
youth, with a cultural heritage given to her by her parents and then notes how she has, in later 
years, embraced her roots is evidence of Funk Wiebe’s ongoing shifting sense not only of 
Mennonitism but, also, of family. In You Never Gave Me a Name, Katie Funk Wiebe re-defines, 
accepts, and critiques family all at once. Regardless of which aspects of family she accepts or 
challenges, she nevertheless demonstrates the dominating presence her several families have had 
in her life. 
 Miriam Toews’s Swing Low likewise demonstrates the overwhelming influence of 
family, in this case the role that Toews’s father played in her life. The book follows a somewhat 
more traditional pattern of the filiation memoir as Couser describes it though only in certain 
specific ways, given that the book cannot be classified as autobiography or memoir though it 
does use the discourse of self-representation to tell a non-fictional story. Much like the authors of 
conventional filiation memoirs, Toews appears to be motivated to write about a parent because 
of that parent’s death. Nancy K. Miller has addressed this issue in her book Bequest & Betrayal. 
Just as Halbwachs argues that memories are a product of collective social networks (such as 
family), Miller contends that it is within the family unit where identities can be constructed. She 
suggests in her prologue that “happy or unhappy, families provide a scenario in which we get to 
try out and perform ideas about ourselves, who we would like to be – within limits. The limits set 
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by the family constitute the blueprint of a self, the outlines of autobiographical space. We could 
also think of this as the family plot” (xi). She concludes by insisting “on the inordinate power of 
that plot to shape our profoundest ideas of self and other” (Miller xii). For Miller, it is the family 
plot – the notion of being able to conceive of one’s self within an “intergenerational, historical, 
and spectral matrix of identifications” (xii) – that provides models of identities. 
 For this reason, too, Miller notes that one’s sense of one’s own selfhood can come into 
question with the death of a parent. She writes: 
The death of parents – dreaded or wished for – is a trauma that causes an invisible 
tear in our self-identity. In the aftermath of a parent’s death, which forces the 
acknowledgment of our shared mortality, loss and mourning take complex paths, 
since our earliest acts of identity are intimately bound up with our relation to the 
dead parent. But the closure produced by the end of their plot does not signal the 
end of ours. (x) 
Much like Katie Funk Wiebe, who faces a lack of identity following the death of her husband, 
Miller notes that children of deceased parents can experience a similar crisis for similar reasons. 
What Miller says here regarding “our earliest acts of identity” being “intimately bound” to 
parents certainly holds true when looking at these particular examples of Canadian Mennonite 
life writing. And indeed, as Rudy Wiebe’s book demonstrates, there is a certain impulse to write 
a book about people who helped establish your sense of self and who are no longer around, 
perhaps because, as Miller suggests, their deaths have left a “tear in our self-identity.” Swing 
Low is a book that Miriam Toews was compelled to write after her father’s suicide. In light of 
Miller’s above comments, it becomes easier to view why Toews chooses to write about her 
father at this particular time. 
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Swing Low is an attempt by Toews to work through her own difficulties not only in losing 
a father to suicide but also in having a father who suffered in silence for a large part of his life 
leaving Toews herself somewhat confused about who her father was, why he acted the way he 
did during his life, and why he ended his life the way he did. As she notes in her introduction, 
I became obsessed with knowing all that I could about his life, searching, I 
suppose for clues that would ultimately lead me to the cause of his death. With the 
help of my mother and my sister and Dad’s friends, colleagues, and relatives, I’ve 
managed to put a few pieces of the puzzle of his life together. But in spite of 
many theories and much speculation, there’s really only one answer, and that is 
depression. A clinical, profoundly inadequate word for deep despair. (xiii) 
The book then is, in many ways, an attempt by Toews at uncovering an identity of her father’s 
that she can comprehend. Ultimately Toews writes in a way that is discursively autobiographical 
in that the book features an autobiographical-I recounting real life experiences. Yet at the same 
time the book is first and foremost about her father’s experiences rather than her own. 
 What makes Swing Low unique from the other books that I am looking at is the fact that, 
apart from the introduction, the entire book is written from the point of view of another person. 
In that sense, I will not attempt to argue that the book is a memoir but it importantly does adopt 
the form in significant ways. Toews herself has written autobiographically on several occasions, 
most notably in A Complicated Kindness and the recently published All My Puny Sorrows. 
Crucially, both of these autobiographical novels deal with a family made up of a father, a 
mother, and two daughters, which not coincidentally is the same familial structure in which 
Toews herself grew up. Perhaps because Toews has a first person narrator in both novels, one 
could make the case that in these books, as well as in Swing Low, Toews uses an 
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autobiographical discourse. However, Swing Low differs in a crucial respect. Unlike Nomi in 
Kindness and Yolandi in Sorrow, Melvyn Toews was very much a real person. Whereas Toews 
constructs a narrative in Swing Low, she fictionalizes one in Kindness and Sorrow. In Swing Low, 
Toews pointedly uses the autobiographical-I in order to tell a story that was sold and marketed as 
a non-fiction. Consequently, I suggest that many aspects of Lejeune’s autobiographical pact are 
still at play here even if the key connection between the name of the author and the narrator of 
the book does not hold up. 
I contend that Toews’s use of the autobiographical-I rather than a more biographical “he” 
is a crucial choice and that if the book were to be categorized as a memoir it would be Melvyn 
Toews’s memoir written by his daughter. This, of course, is not unprecedented. Perhaps the most 
famous example of this particular kind of life writing is Gertrude Stein’s The Autobiography of 
Alice B. Toklas – a book which, despite not being authored by Toklas, has been taken up by 
autobiography scholars in that it “imitates traditional autobiography” (T. Smith 67). Stein’s 
book, in recent years, has been interpreted via a relational approach. Thomas R. Smith, in his 
article “Generating Selves,” has argued that “Stein violates Lejeune’s strict contract by not 
identifying all three narrative functions as aspects of the same person. In so doing, she intimates 
that her own identity is inextricably combined with that of Toklas” (67). Smith, then, positions 
Stein’s book within the realm of relational life writing by reading the text for what it can tell us 
about Stein’s own mutual and fluid relationship with Toklas. 
While Smith’s point may very well be true, I find it somewhat problematically re-asserts 
the dichotomy of individualism and relationality. Reading Stein’s book through the lens of the 
“relational paradigm” forecloses the important gesture of privilegeing Toklas’s narrative in the 
context of self life writing. Similarly, while Swing Low does reveal a good deal about Toews’s 
144 
 
“self-conception,” (which is something I will discuss below) it is also necessary to admit that her 
choice of writing from the perspective of another is a markedly different choice from writing 
from her own perspective even within the realm of what could be called relational life writing. 
To borrow Thomas Smith’s wording, I am not particularly concerned with whether or not Toews 
“intimates that her own identity is inextricably combined” with her father’s. Rather, what is more 
significant to me is that Toews, for the very personal reasons outlined in the quotation above, 
explicitly wants to tell the story of her father. 
Intriguingly, Toews herself largely dismisses the notion that the book is in any way self-
revealing. In an interview with Toews, Natasha G. Wiebe brought up the similarities between 
this book and Toklas. Wiebe observes how “Some people think that Stein was telling her own 
story as much as Alice’s, but in a way that she was comfortable with, through the distancing 
provided by using another person’s voice” (121). Toews replies, “I don’t think I was doing the 
same thing that Gertrude Stein may, or may not, have been doing” (122). In answering whether 
the book is Toews’s own personal story as well as her father’s, she notes, “Maybe in some small 
way. But not overall” (122). She concludes, “Yeah, I think of it as his story. I was very careful to 
write it in his voice, and everything that happens in the book really did happen” (123). Whether 
or not one takes Toews’s claims about her own work as gospel, these quotations ultimately pose 
a problem for those who might read Swing Low through the lens of the relational paradigm as has 
been done with Stein’s book. Such a reading eliminates questions like why Toews focuses 
primarily on her father’s point of view rather than on her own. 
Ultimately, central to Swing Low is the imperative of breaking the silence and stigma on 
mental illness. In this book, Toews allows her father to speak to an experience that he was in 
many ways shamed into silencing for most of his life. At the beginning of the book, Mel is 
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admitted into the Bethesda Hospital in Manitoba after displaying increasingly erratic behaviour. 
Mel says, “Eventually my brother went on a bit to say that he felt my ‘admission’ was a big step 
forward, an essential part of the healing process, and now, perhaps, I’d be able to open up with 
my psychiatrist. You’ve got to be honest, Mel, he said. And of course he’s right” (2). Toews 
demonstrates though that for Mel to be honest about depression meant to divert from what he 
understood for most of his life to be the conventional way of dealing with personal problems. 
Significantly, Toews connects Mel specifically to other family members who suffered in 
much the same way that he did. A good deal of the book, for instance, focuses on Mel’s 
comparing his own depression to the battles experienced by his parents. In these particular 
moments, Mel breaks the problematic silence that has surrounded what appears to be a 
transgenerational issue. He says, “I should have wondered … about my father’s own bout of 
despair and about his three-month stay in bed after leaving the feedmill. But it didn’t occur to me 
then, or ever, to ask him” (79). Later, he speaks of his mother’s alcoholism in similar terms, 
“Perhaps if I had known more about my mother’s past, about her own dark secrets and demons, I 
might have understood why she was the way she was” (106).  
Here Toews presents Mel as having faced the same problem that she herself has faced, 
namely, a lack of discussion about “dark secrets and demons” within the family and the 
confusion that comes as a consequence of this silencing. Toews eventually conveys her own 
direct personal connection to this history of silence through the voice of her father. Mel writes, 
“The birth of my second daughter [Miriam] triggered something inside of me, and I stopped 
talking at home. I didn’t say a word to my wife and daughters for a year. The only sound I made 
resembled the sounds of abject, wordless grief” (107). In illustrating these moments, Toews 
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conveys that she, like her father, is part of a familial chain which has served to perpetuate the 
problem of unaddressed mental instability in the family.  
Toews in several ways makes this a cultural concern and goes so far as to have a nurse 
tell Mel at one point that “there are unusually high numbers of Mennonites who suffer from 
depression” (95). Furthermore, as I will detail further below, it cannot go unaddressed that in this 
book Toews implicates Mennonite in a culture of silencing. There is varying scholarship on how 
mental illness is treated within the Mennonite community. Historian Erika Dyck, for example, 
has stated that historically “mental health issues were woven into the fabric of the community, as 
sources of pride when they involved establishing care homes, and as sources of concern or even 
embarrassment when events strayed toward the misunderstood or stigmatized” (94). Dyck 
ultimately suggests that Mennonites who openly suffered from mental illness were not silenced. 
Yet literary critic Grace Kehler, who also examines Toews’s Swing Low suggests otherwise. 
Kehler argues that Mel’s “story is inherently inter-personal and his psychosomatic suffering an 
event inseparable from his Mennonite community in Steinbach, Manitoba” (171). Kehler argues 
that stories such as Swing Low convey “generations of muted affects and curtailed 
conversations” (171) and reveal that “acts of silencing, shaming, or exiling paradoxically stem 
from a desire to preserve the Mennonites as a distinct cultural and spiritual group” (170).  
Certainly Dyck and Kehler’s opposing points of view reflect the variety of ways that 
different sub-cultures within Mennonitism have dealt with issues of depression and mental 
illness. Nevertheless, Toews herself appears to agree with Kehler’s assessment. In her interview 
with Natasha Wiebe, Toews says,  
Back then I was very angry, because of all of the circumstances surrounding my 
dad’s death, his suicide, and everything that played out in the community, before 
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and after and surrounding that. I was very angry, you know; I was very bitter. I 
think I in part blamed the Mennonite community and church – to a certain extent, 
not entirely, obviously, it wasn’t the whole picture in terms of my father’s mental 
illness and suicide. But certainly, that kind of repression, and his own guilt and 
the pressure that he felt to play a certain role in a community, in the church, just 
this very constricted life that he had that was all tied up with religious 
fundamentalism. And then, some of the responses from some of the people in the 
community in the terms of their denial of his illness and suicide, or the rumors 
that were spread that were not true. To a certain degree, I blamed the Mennonite 
community and Mennonite fundamentalism for contributing to my dad’s mental 
illness and death. (“It Gets Under” 107-08) 
Toews’s point of view here is unquestionably represented in the book. Toews shows Mel 
learning from a young age that his mother’s own personal issues were not to be publicly 
discussed.  
This becomes clear in a scene when young Mel is undergoing analysis. Mel says, “The 
doctor, who was really a psychiatrist from Winnipeg, and who may not have been aware of the 
implications of a small-town confession, had asked me if there was anything bothering me, 
anything untoward happening at home, anything that might be making me feel sad” (76). When 
Mel does reveal his mother’s problems with alcohol to the doctor, he is sharply rebuked for it. 
He notes, “I had shamed the family, I had jeopardized our status in the community, and my 
father’s livelihood. I had ruined my mother’s reputation and undermined my father’s efforts to 
cope by turning away from it” (76). This is a critical moment in Mel’s narrative as it ultimately 
solidifies the notion that, in his own community at least, personal problems are to be kept quiet. 
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Mel observes, “I had been brought up to learn that who we are at home and who we are at work 
and in the community can be as different as night and day” (104). Here he is speaking both about 
the silencing of his mother’s alcoholism as well as the overall silencing of his own mental 
illness.  
This is significant because here Mel reveals his decision that the public persona that he, 
in many ways, crafted, would show no appearances of depression. This, of course, has many 
ramifications in a discussion on life writing which, as Andrew Lesk puts it, “is a field of cultural 
production” and “self-authorship represents an attempt not only to shape the public self but also 
the reception of that self” (174). Lesk suggests here that the autobiographical self is very much a 
“public self” – it is the self that the writer wishes to portray to a reading audience. Given that 
Mel had always intentionally silenced his own depression in shaping his own public self, it 
would make sense that it would be difficult for him to write autobiographically as writing 
autobiographical texts require openness and honesty. 
Toews, as discussed by Mel throughout the book, does not appear to suffer directly from 
the same issues. Rather, as Mel puts it, she takes after her mother, Elvira, while Marjorie, 
Toews’s sister, takes after Mel. Of Toews, Melvyn notes, “I would see her at assembly 
occasionally and she would remind me of Elvira in that old kindergarten photo I was telling you 
about, elbowing her way to the front row, determined to see and be seen” (131). He concludes 
later that it “has been easier to understand Marjorie as she grew from a girl to a young woman” 
(157), but “Miriam, on the other hand, baffled me” (158) 18. Given that the book gives no 
indication that Toews likewise suffers in the same way as her father, it is ultimately a remarkable 
choice on her part to have her father’s voice, rather than her own, break the silence on the issue 
through telling the book from his perspective. It is as if Toews is saying that it is important to 
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specifically listen to the voices of those who experienced depression firsthand, even when they 
are no longer around.  
 Yet while Toews writes Swing Low in a way that spotlights Mel and gives him the 
opportunity to break the silence on depression, she also reaffirms the notion of the family unit as 
a producer of identities. Intriguingly, a great deal of the book’s narrative is made up of what 
appear to be shared familial memories. There is, for example, the section of the text in which 
Mel and five-year old Toews watch a family of young wrens in their outside birdhouse unable to 
get food from their mother because of a “sparrow” who was “blocking the entrance, … 
preventing the mother wren from returning home to feed her babies” (27). The point of this 
episode, according to Mel, was that it confirmed his suspicion “that evil would inevitably 
triumph over good” but also that “the struggle to be good was the purpose of life” (27). This 
episode helps to construct Mel as pessimistic yet also positive about the value of struggle.  
The presence of young Toews in this episode though begs the question of whether this 
was a memory for Mel at all, though there is a similar doubt about whether a five-year old would 
remember this moment which only seems to have a real memorial value because of what Mel 
takes away from it. What seems most likely, then, is that the event could be recalled here in this 
moment of identity construction because it was a common and shared moment between the two. 
Similarly, Mel tells the story of his wedding to Elvira which turns out to be comically disastrous 
when Elvira’s veil catches on fire during the wedding kiss. Melvyn notes, “That fire bothered me 
more than I ever let on, and as Elvia recounted the tale, in all its hilarious detail, to whoever 
would listen, I would sit quietly smiling at intervals and waiting for it to be over” (43). Again, 
this moment works to tell us about Mel’s character but it also tells us that these memories are not 
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brought about and retained by the individual but, instead, are shaped through a collective familial 
recounting of events. 
The book, in many ways, demonstrates how Mel’s self-conception is a family effort, 
particularly when it comes to the way that his family members shift his own sense of self. 
Speaking of his own parenting skills, Mel writes, 
I didn’t know how to be with them, other than as a teacher, and the odd time I 
made an effort to interact casually and affectionately as I felt a father should, it 
felt forced and artificial and I knew they sensed it too, and I became self-
conscious. I retreated into my bedroom, reassuring them with a few words of my 
love and concern, and smiling at them often like a distant relative, unsure how to 
proceed from there. (141) 
If it is the case that Melvyn was a distant father, as he suggests here, Toews ultimately does not 
use this book as a space to critique him. In fact, Toews’s book reinforces the points made by 
critics on filiation life writing, in that these books often come out of a certain absence or lack.  
Scholars have noted that because authors are frequently writing out of absence, their 
work is rarely judgemental. Couser, for example, suggests that works of filiation life writing are 
often “driven not by the desire to memorialize a beloved or admired father but by the impulse to 
shore up, repair, or compensate for a flawed relationship” (“Genre Matters” 151). In agreement, 
Roger J. Porter notes that in these books there is often an “attempt at reconciliation of some kind, 
for their function is to understand rather than to blame. Sympathy, not anger, tends to 
predominate” (103). A good deal of the book, then, involves Melvyn’s being reassured by his 
family. These moments make Swing Low a crucial example of a text where the collective family 
works to construct identity via memory.  
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At one point Mel’s daughters remind their father of moments from his past in order to 
challenge his negative self-conception. He says, 
I have neglected them horribly and it’s much too late now to make amends. They 
tell me in big block letters that I have not neglected them, that I have provided 
them with everything they could ever want in life, with holidays and riding 
lessons and music lessons and summer camp and new bicycles and a cottage at 
the lake and university and…They tell me I was a good father, but they of course 
are lying to me, trying to make me feel better. (37) 
At this point, Mel is confused regarding his own past and consequently his sense of self. In this 
case, there is a need to remind Mel of these memories because of his depression, though given 
what we have seen in the other texts in this chapter, this exercise in collective familial memory-
making is simply an extreme example of a common practice
19
.  
 The quotation above does say outright that Mel seems to believe his children are “lying” 
when they tell him he was a good father; however, a subsequent passage in the same section of 
the book suggests that he relies heavily on his daughters to confirm that this identity of the good 
father is true. He writes, “I have pages and pages of YOU’RE A GOOD FATHER, A GOOD 
MAN, AND WE ARE PROUD OF YOU. THIS IS NOT YOUR FAULT. WE LOVE YOU 
AND WE KNOW YOU LOVE US. Please write it down one more time, I ask them, and they 
do” (37). This moment illustrates how Mel is not only dependent on his daughters to give him a 
good sense of who he is as a father, but also reveals that his belief that such an identity can be 
legitimized through the act of writing. Importantly, it is Toews herself who seeks to establish her 
father as a kind and sympathetic man rather than simply an emotionally distant and frequently 
incomprehensible figure, through the act of writing his story in this book. 
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 As critics of similar types of books like The Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas point out, 
Swing Low works to establish Toews’s own identity, which is also bound to family. Toews 
makes this clear on a much more basic level when she suggests that her sister Marj inherited her 
father’s traits while she inherited her mother’s. Yet while this conventional relational approach 
may be accurate and has its merits, it does not fully explain why Toews should focus so much on 
her father rather than illustrate the mutual dynamic between self and her familial others. What is 
remarkable with Swing Low is that it conveys the importance of self life writing in that it stresses 
the imperative of breaking the silence of depression, yet at the same time contains an 
autobiographical-I which does not correlate to the name on the cover of the book. Toews, like 
Rudy Wiebe and Katie Funk Wiebe, ultimately conveys that memory, and with it identity, can be 
a familial project and doing so allows her to construct an autobiographical text that focuses on 
others. 
 The authors I have looked at in this chapter have stressed the significance of family in 
one form or another. I began by re-assessing the claims made by Alison Landsberg, whose 
arguments on the issue of prosthetic memory were crucial in my discussion of intergenerational 
trauma in chapter one. In this chapter, the authors I examined reconfirmed Landsberg’s point that 
one can take on the memories of others. In each text, the book’s authors present the memories of 
familial others – memories the author either did not experience firsthand or forgot – in their work 
of autobiographical construction.  
That being said, these works also challenge another key point made by Landsberg that the 
onslaught of 20
th
 century modernity effectively disrupted and rendered “inadequate” traditional 
ways of transmitting memory, such as family ties. These books show how Landsberg’s point 
neglects to fully account for particular cultural groups like the Russian Canadian Mennonites of 
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the first half of the 20
th
 Century who were, for a time, less influenced by new technological 
trends and sought to sustain familial connections. These texts are, in many ways, testaments to 
the success of those endeavours even when the families presented by the authors are plagued by 
very real and very damaging issues such as patriarchy, depression, intergenerational silence, and 
so on. 
 More than that though, in effectively illustrating Maurice Halbwachs’ point that memory 
can be produced in collective social networks such as family, each of these authors effectively 
manages to provide an autobiographical account that illustrates the dominating role familial 
narratives play in their own lives. In evoking and revealing the lives of others within the 
discourse of autobiography, Rudy Wiebe, Katie Funk Wiebe, and Miriam Toews reveal how the 
story of the family (or, of particular family members) could be privileged over the story of the 
individual self. In my next chapter I will look at Lauren Berlant’s concept of “intimate publics” 
and consider how several Mennonite authors’ work obscures the autobiographical-I by shifting 
attention to issues for a small and intimate community of others so that the works are both 
revelatory as well as closed off. 
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Chapter Three 
Intimate Publics and Community  
In my previous chapter, I discussed how Rudy Wiebe, Katie Funk Wiebe, and Miriam 
Toews positioned themselves in relation to an intimate group, namely family, to the extent that 
the familial narrative was privileged over the narrative of the self. The relationship between self 
and other that I described in chapter two was somewhat different from that which I discussed in 
my first chapter where I discussed Mennonite authors in relation to a more abstract group of 
historical others. In this chapter, I would like to in some ways blend elements of my first two 
chapters by discussing Mennonite authors who frequently privilege the narrative of an intimate 
but, at the same time, abstract group. By that I mean an abstract public community who 
potentially share similar life experiences to the writers.  
In discussing community, I am not necessarily talking about the Mennonite community in 
which the authors were raised (though I will talk about that as well). Rather, my notion of 
community is somewhat inspired by critic Lauren Berlant’s use of the term in her discussion of 
“intimate publics” in her books The Queen of America Goes to Washington City and The Female 
Complaint. In the latter book, Berlant defines intimate publics as a group of people who “share a 
worldview and emotional knowledge that they have derived from a broadly common historical 
experience” (viii). Berlant uses the term intimate publics interchangeably with the term 
community. In The Female Complaint, for example, she notes that “The concept of the ‘intimate 
public’ thus carries the fortitude of common sense or a vernacular sense of belonging to a 
community, with all the undefinedness that implies” (10). Elsewhere, in an interview with Jay 
Prosser, she refers to intimate publics as an “affective community” (Prosser 184). This 
community, though, is somewhat unusual because none of its members necessarily have to ever 
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know each other or meet. Rather, as Berlant says, intimate publics can be understood as a 
collection of “strangers” connected “in a kind of nebulous communitas” (Female xi).  
This chapter will look at authors Katie Funk Wiebe and Di Brandt in order to show how 
both authors forge identities in relation to a larger community, the members of which they 
themselves do not necessarily always know personally
20
. Rather, these authors connect with this 
abstract group on the grounds that they share a common ideological belief system or have similar 
past experiences. Thus, Di Brandt sees herself in relation to a community of others who are, in 
many ways, victims of environmental exploitation carried out in market driven economies. Katie 
Funk Wiebe, meanwhile, constructs her identity in relation to a community of females who have 
struggled against patriarchy, and she also sees herself in relation to a community in exile. 
Importantly, for each of these authors, identifying themselves in relation to this abstract 
community allows the writers to focus their attention on others who have similar life 
experiences.  
I will begin by exploring in some detail Berlant’s discussion of intimate publics and will 
then consider its relevance to both life writing scholarship and Mennonite literary scholarship. 
As discussed above, an intimate public is a sphere wherein people assume a connection to others 
because of their perception of having had similar life experiences and holding common 
ideologies. What draw members together in an intimate public can be quite simply shared beliefs 
and activities. As Gabriele Linke points out, “Berlant finds intimacy emerging in unpredictable 
places and forums - for instance, when people walk their dogs at the same times or read a book” 
(15). Linke’s examples, here, of people who do the same activity “at the same times,” and who 
also forge connections to others via text, draw out the obvious parallels between Berlant and 
Benedict Anderson. Anderson traces the prevailing conception of national communities to the 
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origins of print culture. In particular, he states it is in the mass ceremony of reading the 
newspaper that an understanding of community is formed: “It is performed in silent privacy, in 
the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the ceremony he performs is being 
replicated simultaneously by thousands (or millions) of others of whose existence he is 
confident, yet of whose identity he has not the slightest notion” (35).  
Berlant’s theorization of intimate publics, then, really belongs within a larger theoretical 
framework which helps explain how different cultural groups conceive of their own collective 
identities. Like Anderson’s imagined national communities, Berlant’s intimate publics are 
equally illusory. As Michael Warner puts it in his complementary discussion on publics and 
counterpublics, “publics exist only by virtue of their imagining. They are a kind of fiction that 
has taken on life, and very potent life at that” (8)21. Furthermore, just as Anderson sees national 
communities emerging out of a print culture, Berlant observes intimate publics “[operating] 
when a market opens up to a bloc of consumers, claiming to circulate texts and things that 
express those people’s particular core interests and desires” (Female 5). Here Berlant adds to the 
points made above by Linke. Certainly an intimate public can be formed between two people 
who “walk their dogs at the same times,” but as the quotation above demonstrates, an intimate 
public is also crucially reliant on text as a product that can reach a reading public. It is through 
the act of reading, she suggests, that one can see their own “interests and desires” and 
consequently imagine belonging to a unified social community. 
 Yet while Anderson’s readers imagine a nation, Berlant’s readers often imagine 
themselves belonging to a far more narrow social (rather than national) group based on a 
common set of concerns. Berlant’s communities are social groups that are populated by those 
unable to take on the role of a legitimate social actor in the grand narratives of nation. She writes, 
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“Whether linked to women or other nondominant people, [an intimate public] promises a certain 
experience of belonging and provides a complex of consolation, confirmation, discipline, and 
discussion about how to live as an x” (Female viii). Thus, intimate publics are a way for 
historically nonprivileged subjects to connect with fellow nonprivileged subjects in a way that is 
otherwise denied by the socio-political structure.  
As Gabrielle Linke correctly points out, though, Berlant sees intimate publics as being 
“part of the mechanisms of capitalism” (16) precisely because they emerge out of a commodity-
driven culture. Thus intimate publics can never fully undermine the system that has rendered 
them subordinate. Intimate publics illustrate how the politically subversive spirit of the sixties 
was undermined and rechanneled during the Reagan era of the 1980s. She argues that “A 
conservative coalition formed whose aim was the privatization of U.S. citizenship. One part of 
its project involved rerouting the critical energies of the emerging political sphere into the 
sentimental spaces of an amorphous opinion culture, characterized by strong patriotic 
identification mixed with feelings of practical political powerlessness” (The Queen 3).  
Berlant argues that because political subversiveness has been silenced in the name of 
feelings of powerlessness, connections between people are made through emotionally (but not 
politically) charged discussions about common experiences of injustices and helplessness, thus 
reinforcing a status quo rather than enacting systemic change. I give this information not only 
because I want to engage with Berlant’s notion of intimate publics but also to convey the very 
specificity of its definition in order to explain my own departure from Berlant and how the 
authors that I look at may very well be forging a similar yet different kind of intimate public in 
their autobiographical texts.  
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Berlant’s conception of intimate publics have been taken up by life writing scholars, most 
notably at the 2010 IABA conference in Sussex and subsequent publication of a selection of 
IABA conference papers in a full issue of Biography (2011) devoted to the subject of life writing 
as intimate publics. It seems to me, though, that many of these papers illustrate how intimate 
publics and life writing are a more uncomfortable fit than what one might be led to assume. 
Many of the scholars in the special issue of Biography themselves begin with Berlant’s own 
assertion that “By ‘intimate public’ I do not mean a public sphere organized by autobiographical 
confession and chest-baring, although there is often a significant amount of first-person narrative 
in an intimate public” (Female viii). Despite Berlant’s claims, life writing scholars have used the 
notion of intimate publics in order to examine how life writing works to draw together 
nonprivileged social groups. But because Berlant’s notion of intimate publics is so specific, I 
often find that these analyses cannot fully engage with the term as Berlant herself means it. 
 Ioana Luca, for example, uses Berlant in her examination of autobiographies written by 
authors who experienced the effects of Eastern European Communism in order to “show what 
kind of worlds and spaces intimacy builds in the context of a totalitarian regime” (71). Luca’s 
discussion is a good one but to me the theory of intimate publics seems somewhat out of place in 
a paper on totalitarian Communism when, for Berlant, intimate publics are specifically a 
consequence of consumer capitalism. Similarly, Susan Stabile’s article, “Tell-Tale Heart” refers 
to “organ donors and recipients” as being “one of the historically disenfranchised groups 
recognized by Berlant” because “their legal identities are institutionally censored” (135). Rather 
than examine literary texts, Stabile suggests that a sentimental intimate public is formed between 
an organ donor and the patient who benefits from the donation. Fascinating though this article is, 
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it does not fully account for the way Berlant herself appears to use her own terminology. These 
examples illustrate the inherent difficulty in applying Berlant to an analysis in life writing.  
I want to suggest, though, that Berlant’s concept of “intimate publics” is helpful in 
discussing the works that I am looking at. For one, Berlant (along with Anderson) helpfully 
suggests how the commodification and circulation of texts proliferates relational identities or 
what Berlant calls a “collective sociality routed in revelations of what is personal” (Female 10). 
For Berlant, cultural conditions produce subjects that see themselves as part of a larger 
organization of people with shared interests, ideologies, and desires. Anderson and Berlant, then, 
give me a solid theoretical background in order to explain how the authors I examine construct 
themselves in relation to an abstract community of others, one which is frequently reinforced by 
literature or literary texts, on the basis of perceived similarities.  
Important too to my own particular discussion is Berlant’s notion of intimate publics as 
being a formation of nonprivileged people excluded from the dominant political or socio-cultural 
sphere. Berlant draws on Deleuze and Guattari’s notion “that one’s identification with any 
material marked by a ‘minor’ voice performs one’s attachment to being generic, to being a 
member of a population that has been marked out as having collective qualities that are 
apprehensible in individuals” (x). Significantly, similar claims have been made about 
contemporary Canadian Mennonite literature. In Surplus At the Border, for example, Douglas 
Reimer likewise uses Deleuze and Guattari in order to characterize Mennonites as a “minor” 
group who are “gathered around the outside edges of the major English group” (4). While he 
later asserts that “Much Mennonite writing of the late twentieth century belongs to the tradition 
of major literature” (10), he nevertheless notes that even writers “who have imitated the major” 
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such as Rudy Wiebe and Di Brandt, “continue actively to write for their Mennonite 
communities” (6) and thus, as he concludes, write “against major literary conventions” (191).  
At the same time, it should be noted that Reimer is referring to authors who frequently 
write out of personal experience, even if it is a personal experience that is somewhat cloaked by 
poetic language or fictionalized characters. Ultimately, then, these personal stories serve to 
connect with a community of readers (for Reimer, specifically “Mennonite Canadians”) who 
have had similar histories. Reimer notes that Rudy Wiebe’s personal novel Peace Shall Destroy 
Many speaks to a “community threatened by the failing leadership of its religious, political, and 
education institutions” (5). Certainly, it is the case that Wiebe’s first novel can be read as a 
personal text even if many events that occur in the book did not occur in real life. Wiebe himself 
has referred to the book as “the first realistic novel written in English about the Mennonite 
experience” (“The Skull” 16) and, in a rejoinder to criticisms he received over the book, 
somewhat sarcastically noted that “clearly such things happen [in his Mennonite society], but 
they should not be spoken of in public” (“The Skull” 18).  
Paul Tiessen has likewise drawn a connection between Wiebe’s memoir Of This Earth 
and Peace Shall Destroy Many, calling attention to “the essentially autobiographical nature of 
both texts. The novel’s material setting – its place in Saskatchewan, its time, its demographic, 
and, implicitly, many of its people – is more or less identical to that of the memoir, published 44 
years later” (203). In other words, in Peace Shall Destroy Many, Wiebe draws from his own 
personal life in representing a Mennonite family growing up in a small Mennonite community 
and, according to Reimer, portrays a social experience recognizable to other members of the 
socio-cultural group out of which he writes.  
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Reimer is not the first critic to have observed the custom of contemporary Mennonite 
authors writing for a specific community to which they see themselves belonging. In 1988, Hildi 
Froese Tiessen noted that “As they have moved relentlessly into the mainstream, many of these 
Mennonite writers have incorporated mother tongue into their work in such a way that it 
functions as shibboleth, re-delineating the very barriers between insider and outsider many of 
them have railed against in their work” (“Mother Tongue” 181). For Froese Tiessen, even 
Mennonite authors who refuse to adhere to the traditional Mennonite desire for separateness and 
aversion to wordliness can nevertheless sometimes reflect the tenets of their (occasionally 
former) community in their writing. Moreover, their use of the “mother tongue” which “For over 
400 years” Froese Tiessen notes, “functioned as shelter for the Mennonites committed to existing 
as a people apart” (183), works to relate the personal with the public. In other words, in evoking 
the mother tongue, these authors point to themselves and their texts as belonging to and speaking 
for a particular culture with members who have shared life experiences. As Reimer still asserts in 
2002, these mainstream authors write in a way that speaks specifically to a Canadian Mennonite 
community.  
This should not be surprising given the significance of community in the Mennonite 
historical tradition. As Calvin Redekop puts it in his book Mennonite Society, “Mennonites 
throughout their history and wherever they have lived have displayed in most explicit ways the 
very central concept of the Mennonite community. Community has always been an influential 
factor in the thought and life of the whole Mennonite society” (130). Almost in line with the kind 
of publics that Berlant discusses, Redekop goes on to define community in the Mennonite sense 
as a “network of interrelationships, among persons who share the same history, who have the 
same symbolic system, who feel emotionally one with other Mennonites, and who tend to live in 
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spatially defined areas” (131-32). I argue that this tradition of community, in the sense of 
emotional connections with others who have shared “the same history,” has in many ways 
influenced the two authors I look at in this chapter in the sense that they are particularly 
accustomed to foregrounding or privileging the narrative of community. 
Reimer and Froese Tiessen as literary critics, are crucial in explaining how this socio-
cultural convention of placing an emphasis on community has influenced several Canadian 
Mennonite authors. Yet unlike Reimer and Froese Tiessen, I will show in this chapter that while 
these authors construct themselves as being one amongst a community, their community is not 
necessarily always strictly a Mennonite community. What I want to show is that the Mennonite 
ethos of community which is enacted in these texts extends to other communities as well. It is 
perhaps the case that as these authors have become more mainstream and less separate their 
sense of community has shifted whilst still remaining a vital component of their sense of self. 
To be clear, the community I see at work in these texts is not a stable, unified, and 
essential Mennonite community and sometimes not even a Mennonite community at all. Yet 
while Funk Wiebe and Brandt see community in various ways, they both speak for and count 
themselves amongst a public they connect with via personal, autobiographical stories. In this 
sense, the model of intimate publics works well for this analysis. Nevertheless, I stray somewhat 
from the model established by both Anderson and Berlant in that I am making no presumptions 
about audience. I do not focus on how these texts work to construct a sense of community or 
intimate public with a group of readers. What concerns me is how the authors themselves 
presume an intimacy with their addressees and others whom they mention in the text. To borrow 
a phrase from Michael Warner, I am focusing on how the text itself conveys a “sense of its 
public” (110). In other words, I am looking at how these writers of autobiographical texts 
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establish their own particular identity in relation to an often imagined community whom the 
author constructs as sharing similar histories, beliefs, and goals. In presuming these intimate 
publics and in characterizing themselves as members of this public, the authors are able to write 
autobiographically and at the same time privilege the narrative of a community of others.  
While I see Berlant as useful in explaining how these authors construct themselves as 
belonging to a perceived community, I also think that her definition of intimate publics is limited 
in the sense that it does not account for texts, like the ones I examine here, in which authors do 
not rely primarily on affect. While the authors that I examine may make emotional pleas and 
forge emotional connections to a community of others, they also make very rational (and 
sometimes radically political) systemic critiques against the patriarchal social structure and a 
destructive profit-oriented capitalist economic system. In that sense, I agree with writers Helga 
Lénárt-Cheng and Darija Walker who see the political potential for intimate publics. Specifically 
examining the sharing of life narratives on social networking sites, they argue that “Although 
Berlant’s description of the ‘intimate public sphere’ is relevant to our topic, it is important to 
note that in her examples it is the actual private act that is appropriated, while in ours, the 
emphasis is not on the actual private experience, but on the communal act of sharing it” (152).  
Lénárt-Cheng and Walker stress that “communal sharing of individual lifestories can lead 
to more effective, and more individualized, forms of participatory democracy” (142). Lénárt-
Cheng and Walker, here, are speaking quite specifically about places of exchange, such as an 
online forum, where life stories can be in dialogue with others. While the cases that I look at are 
different, these authors nevertheless do share their personal stories with and about a perceived 
intimate public that they consider themselves as belonging to, with the intention of creating 
genuine systemic change. In the same way that Lénárt-Cheng and Walker discuss online sites, I 
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likewise suggest that these texts reveal how sharing both the personal as well as the narrative of a 
community with an intimate public can be a form of social and political activism. 
Beginning with You Never Gave Me a Name, I would like to consider the multiple ways 
that Katie Funk Wiebe’s text speaks to an intimate public. One of the ways she does this is by 
connecting specifically to a Canadian Russian Mennonite community who share the loss of a 
homeland as a key aspect of their collective master narrative. Robert Zacharias has recently 
noted that the story of “the rise and fall of the Mennonite Commonwealth” (5) has “taken on the 
status of a supplementary scripture for Canada’s Russian Mennonites – as if its retelling has 
become as central to the identity of this deeply religious community as the biblical narrative 
itself” (4). Developing his argument further, Zacharias suggests that it is the “1920s migration 
narrative” that functions as the “break event” for Mennonites, which affirms “communal identity 
across national and generational borders” and has led “much of their recent literature” to be 
“characterized by clear tropes of migration, displacement, and homelessness” (5). I suggest that 
Funk Wiebe taps into this marker of communal identity and works to construct an identity for 
herself in the text that connects with this Russian Canadian Mennonite community by 
constructing her own origin story of “migration, displacement, and homelessness.”  
Funk Wiebe’s first chapter, aptly titled “A beginning that led to many beginnings,” starts 
with her already having left home to attend the Mennonite Brethren Bible College. There Funk 
Wiebe meets her future husband Walter, and at that point begins a rather unstable journey of re-
locating to different destinations that include Yarrow, B.C., Hepburn, Saskatchewan, Funk 
Wiebe’s hometown of Blaine Lake, Niagara-on-the-Lake, Ontario, Kitchener, Ontario, and 
finally, Hillsboro, Kansas. Funk Wiebe notes how financial concerns were a significant 
motivation behind these moves, suggesting that “Money was always short” (82), which 
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increasingly becomes an issue for Funk Wiebe as her family grows to include four children 
followed by Walter’s becoming ill. The narrative of constant wandering, of course, bears a 
striking similarity to the historical narrative of the Mennonites. Funk Wiebe’s description of her 
own ancestors reinforces this connection: “Always movement and wandering in search of a 
better livelihood, greater freedom of religion, and opportunity to better the family” (253). One 
could describe Funk Wiebe’s own early life in similar terms. In fact, when Funk Wiebe’s father 
refers to her as a “child of many wanderings” (14) during an imaginary conversation that she 
herself constructs, it is unclear whether he is referring to her heritage or to her own life. What is 
more likely is that he means both and that Funk Wiebe is calling attention to the feeling of 
homelessness that continues to persist amongst contemporary Canadian Russian Mennonite 
communities. 
Funk Wiebe’s decision to illustrate the condition of homelessness through a personal 
story rather than through the larger, historical narrative of Mennonite exile is not without 
precedent and is, in fact, common in contemporary Canadian Mennonite literature.  In her article 
on Miriam Toews’s A Complicated Kindness, titled “Restorying the Mennonite Diaspora,” 
Natasha G. Wiebe notes how “writers of Russian Mennonite heritage often use the diaspora 
narrative to re-present community and personal histories and to establish their identities as 
Mennonites to themselves and to others” (34). She refers to this practice as restorying, which she 
suggests is a “process of constructing new narratives from existing ones” (35). For Wiebe, 
Toews restorys the Mennonite diaspora narrative in A Complicated Kindness in three different 
ways.  
One of these ways is through a direct re-telling of the “Mennonite Flight from Russia” 
(37) but she also tells the story of diaspora through less direct narratives such as “The Christian 
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Flight to Heaven” (38) and “The Nickel Family Flight from East Village” (40). Natasha Wiebe’s 
point, similar to the one Zacharias offers, is that the diaspora has operated as a master narrative 
in Mennonite writing and for establishing a particular Mennonite identity. As Zacharias argues, 
writers reveal the overarching cultural influence of this mythical origin narrative by writing 
specifically about the experience of migration from Russia to Canada. As Natasha Wiebe points 
out, though, Mennonite authors can also re-tell the narrative indirectly through more figurative 
versions of the history in stories about other kinds of flight, migration, and exile.  
This practice of restorying is a familiar one within autobiography scholarship where it 
has long been understood that, in life writing, authors adopt the discourses of self-representation 
(along with the stories that go with them) that are made available through cultural circulation. As 
Smith and Watson note, “Conventions that are culturally and historically specific govern 
storytelling options, narrative plotting, and the uses of remembering” (91). The stories that we 
use to talk about ourselves, then, are rooted in a very particular time and place. Moreover, stories 
are crucial in the discursive formation of identities and, as a result, we frequently come to 
understand who we are via entrenched cultural narratives. As Jerome Bruner puts it, master 
narratives help “to structure perceptual experience, to organize memory, to segment and purpose-
build the very ‘events’ of a life” (694). Restorying, to use Natasha G. Wiebe’s term, is a crucial 
method of writing that allows one to make sense of one’s life by positioning one’s self within a 
larger cultural master narrative.   
 I am suggesting that this restorying is at work in Katie Funk Wiebe’s narrative of 
migration that shows her and her family frequently and repeatedly “moving into the unknown” 
(You Never 99). This is not to say, of course, that these moments of constant wandering did not 
occur. Rather, what I am suggesting is that cultural conventions are at work in Funk Wiebe’s 
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decision to understand and subsequently relay her own lived experiences in this way. To use 
Natasha Wiebe’s phrasing, the narrative of diaspora “provides a framework” (34) for Katie Funk 
Wiebe to make sense out of her own life. Furthermore, by evoking the narrative of diaspora, and 
in effect by calling attention to the double meaning inherent in the name “child of many 
wanderings,” Funk Wiebe connects her own story to the story of a community of fellow 
Canadian Mennonites who continue to see exile as a crucial part of their collective identity. As 
Natasha Wiebe notes, these stories of homelessness reveal “personal histories.” Yet, as Zacharias 
points out, these particular stories resonate amongst a specific audience of Canadian Russian 
Mennonites. It is with this audience that Funk Wiebe connects herself in her memoir.  
In this sense, I see Funk Wiebe’s story as establishing not only an intimate public but also 
what Svetlana Boym has termed a “diasporic intimacy.” Similar to Berlant, Boym argues that 
diasporic intimacy “thrives on unpredictable chance encounters, on hope for human 
understanding. Yet this hope is not utopian. Diasporic intimacy is not limited to the private 
sphere but reflects collective frameworks of memory that encapsulate even the most personal of 
dreams” (500). Much like intimate publics, diasporic intimacy works to construct a community 
on the basis of shared experiences, in Boym’s case, the shared experience of exile. Both intimate 
publics and diasporic intimacy function to draw the personal to a specific, collective and 
communal public.  
In his memoir Of This Earth, Rudy Wiebe likewise calls attention to this pervasive 
feeling of homelessness amongst Canadian Russian Mennonites when he speaks of his family 
moving throughout Canada until they find a home that “was as close to a Russian Mennonite 
village as my parents ever found in Canada” (374). This quotation reveals the pervasive feeling 
of displacement amongst Russian Mennonite migrants and their inability to fully recover their 
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mythical origin which leads to an ongoing wandering. Unlike Rudy Wiebe, though, who speaks 
here of his parents, Katie Funk Wiebe tells an explicitly personal story of constant wandering. To 
borrow from Robert Zacharias, Funk Wiebe reveals “the ongoing importance of the migration 
narrative for the contemporary community” (11). Ultimately, in her memoir, Funk Wiebe 
connects her own identity (rather than her parents’ identity) to a community of Canadian Russian 
Mennonites who still consider exile as a crucial component of their self-understanding. 
 Katie Funk Wiebe, though, establishes her identity in relation to a Mennonite community 
in other ways that are potentially more subversive. This is noted, in fact, in the foreword of Funk 
Wiebe’s book by Wally Kroeker who writes, 
This “life review,” as she calls it, is a wine of late harvest, a story “told right” 
which many readers can embrace as their own. It is, in a sense, a social history of 
the Mennonite movement of the second half of the last century, as refracted 
through her Mennonite Brethren lens. Her opening depiction of earnest but 
stifling Bible college life, for example, is not simply personal reflection but a 
candid analysis of Mennonite piety, a textured rendering of a generation in flux. 
(9-10) 
Kroeker’s notes, in this quotation, that this memoir is not simply Funk Wiebe’s story but rather 
the story of an entire generation. Moreover, he importantly suggests that readers can look at this 
personal story “as their own” as if what happened to Funk Wiebe in her own personal life also 
happened in much the same way to a larger collective group. Her book is a “personal reflection” 
but at the same time, it is a story that speaks for many who saw their lives in a state of “flux” 
during the same time.  
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 The flux that Kroeker speaks of is articulated by Funk Wiebe as the experience of a 
slowly changing attitude regarding the role of women in the Mennonite Brethren church, a point 
that Kroeker calls attention to when he refers to Funk Wiebe’s “Stifling Bible college life.” You 
Never Gave me a Name discusses, in no small detail, Funk Wiebe’s own attempts to have a more 
active public life – particularly, a life that would be more active in her Mennonite Brethren 
religion. She notes soon after her husband Walter dies that her goals were “to become a better 
writer and to clarify for myself my role as a woman in the church” (114). Such a life was largely 
discouraged by the patriarchal structure of the Mennonite Brethen. As Marlene Epp observes, 
“Until the mid- to late twentieth century, and in certain subgroups still today, Mennonite women 
were explicitly excluded from important aspects of church organizational life and expression” 
(Mennonite Women 120).  
Funk Wiebe indeed addresses precisely this sort of exclusion but also the problems that 
accompanied the gradual change of the system in the late twentieth century. She writes, 
I sensed women were reluctant to expand their ministry into new aspects of 
church life, especially leadership roles, even as the church rapidly changed in the 
latter third of the twentieth century. They had accepted that a woman’s role was to 
be subordinate, submissive, silent, working alongside the men or from behind the 
scenes. Furthermore, they were inexperienced, fearful, and uncertain about 
stepping outside long-held views of women’s roles even though they knew they 
had a contribution to make. Because women seldom participated in real church 
decisions, they couldn’t see the big picture of what was taking place in church and 
conference and where they might fit in. (196) 
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This is a central struggle for Funk Wiebe throughout the book – namely her fight against the 
conventional role established for Mennonite women and the social structure that largely stifled a 
woman’s opportunity to influence the culture that was shaping gender identities.  
 Importantly, though, in this quotation, while Funk Wiebe is describing what could be 
read as her own personal struggles, she only uses the autobiographical-I once. Otherwise, she 
appears to be talking about a more generic group of “women” who struggle against a role of 
subordination, submissiveness, and silence. This is, in fact, a common convention that Funk 
Wiebe utilizes throughout the book. When she goes to Bible college near the beginning of the 
autobiography, Funk Wiebe describes how the school essentially worked to reinforce gender 
norms. She writes: 
We women were advised out of theology classes, which didn’t bother me too 
much because I didn’t know what theology was. And homiletics and Greek, of 
course, was out of the question. No woman in the MB Church would ever been 
called upon to preach. After all, we were told, we would probably become 
housewives, and our ministry would be in Sunday school, women’s circles, or 
child evangelism. (25-26) 
Again, here, Funk Wiebe makes it clear that this is not merely her story. Rather, this is the 
memoir of “we” and at times, as the previous quotation displays, it also slips into the story of 
“they.”  
Funk Wiebe uses the same technique when she describes the various stages of her life. 
When she begins to break free of the mould constructed for her by the patriarchal culture, she 
frequently devotes space to explaining the stories of other women who were similarly escaping 
the confines of traditional Mennonite gender roles. For example, she writes about “women” who 
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“were growing in spirit and mind and in their teaching and leadership. They had great gifts; they 
only needed experience and opportunity. Devotionals, those darlings of women’s circles, 
changed from gentle little readings from Chicken Soup for the Soul to more independent 
thinking. Women were becoming more involved in church work, locally and nationally” (183). 
The book, at times, is less about Funk Wiebe’s own stories than it is about the stories of 
women’s communities as she observed them. The struggle that she talks about, then, is not 
merely personal, although it is that too. Significantly, though, Funk Wiebe alerts us, through her 
very wording, to the fact that this is also a collective story of what she sees to be a female 
community. Funk Wiebe’s positioning of herself within this collective allows her to speak 
autobiographically as well as focus some of her attention on the story of others. 
 Funk Wiebe quite strikingly constructs an identity in relation to a larger community of 
Mennonite women who lived through the same history and felt similarly discriminated against 
and constrained by a patriarchal religious structure. She largely sets herself up as a representative 
of a nonprivileged social group, to borrow Berlant’s terminology. This is crucial because, as 
Funk Wiebe herself notes, there were very few role models for progressive Mennonite women to 
look to during the time period she describes. At one point in the book she notes that “My role 
models were loving, generous women who made excellent Zwieback and borscht and sewed fine 
stitches in pillow cases, but understood little of my yearning to give myself away on paper” 
(163-64). In other words, while Funk Wiebe admired the women she looked to in her socio-
cultural milieu, she nevertheless observes that there were no women she could look to who 
outwardly shared the same desires and wants. She later argues that the lack of role models 
negatively affected the women’s movement in the Mennonite Brethren community. She writes 
that “Women’s groups were looking for direction. They had zeal. They had money. They had 
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energy but lacked direction” (190). Again, here, it is crucial to mention that Funk Wiebe’s own 
lack of direction and the absence of progressive role models in her own life transforms into a 
discussion that is not about her but is, rather, about a larger and more general group of women 
who likewise “lacked direction.”  
On a more basic and fundamental level, Funk Wiebe notes that the absence of prominent 
female voices in her community led to a very real confusion on crucial issues. Pregnant with her 
first child, she recalls that “I knew nothing about the birth process. No one took time to explain 
the stages of labor. I longed for someone to be with me through those long lonely hours as my 
tense body was racked by pain after pain. But that was the way childbirth was done in large city 
hospitals” (62). Soon after giving birth in the hospital, she writes, “A wonderful woman in the 
bed next to mine had just given birth to her seventh child. Her positive, refreshing spirit reached 
me, soothed me. She was an early mentor” (62). Here Funk Wiebe’s confusion and anxiety over 
giving birth becomes soothed by the model of motherhood she sees next to her. She suggests that 
such female role models are necessary for women who are pregnant and going through labour 
and the absence of such women from the impersonal atmosphere of the hospital which was, at 
the time, surely male-dominated, had detrimental consequences. 
 As she does with the mother in the bed next to her, Funk Wiebe looks to find mentors in 
other contexts. Importantly, for her, she finds role models by integrating herself more within a 
Mennonite Brethren community. She writes,  
In August 1962 Walter and I had the wonderful opportunity to attend sessions of 
the Mennonite World Conference held in Kitchener and entertained guests in our 
home. This was my first introduction to the wider Mennonite family, coming from 
many countries and branches of the church. I heard speakers of the caliber I had 
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not experienced before. I attended a women’s session. I opened myself to this 
generous unexpected outpouring of blessings. (99) 
Funk Wiebe goes on to call this moment a “mountaintop experience” (99). By attending these 
conferences, she witnesses females playing a role in religious life that she herself felt was denied 
to her. By integrating herself more into a wider religious community of Mennonites, she is able 
to locate models that encourage her to develop her own rebellious position as a more powerful 
female figure within the church.  
As the book continues, Funk Wiebe encounters more women playing active roles in the 
church, which helps to bolster her own stance. She writes, “Women are rejected for ministry 
because many people have never seen them in active ministry. My early role models were 
pioneers Ruth Brunk Stolzfus, Lois Clemens, and Ella Mae Miller of the then-(Old) Mennonite 
Church. I traveled around the country to allow men, women, and children to see a woman in 
ministry with all her flaws and follies as well as strengths” (181). Here, Funk Wiebe names the 
women who have played a crucial role in the formation of her own sense of self. Important here, 
too, though, is her point that she also puts her own self on display for others in order to 
encourage their own personal development. Funk Wiebe is again presuming a kind of intimate 
public – a community of like-minded people who need to see a role model in order to spur a 
reaction against what they feel is the repressed development of the church. This was, after all, 
Funk Wiebe’s own personal experience as she describes it. She herself needed to see the actions 
of other females in order to confirm her own desire to be more than a conventional homemaker 
and mother. Thus, Funk Wiebe assumes that the personal is also the public and that her own 
experiences and beliefs would largely connect with the experiences and beliefs of a larger 
Mennonite community. 
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Perhaps more important, though, is that it is especially through the act of reading that 
Funk Wiebe herself recognizes that she belongs to an intimate public. She recalls, “As I read 
Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique in the 1960s, I couldn’t believe other women thought the 
way I did, hundreds of then, maybe even thousands. I wasn’t alone in my feelings about being set 
aside when it came to use of gifts” (199). Through reading Friedan’s monumental book, Funk 
Wiebe becomes aware of the burgeoning feminist movement that would become more 
mainstream and organized during the 1970s. Intriguingly, as Gloria Neufeld Redekop notes, 
Friedan’s book was introduced to Mennonite readers via a positive review in The Canadian 
Mennonite. Redekop writes how the reviewer “agreed with Friedan that women were living 
below their capabilities and queries whether the Mennonite church had been guilty of asking too 
little of Mennonite women” (78). The Feminine Mystique, then, as Redekop suggests, would 
have held a particularly unique resonance for Mennonite women. The book spoke for a 
nonprivileged community in which members were connected to strangers on the basis of similar 
thoughts, feelings, and experiences. Funk Wiebe constructs her own identity as being very much 
connected to this group of “hundreds” or “maybe even thousands” of other women readers. 
Funk Wiebe’s story, then, is a story of personal growth but it is also the story of the 
growth of a community of women of which Funk Wiebe counts herself a member. As Gloria 
Neufeld Redekop puts it, “women were beginning to question male-centered biblical 
interpretation and traditionally held positions in the church but also … Mennonite women were 
being influenced by society around them, in particular, the women’s movement” (78-79). Funk 
Wiebe’s experiences as she describes them in this book can be very much understood as shared 
or transportable experiences that are applicable to other women. Importantly though, as Funk 
Wiebe describes it, it is the text circulating as a commodity that creates the assumption that there 
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exists an intimate group of strangers who share the same concerns. Funk Wiebe reinforces the 
relationship between text and community throughout her memoir. She notes that “I lined my 
shelves with all the new books about women coming out. I watched and studied what was going 
on in the broader Mennonite constituency and elsewhere” (204). Indeed, literature plays a crucial 
role in giving Funk Wiebe a sense of a community. 
Significantly, Funk Wiebe tells the story of becoming a writer herself. Discussing her 
early experiences as an author, she notes how she wrote about her own personal struggles and, as 
a result, connected with a community of readers. Consequently, she acknowledges her own role 
in forming an intimate public with her writing: 
I had not expected reader response. But letters arrived with comments like these: 
“Your articles reflect an insight and awareness beyond most MB women I know.” 
The writer described my Christian Leader column as “meat for her spiritual diet.” 
Another reader found in my writing truths she had sensed but not thought through. 
As the years sped by, I became aware that wrapping words around thoughts 
readers were struggling to articulate was my greatest gift. Other women were also 
striving to find answers to questions they didn’t know how to formulate. I was no 
different except that I had the opportunity to think openly about them. (114) 
This quotation reaffirms the point that subjects within an intimate public have a sense that a 
community of likeminded strangers exist before the “‘culture of circulation’ takes hold,” 
(Female 5) as Berlant puts it. In fact, in some ways, moments like these in Funk Wiebe’s text 
reinforce the notion of a women’s culture – what Berlant refers to as “the first mass cultural 
intimate public in the United States” (viii). Berlant goes on to say that “This ‘women’s culture’ is 
distinguished by a view that the people marked by femininity already have something in 
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common and are in need of a conversation that feels intimate, revelatory, and a relief” (viii-ix). 
Certainly, the readers’ letters, as they are described here, suggest that Funk Wiebe put into 
language a feeling that a community of women had always shared but could not express.  
Furthermore, there is no question that Funk Wiebe’s writing and the responses to it rest 
specifically on a belief that it is women in particular who need to hear stories about concerns that 
are specific to women. At the same time, though, it is worth noting that Berlant’s claim is that 
these stories are narrow in scope. That is, they continually revisit what she calls “the female 
complaint,” which, as she puts it, stresses the notion that “women live for love, and love is the 
gift that keeps on taking” (1). In other words, Berlant sees these texts as critiquing romantic 
relationships whilst simultaneously arguing for their inevitable necessity and, in doing so, are 
maintaining “some fidelity to the world of distinction and desire that produced such 
disappointment in the first place” (2).  
While it is most definitely the case that Funk Wiebe’s book does adhere to a belief in a 
kind of essential and unified group of women readers, she does not resort to sentimentality or to 
what Sara L. McKinnon, in her review of Berlant’s book, has called “the conventional fantasy 
[of romantic love] that is projected so pervasively in women’s culture” (333). Indeed, Funk 
Wiebe’s book encourages each woman to consider her own identity as an individual, not as one 
that is “submerged in someone else’s – a husband’s, a father’s, sometimes even a child’s if that 
child was a missionary or other prominent person” (Funk Wiebe 114). Funk Wiebe’s book, then, 
both affirms Berlant’s points about women’s culture as an intimate public and, at the same time, 
presents an alternative and perhaps more productive discussion for this culture that writers like 
both Berlant and McKinnon see as being so pervasive. 
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The long quotation above from Funk Wiebe also gives insight into the kind of work that 
she believes her writing is doing and, thus, the kind of work she believes her own 
autobiographical writing in this book is doing. For Funk Wiebe, she is not merely telling her own 
story. She is also articulating the story of an entire community of women. Consequently, the 
identity that she constructs for herself in this book is not merely her own but is rather a collective 
and communal identity. Constructing an identity that is very much bound to a collective 
community allows Funk Wiebe to privilege the narrative(s) of others. She articulates how she 
sees the relationship between her own private self and the wider community in greater detail, 
later in the book, writing that, 
My own personal journey as a woman in ministry in the Mennonite community 
has been a never-ending roller-coaster ride, yet here I am, not where I began but 
on a much surer level. It took a while before I realized I was part of something 
much bigger than my little thoughts, an idea whose time had come, even as it had 
been coming, off and on, for centuries. I think of it as wispy spider webs floating 
in the atmosphere, pulled together first by one person, then another, until a strong 
fabric results. (198) 
The description here of “wispy spider webs” reaffirms Funk Wiebe’s positive emphasis on 
community. The suggestion appears to be that the role of women “in ministry” could only 
improve once more women joined the movement and recognized their vital role in organizing a 
cohesive and coherent movement that could work to dismantle old prejudices.  
Perhaps here, more than anywhere else in the book, Funk Wiebe best explains how she 
sees herself in relation to this community. She notes that she has, indeed, had a “personal 
journey” but that this journey was merely part of a larger collective struggle which, here, she 
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suggests, was a more significant struggle. This quotation ultimately demonstrates why she can 
privilege the narrative of others throughout the book while also talking a great deal about her 
own significant accomplishments. Indeed, even as she recognizes the figures in the movement 
who pulled together the “wispy spider webs,” she acknowledges this pulling together as being 
done by “one person, then another,” rather than pointing to her own role in helping to construct a 
“strong fabric.” Certainly, Funk Wiebe does point out her own role elsewhere in the book, but it 
is noteworthy that in this instance, when she is describing the importance of the women’s 
movement, she ultimately diminishes her own role or leaves herself out entirely. 
In my previous chapter, I observed how Funk Wiebe’s book challenges the assertions 
made in earlier theoretical discussions on women’s autobiography, as exemplified by figures 
such as Mary G. Mason who argued that women most frequently construct autobiographical 
selves in relation to a marital other. Here, I would like to suggest that Funk Wiebe fits better into 
the paradigm of women’s autobiographical selves as outlined by post-Mason theorists of 
women’s life writing, such as Susan Stanford Friedman. As I noted in my introduction, Stanford 
Friedman distinguishes women’s life writing in suggesting that their texts demonstrate how 
women do not consider their selves as being “solely unique” (79). Rather, she argues, the authors 
of these texts “often explore their sense of shared identity with other women” (79); they oppose 
themselves to “individualistic paradigms” which “do not recognize the significance of 
interpersonal relationships and community in women’s self-definition” (79). Significantly, 
Stanford Friedman highlights community as a crucial aspect in informing women’s sense of self. 
In that respect, Funk Wiebe’s consideration of the community in her own book, particularly a 
community that is driven by the concerns of the feminist movement, illustrates how her work 
functions well as a representative of Stanford Friedman’s conception of women’s life writing.  
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Yet the above quotation from Funk Wiebe, citing her “own personal journey” also serves 
to show how Stanford Friedman’s conception of relationality does not leave much space for the 
kind of self-construction that occurs in You Never Gave Me a Name. Ultimately, Friedman notes 
that “this autobiographical self often does not oppose herself to all others, does not feel herself to 
exist outside of others, and still less against others, but very much with others in an 
interdependent existence that asserts its rhythms everywhere in the community” (79). While it is 
certainly true that Funk Wiebe does not shy away, in this book, from her own significant role as 
a member of this community, her remarks regarding the “Mennonite community” do not 
necessarily suggest an “interdependent existence.” When Funk Wiebe suggests that she “was 
part of something much bigger than my little thoughts,” she is essentially minimizing her own 
part in the movement and is even humbly characterizing her own thoughts as “little” in order to 
do so. Funk Wiebe, here, does not construct a community that is as dependent on her as she is on 
it. Rather, for her, the actions of the community are far more important than her own. Here, Funk 
Wiebe’s remarks reaffirm the limitations of the relational approach to women’s life writing by 
Stanford Friedman, which was then applied to a larger group of writers by scholars like Paul 
John Eakin and Nancy K. Miller.  
I suggest that Funk Wiebe’s privileging of community over the self is very much rooted 
in a cultural discourse. Edna Froese notes that “the choosing to subordinate oneself to the 
community is an integral, or at least an historical, part of Mennonite thinking” (“To Write” 8). 
You Never Gave Me a Name illustrates this to some extent. Funk Wiebe never outright dismisses 
her own story and her own role in the growing movement of Mennonite women. She does, in 
fact, highlight her own accomplishments as a writer and as a speaker and this helps explain how 
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she became a crucial figure at the time. The personal is important in this book but it is important 
in terms of how it can contribute to the larger social community that is working to enact change. 
 I argue that the book itself works to speak to and speak for a perceived intimate public in 
much the same way that Funk Wiebe describes her earlier writings in the book when she 
discusses the connections she forges with women readers. There are moments where she speaks 
directly to a female reader. She states, “I want to say to all women, ‘You’ve come a long way, 
baby, but’ – and this is a big BUT – ‘you’ve still got a long way to go.’” (224). Funk Wiebe ends 
her discussion on her role in the women’s movement by, once again, speaking to and for an 
intimate community of women who share similar concerns and have similar goals. To some 
extent the intimate public formed by Mennonite women’s groups as observed by Funk Wiebe, 
worked to foreground what Berlant calls “affective and emotional attachments” (Female 10) 
rather than political ones. Ultimately, Funk Wiebe writes of relationships that are often forged 
through a deeply emotional connection. We see this quite strikingly in the text when Funk Wiebe 
describes her experience at the Evangelical Women’s Caucus, which she attended in 1975: 
Of the three hundred women present, about thirty were from Mennonite 
denominations. The late Herta Funk, a vigorous Mennonite women’s leader, 
called us together for a breakfast meeting. We looked each other in the eyes and 
knew we shared an undisclosed hurt – often unarticulated even to ourselves. I 
found myself bonding with women who did not see me as someone out of her 
mind. (202) 
Certainly, in noting specifically that these Mennonite women found a common connection 
through their shared pain that had heretofore gone unspoken (what she calls an “undisclosed 
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hurt”), Funk Wiebe describes what Berlant calls the “emotional contact” upon which the 
“intimate public sphere” depends (Female viii).  
In my view, though, Funk Wiebe moves beyond a mere emotional response to systemic 
discrimination in this book. In doing so, she forges connections in ways that are more subversive 
than what Berlant’s definition of intimate publics allows for. This is not to say that Funk Wiebe 
calls for an end to capitalist consumer culture, which Berlant argues makes intimate publics 
possible in the first place, and typically diffuses the possibility of genuinely subversive 
discussion. However, the book does go further than the limitations that Berlant described in 
conversation with Jay Prosser at the IABA conference on life writing and intimate publics. She 
observes that “Intimate publics usually flourish to one side of politics, referring to historical 
subordinations without mobilizing a fundamental activism with respect to them” (Prosser 184). 
In fact, Funk Wiebe specifically calls for activism in her memoir, or at the very least presents 
herself as an activist for women readers by detailing her various activities as a spokeswoman. 
Funk Wiebe’s argument for a larger and more significant role for women within the 
Mennonite church is often made on intellectual grounds. Speaking primarily to Christian women 
and speaking as a Christian herself, she re-interprets the Christian discourse that had historically 
undermined women in order to challenge the male-dominated power structure of the church. 
Marlene Epp notes, “the biblical admonition that women be ‘silent’ became dominant in 
Mennonite church life” (Mennonite Women 121). However, as Gloria Neufeld Redekop suggests, 
by the late 1960s, Mennonite “women were beginning to question male-centered biblical 
interpretation and traditionally held positions in the church” (78). You Never Gave Me a Name 
illustrates this shift in biblical interpretation. Funk Wiebe herself argues that, 
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To succeed I had to change my thinking about the role of women in the church. I 
had to accept that I, as a member of the body of Christ, like all other members, 
had the responsibility to define for myself the nature and teaching of the church. I 
had to accept that I had the obligation to test its doctrine and theology against the 
Scriptures with the goal of growth of individual members as well as the body as a 
whole. Which meant venturing into areas of thought and life not usually open to 
women. (162) 
More than simply dwelling emotionally on her place as a subordinated subject and victim of a 
patriarchal structure, Funk Wiebe re-reads the Bible and, in re-interpreting it, challenges the 
“doctrine and theology” of the religion that has discriminated against women. 
 The quotation also highlights the subversive nature of her argument. Biblical 
interpretation was, after all, not the domain of women, as she herself observes when she tells us 
that she was “venturing into areas of thought and life not usually open to women.” In 
recognizing her own “responsibility” in defining “the nature and teaching of the church,” Funk 
Wiebe refuses to be passive and consequently refuses the admonition of silence that Epp says 
historically prevented women from questioning the role that had been imposed on them. 
Reinterpreting the Bible from a woman’s perspective allows Funk Wiebe to make a case for 
improving women’s role in the church whilst maintaining fidelity to the religion. She says, 
For years I encouraged women to recognize God had given them a gift – giving, 
encouragement, hospitality, evangelism, helps, caring, listening, knowledge, 
teaching, leadership, celibacy. Their task was to discover that gift and risk using 
it. The world was opening up to women. Why were we holding back? Some men 
were more ready to open doors to service than women were willing to enter. 
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Today I rejoice to see women using individual gifts instead of falling into 
identical patterns. (193) 
This passage demonstrates how Funk Wiebe appeals to what she considers to be an intimate 
community of like-minded women through means other than affect. Instead, she proposes 
alternatives to domestic servitude for women and she does so by re-appropriating religious 
discourse. Rather than accepting the doctrine that suggested it was God’s will that women be 
silent, Funk Wiebe suggests that “God had given” women gifts that extend beyond the private 
sphere.  
More than that, though, while she writes here about her own activist work, she 
nevertheless quickly abandons the autobiographical-I in favour of a discussion about women. 
Furthermore, in asking why “we” were holding back, she constructs herself not simply as an 
activist leader, but also as a figure amongst the crowd of women she herself was speaking to. In 
that sense, she tears down the line between herself and her audience, and counts herself among 
the community who still struggled to make progress. Funk Wiebe, then, characterizes the 
women’s movement as being bound by more than an emotional connection. While the women 
she describes are connected to one another as a result of a history of common pain and ongoing 
struggles, they are also connected by a desire to set goals for changing systemic discrimination 
and to communicate these goals to a broader audience.  
 In You Never Gave Me a Name, Katie Funk Wiebe establishes an identity in relation to a 
larger, abstract community in several ways. In one respect, she forges a relationship with what 
she constructs as a community of Mennonites on the basis of a shared history of exile and an 
ongoing experience of diaspora or homelessness. She also constructs herself as being one 
amongst a larger community of Mennonite women who struggled for a voice and fought for a 
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greater role within the Mennonite Brethren church. In creating an identity that is at once personal 
as well as bound to larger community, Funk Wiebe is able to write an autobiographical text that 
speaks for others as much as it speak for herself. Ultimately, then, the book frequently gives 
priority to a movement and a community rather than the individual who is writing. 
 In the same way that Katie Funk Wiebe privileges community, Di Brandt in her 
autobiographical texts often foregrounds the stories of others over the story of the self. Of the 
many strands of thought that are at work in Di Brandt’s So this is the world & here I am in it, the 
most prevalent one is ecology and its relationship to a profit-driven capitalist economy. As Tanis 
Macdonald stresses in her review, the book conveys “a naked despair over the possible loss of 
the land to a postindustralized culture” (82). Significantly, Brandt’s remarks on the environment 
are at once personal and communal. While she focuses specifically on the destruction of the 
prairie land where she grew up, she nevertheless considers herself as being part of a large 
community (made up of several cultures) which has been and continues to be victimized by a 
corporate power structure and forced to destroy the environment in the name of profiting elite 
institutions. In that sense, Brandt constructs herself as being one amongst a larger community on 
the basis of a shared connection. 
 At the same time, though, Brandt perhaps goes further than Funk Wiebe in her critique of 
power. Brandt draws on a conception of community based on what she sees as similar histories 
in order to suggest a political alternative to the market economic system that she considers to be 
destructive. She connects herself, for example, to what she sees as a community of Mennonites 
drawn together by their common ancestors who lived “low to the ground with fierce communal 
independence” (107). As I mentioned in my first chapter, Brandt mostly focuses on Mennonites 
and Mennonite characteristics that work to reaffirm her own values. It is, of course, the case that 
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the Mennonites who lived “low to the ground with fierce communal independence” were but a 
small part of the heterogeneous whole. In this sense, the community as Brandt describes it 
(particularly in the monolithic terms in which she represents them) may very well be an 
imagined one.  
Nevertheless, this potentially imagined community plays a pivotal role in Brandt’s book 
– it is an ongoing subject of her focus and continues to provide, for Brandt, a model for 
subsequent communities (also potentially imagined) to whom she speaks in the book. Brandt, in 
fact, calls upon Mennonites to recuperate what she considers to be common amongst them, 
namely their “ancient peasant loyal ties to traditionalist local land and community practices” 
(115) as a way to combat the oppressive and destructive machinations of consumer capitalism. 
Yet along with this, Brandt sees both herself and her fellow Mennonites as having collectively 
turned away from that tradition. In other words, Brandt is self-postioned within a community, 
members of which, because of their common heritage, are primed to enact genuine political 
change but have, at the same time, ignored this heritage.  
Brandt presumes and considers her identity in terms of its relation to a community of 
nondominant people. Moreover, Brandt establishes this intimate community in order to call into 
question the structural economic system that has positioned her community as nondominant. I 
want to initially focus on the first chapter of Brandt’s book in order to discuss how she 
establishes an identity largely in connection with a nonprivileged community. Once having done 
that, I will then go on to look at the whole book in order to examine how Brandt uses this 
communal identity in order to consider both political solutions to ongoing subordination and 
ecological destruction as well as the obstacles to those solutions. 
186 
 
In the book’s first section, Brandt constructs an intimate public that is frequently (though 
not exclusively) a Mennonite community that has been victimized by financial institutions as 
well as the larger capitalist economic system in which such institutions flourish. This economic 
system has not only worked to harm people, Brandt argues, but it has also severely damaged 
what she calls, “This land that I love, this wide, wide prairie” (1). She articulates this concern in 
her first chapter in a way that connects the personal to the general. Brandt begins by talking 
about the experiences of her father, noting that “Like almost all farmers in the modern era, he 
was a victim of economic exploitation by multinational corporate interests … which are profit 
rather than health driven, and proliferate false propaganda about the environmental risks of 
chemicalization” (9). Almost immediately in the book, then, Brandt implicates corporate 
hegemony in damaging both the health of her family and the land where they lived.  
Brandt is in many ways responding to the consequences that occurred as a result of 
changes in farming practices in Canada during the post-WWII era. As Mennonite historian T.D. 
Regehr observes, “Canadian farmers were bombarded after the war with literature and public 
addresses that insisted that those who wanted to succeed as farmers had to become more 
business-like. They must take advantage of new technologies, which in turn required much larger 
capital investments” (143). Regehr notes that these changes had a particularly poignant effect on 
Mennonite farmers, since “For them, perhaps more than for almost any other Canadians, farming 
represented an idealized and separatist way of life” (118). Moreover, Brandt suggests that, for 
her at least, traditional Mennonitism involves being deeply connected to the land, as she observes 
on multiple occasions (80, 127). In that case, then, the technological takeover and mechanization 
of farm practices along with what she calls above the “chemicalization” of the land, would work 
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to undermine what many Mennonites (among them Brandt herself) believed were important 
cultural traditions.  
Indeed, Brandt states in explicit detail the way corporate practices have affected 
Mennonites families and the prairies in general. As Berlant might put it, Brandt chooses 
examples that demonstrate her own affective response to the corporatization of prairie farming 
practices in order to reinforce her critique. Brandt observes how “The rivers are being choked 
with reeds and fungi, because of fertilizer run-off in the water systems. Many people in south 
central Manitoba, in the heart of Mennonite farmland, are dying of cancer, MS, pneumonia, 
leukemia, all of them victims of damaged immune systems and, indisputably, environmental 
pollution” (7). Indeed, Brandt demonstrates repeatedly how she has a personal and emotional 
connection to this particular story. She tells us that her own father “died of cancer at age sixty-
one” and that her brother quit farming “due to environmental illness, almost certainly caused by 
exposure to pesticides” (6). Brandt, then, has seen suffering first hand and she describes it in 
great detail, but she also suggests that this suffering belongs not just to her but to a wider 
community. 
She first draws a connection between her own family’s experiences and her “friend 
Owain Jones” who, she notes, had a father who “was a Welsh farmer” and had a “family story” 
that was “similar to mine even though he’s a son, not a daughter, and was not brought up in a 
separatist, migrant culture, and lives on another continent” (9). Importantly, Brandt sees herself 
as connected to others not on the basis of gender, culture, or familial background. Rather, she 
draws connections on the basis of a shared feeling of being exploited by the dominant group. She 
writes, for example, how Owain Jones’s story, 
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startled me into empathy for my father, who worked so hard to provide for us, 
who so loved his farm. Empathy for my mother, who had so much imagination 
and feeling, and so little decision-making power. Empathy for my people, the 
Mennonites, who didn’t realize they were being swindled by the promise of riches 
into corporate practices they wouldn’t have approved of if they’d understood 
them. Empathy for the citizens of Canada who have worked close to the land, in 
good faith, and been implicated in so much exploitation by the corporate powers 
who were organizing giant, and as it turns out, potentially lethal, takeovers, 
without declaring themselves. Empathy for the First Nations and Métis peoples of 
Turtle Island who signed treaties, albeit under duress, with strangers who 
practised duplicity, that put their inheritance and the future of this great land in 
jeopardy. It has been the same, and worse, in other countries around the globe. (9) 
What is striking in this quotation, first, is that Brandt repeatedly uses the term “empathy” rather 
than sympathy.  
Brandt counts herself amongst the victims by noting that she feels empathy, defined by 
the OED as “The power of projecting one’s personality into (and so fully comprehending) the 
object of contemplation.” Brandt, then, considers herself to be as much a victim of corporate 
exploitation as those she discusses in this quotation. Unlike Katie Funk Wiebe, Brandt does not, 
at this point, replace the “I” with “we” or eliminate herself altogether the way Funk Wiebe 
occasionally does. Nevertheless, the remarks that she makes here are ultimately far more about 
the experiences of others. Significantly, for Brandt, community consists of Mennonites whom 
she refers to as “my people” but also to a much larger group of people who were similarly 
victimized, including women, First Nations, Métis, and all of the “citizens of Canada who have 
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worked close to the land.” Brandt here creates a large but intimate community of strangers who 
share with her similar historical and ongoing experiences of economic and social exploitation.  
 Brandt, though, diverts from the kind of intimate community as described by Berlant by 
questioning the binary oppositions between privileged and nonprivileged and victim and 
perpetrator. In the first chapter of So this is the world, Brandt discusses her personal relationship 
with the land. She begins by describing her great reverence for the prairies where she grew up, 
saying “How I loved you, how I love you, how I love you” (1). In many respects, the book falls 
within the category of eco-autobiography as defined by Peter Perreten. Perreten suggests that in 
eco-autobiography, “The story of the landscape and her personal story are one; ecology and 
autobiography merge into a single text” (8). Eco-autobiographies as Perreten describes them 
convey selves in relation – in this case, a self that is constructed in relation to place. These texts 
reveal the capacity that place has in shaping the self.  
Certainly, Brandt conveys such a relationship in her book. At one point, she explains the 
lingering influence of the prairie landscape in her life: “I haven’t really gotten very far away 
from my sensuous childhood love of prairie silence and four leggeds and green places after all. 
… I’m still country in my imagination and my bones” (73-74). Furthermore, Brandt continues to 
explore the relational connection between self and place by equating the poisoning of the land 
with the rise in illnesses amongst the population who live there, as quoted above. Yet 
importantly, in this case, Brandt is not merely talking about her own relationship with the land, 
but an entire community’s. Ultimately, while this identity of self in relation to place exists in the 
book, what is even more pervasive is the sense that she is not the only person who has such a 
connection to land
22
 – that, in fact, an entire community is connected in ways that must be 
addressed in order for change to occur.  
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She notes that “In a little more than a hundred years, we, the immigrant settlers of this 
beautiful land, have managed to poison the land and our food sources and our own bodies so 
drastically as to jeopardize the future of all life in this country” (7). Importantly, at this point, 
Brandt does use the word “we” to include herself amongst a group she designates as “immigrant 
settlers” which, here, clearly applies not only to the original settlers but to their descendants as 
well. Brandt, then, is suggesting that while the intimate community to which she herself belongs 
has a shared history of being exploited by the dominant class they also have a shared 
responsibility for damaging the land along with participating in practices that have been harmful 
to the people who have lived there. 
 Nowhere does Brandt make this issue more explicit than in her discussion regarding the 
Mennonite relationship with Native people. As has already been noted, Brandt sees similarities 
between the exploitation of her own Mennonite family with the exploitation of Native 
Canadians. Brandt is not the first Mennonite writer to draw connections between her own 
cultural background and indigenous communities. As Penelope Van Toorn has observed, Rudy 
Wiebe’s books such as The Temptations of Big Bear reveal “Wiebe's own observations on the 
similarities between the traditional Native Indian and Mennonite Christian outlooks” (105). Yet 
while Brandt similarly sees other connections between Mennonites and Natives, she is also very 
much aware of the Mennonite role in displacing indigenous populations from the land. She 
writes, “This stolen land, Métis land, Cree land, buffalo land. When did I first understand this, 
the dark underside of property, colonization, ownership, the shady dealings that brought us here, 
to this earthly paradise” (1). Brandt’s love of the land is coloured by the very notion that the land 
itself is uneasily bound to destructive economic and political practises that her “people” 
participated in.  
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She acknowledges her own community’s historical culpability in this destructiveness, 
writing that the Mennonites “would have been part of the agricultural project of the newly 
formed Canadian government,” which saw “the arrival of numerous immigrant groups to take up 
farming in what had previously been uncultivated grasslands” (2). Brandt notes how this land 
“had previously been First Nations and Métis territory” and therefore the new policy of farming 
this land was “one of the reasons for the Métis rebellion” (2). Brandt, here, speaks to the 
complex and somewhat contradictory position of Mennonite settlers in Canada. As Amy Kroeker 
argues,  
Mennonites in Canada occupy a position of ambivalence as they struggle, as they 
have struggled, to maintain their identities in the face of pressure to assimilate 
culturally and linguistically yet base those identities in part on a geographic 
separation made possible only through cultural practices which removed resident 
Native populations from the land that became Mennonites’. Although ‘white 
Canadians,’ Mennonites traditionally do not hold positions of dominance, yet 
their actions as agents of colonization make impossible a neat categorization as 
either ‘colonized’ or ‘colonizers’. (240) 
Brandt indeed portrays herself as belonging to this ambivalent community – a group who are 
nondominant yet, at the same time, are also agents of power as witnessed by their active 
participation in the colonial project along with their role in poisoning land, food, and bodies.  
In recognizing her own community’s culpability in poisoning the land and its people, 
Brandt offers the possibility of genuine change, since, for her, responsibility rests as much with 
the nondominant group as it does with the dominant group. Ultimately, Brandt in this case 
appeals to a community of Mennonites to whom she herself belongs and who come out of a 
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common historical tradition. Brandt argues in favour of returning to certain traditions as a way to 
resist the oppressive and destructive policies of the dominant class rather than participate in them 
as she believes has historically been the case. One of the traditions of the intimate community 
Brandt sees herself as belonging to is fiercely anti-industrial. She notes that “at the heart of 
Mennonite culture lies a much older world view than the early modern” (122). Brandt explains 
this pre-modern mindset in more detail elsewhere in the book. She argues that, 
Our resistance to textualization and industrialization therefore happened not 
because we were intellectually backward, as the contemporary world has depicted 
us, but rather because we valued our oral peasant culture enough to want to 
preserve it, originally in resistance to the violent multinational globalizing tactics 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, not waiting to be shepherded into 
factories and crowded city ghettoes or culturally alienated suburbs as the peasants 
of England and Scotland were forced to do at that time. We have practised our 
traditionalism ever since, migrating from one country to another in search of 
political/cultural freedom, in resistance to whatever sources threatened it, 
including the pressures of citizenship in the modern national state, at the cultural 
investments of text and electronic media. (81) 
Again, here, Brandt neglects to use the autobiographical-I but instead adopts a more general 
“our” and “we.” The self that Brandt constructs recalls the one that I described in my first 
chapter, as she draws a connection between herself and a general Mennonite located in a 
historical past before she herself was born.  
Yet Brandt also speaks to a more current community here. While she notes that at one 
point in history, Mennonite ancestors largely opposed the early developments of the Industrial 
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Revolution, she also goes on to say that “We have practiced our traditionalism ever since.” In 
that sense, Brandt is suggesting that the anti-capitalist spirit amongst Mennonites that largely 
drove the movements against “the violent multinational globalizing tactics of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries” still exists to some degree amongst the intimate community as she 
understands (indeed constructs) it. Indeed, Brandt is romanticizing the Mennonite past here, in 
many ways seeing only anti-industrialists when, in fact, as Rob Zacharias notes, “an elite class of 
wealthy Mennonite industrialists emerged” in the Russian Commonwealth (50-51). Importantly 
though, Zacharias suggests that this was more true for the Russländer population “who, 
remaining in Russia [beyond the 1870s], accommodated themselves to the new regulations and 
went on to enjoy remarkable levels of commercial and cultural success over the next fifty years” 
(51) Brandt’s imagined community perhaps speaks more to her own Kanadier background. 
Nevertheless, what is significant is that the community she constructs and positions herself 
within is stridently traditional. She refers, for example, to the “Mennonite celebration of dirt” 
which she experienced in her childhood (80). She describes how her “mother would send us out 
on summer days after a rain shower to leap around in the puddles” (80) and notes how “fathers” 
would “[caress] the black earth in their fields around newly sprouted green” (81). Brandt 
demonstrates how what she sees as the traditions which historically kept many Mennonites in 
opposition to industrialization were still, in some ways, still alive when she was growing up. 
However, Brandt does say that her community gradually turned away from traditions in 
fundamentally negative ways. She criticizes “the villages of my childhood” which valued “our 
separatism” only in the “aesthetic sense” of “food and dress and language and demeanor – while 
farming itself, during the postwar years of the 1950s and ’60s while I was growing up, was 
cheerfully and unquestioningly assimilating to Canadian mainstream agricultural practice 
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through intense and rapid mechanization and chemicalization and corporatization” (82). Brandt 
laments how the Mennonite community that she grew up in mostly remained traditional in the 
conservative sense. They maintained strict rules regarding behaviour but largely turned away 
from the more subversive traditions that included their refusal to participate in the modern 
industrial world.  
Importantly, Brandt describes how she herself is very much part of this community of 
Mennonites who have distanced themselves from the tradition of separatism. She writes how  
I was not the only one to leave the village; my twin sister, and eventually my 
other siblings, and most of the village children of our generation left, too. … The 
whole edifice of our Mennonite separatism, preserved so carefully at so high a 
cost through four centuries of exile and migration and hard labour, in harsh, 
inhospitable landscapes, was coming, as my father rightly perceived it, crashing 
down. (209-10) 
Brandt does certainly draw a distinction here between her generation and the generation before 
her. Her parents’ generation, she says, abandoned traditional conceptions of separatism by taking 
on modern, business-oriented farming practices. Brandt’s own generation, on the other hand, did 
so by turning away from village life. Yet while the turn away from traditions occurred in 
different ways, Brandt’s language in these two different sections of the book indicates that 
ultimately both turns were very much part of the same process. In both cases, she notes how the 
two generations abandoned “separatism” in favour of the “mainstream.” The cost of this, Brandt 
tells us, has been severe.  
 What Brandt does, here, then is construct a large and intimate community of people she 
herself is connected to which allows to her to focus on others rather than herself.  In some 
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respects, Brandt does construct herself as independent of the community when she notes how she 
“was the first one to reject Plautdietsch in favour of English, the first to attend university …  the 
first to leave Manitoba to pursue a graduate degree, in Toronto, the first to stop attending church, 
the first to go secular, assimilationist, mainstream” (210). Yet while she may have been the first, 
she was far from the only one, as she herself admits. Ultimately, the story Brandt tells here is not 
the story of an individual but rather of a community who, for several generations, had made the 
same decision to turn away from what Brandt sees as traditional Mennonite values. 
Brandt ultimately considers her identity as tied to a group of people who have been 
historically victimized by the dominant class and elite institutions who have forced Mennonites 
and others to carry out actions that have been and continue to be both destructive to the land and 
to themselves. At the same time, though, she also argues that this intimate community has its 
own traditions that prime them for resisting and overturning the interests of the dominant class. 
This community, though, has been thus far unable to do so because of their collective 
abandonment of the rebellious aspects of their tradition. She mourns the possibility that “our 
Plautdietsche ways of living low to the ground with fierce communal independence are lost” 
(107). Brandt ultimately speaks directly to the intimate community of readers in an attempt to 
encourage a recovery of traditions that she sees her community as sharing.  
At one point, Brandt discusses the concept of wildness, which she considers to be 
frowned upon by contemporary Mennonites. Yet Brandt in many ways re-constructs the 
Mennonite tradition in order to include it. Speaking both for and to her community, Brandt asks, 
do we really hate and fear wildness, we Mennonites, haven’t we in fact loved it, 
… Is that where we have been most comfortable, balancing on the precarious 
edge between so-called ‘civilization’ and ‘wildness.’ Haven’t we, socially 
196 
 
speaking, been more comfortable locating ourselves next to Turkish and 
Aboriginal and Métis communities with their oral, tribal, hunting-gathering 
sensibilities than within modern post-industrial hierarchical bureaucracies. (83) 
Significantly, in re-constructing the Mennonite tradition, Brandt once again widens her sense of 
community. Her identity is connected not only to a Mennonite community but to a larger group 
that includes “Turkish and Aboriginal and Métis communities.”  
 This expansion extends to several of Brandt’s essays and results in numerous moments 
where Brandt’s focus tends to be on others over the individual autobiographical-I who is telling 
the story. There is the chapter, for example, in which Brandt recalls her trip to Germany (East 
Berlin) where she encounters a country in which people are far more in tune with their collective 
history than her own. She observes how “They haven’t thrown away the old here. They have 
woven it in with the new. Jazz is flourishing, the burned books are being reprinted, the 
synagogue has been rebuilt, …” (103). This refusal to forget the past, Brandt suggests, means 
that Germans have not fully accepted the attempts to globalize the neo-liberal capitalist model. 
She writes, 
Live here among the Ossies for awhile: you will see, the dream hasn’t died. There 
are demonstrations along the street every month. Cells, study groups, political 
rallies: the vision of communalism will never die. (It is my heritage too.) 
Globalization in the capitalist mode may be an unstoppable force around the 
world at the moment, but look at the opposition. The world’s poor, the 
disgruntled, the visionaries, are reorganizing quietly (on occasion noisily), with 
some bewilderment, but lots of high passion. (101) 
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Apart from the brief moment here where she notes how this is “[her] heritage too,” Brandt all but 
eliminates her own part in this community that she very much sees herself as belonging to. Here 
the focus is ultimately on the “Ossies” and “The world’s poor, the disgruntled, [and] the 
visionaries.”  
 The point for Brandt is that in recalling the past, one can retain a pre-modern sensibility, 
one that is based more on wildness than on an adherence to market-driven economics. She 
defines wildness as “a radical irreducible difference at the heart of all living beings and 
organisms and communities” which presents itself with “an energetic fiery free-spiritedness that 
also connects these differences in unexpected, erotic and magical ways, and that resides at the 
very heart of life on this planet” (79).  Wildness, for Brandt, is very much politically subversive. 
The kind of subversion that Brandt calls for is explained in more detail when, borrowing from 
Carolyn Merchant’s book The Death of Nature, she discusses “the communitarian movements of 
Europe during the Reformation, among which [Merchant] includes the Anabaptists, our 
forebears” (81). Brandt notes how Merchant characterizes these protests as “peasant-led 
resistance movements to corporate takeovers by expansionist landlords during the early modern 
period” (81). Both Brandt and Merchant are referring to events such as the enclosure of the 
commons in which landowners seized lands that had previously been commonly shared.  
These events would be particularly significant for Brandt since enclosures marked the 
beginning of environmentally destructive policies. As Vandana Shiva points out, “Land and 
forests were the first resources to be ‘enclosed’ and converted from commons to commodities. 
Later, water resources were ‘enclosed’ through dams, groundwater mining, and privatization 
schemes” (44-45). Brandt tells us that her Mennonite ancestors, with their adherence to wildness, 
opposed such schemes. It is precisely this common ancestry amongst the Mennonite community 
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that Brandt considers to be worth reviving. She asks, “What if we spent our imaginative energies 
celebrating and honouring wildness, and locating ourselves within it” (85). This, for her, means 
to recall a past where Mennonites were “wild-minded, Métis flavoured, independentiste, 
socialist, shtetl, forever rebellious a la Riel and the General Strike, mistrustful of Ontario 
capitalist interests” (144). Yet significantly, for Brandt, it is not merely Mennonites who have a 
propensity for wildness.  
Importantly, Brandt devotes a good amount of textual space to describing the various 
ways in which she sees wildness manifesting itself in other cultural groups. She draws a 
connection, for instance, between what she considers to be her own cultural heritage of wildness 
with the indigenous cultural heritage, noting how “the people the Mennonites have found 
themselves closest to, and felt the most affinity with, are the indigenous and tribal peoples of 
those lands, with similar attachments to land, communalism and ancestors, superstitious beliefs 
in the paranormal, and carnivalesque celebration of the body” (122). Here Brandt calls for a 
return to the “erotic” and the “magical” by way of rejecting the conformist and destructive 
aspects of modern capitalist culture. Again, Brandt’s conception of Mennonite history is one 
very much of her own construction but it is in constructing Mennonite history in this way that 
allows her to connect with and focus on a large, heterogenous community of others. 
In a longer passage, Brandt details how she sees an adherence to these sorts of traditions 
and consequently notices the sentiment of wildness being addressed in more contemporary 
literary works. She writes how, 
it is easy to think of numerous fictional depictions in contemporary Canadian 
literature that still remember old versions of living communally, and close to the 
earth, which barely survived their forced entries into industrialized modernity, and 
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now, like the Mennonite community I have been describing here, tragically on the 
verge of extinction … Thomas King’s wild-minded Blackfoot in Alberta, for 
example, who practise extended family arrangements, and rituals of gift-giving, 
sacrifice, and homecoming … Alistair MacLeod’s unrepentant Scots in Cape 
Breton, who retain many of their visionary Gaelic beliefs and relational 
environmental practices while at the same time participating uneasily in 
exploitative contemporary economic life; Hiromi Goto’s renegade Japanese 
Canadians in Alberta, who despite concerted efforts by the Canadian government 
to break their communal solidarity by incarcerating and then scattering them 
across the country in the ‘40s, joyously practise traditionalist Japanese cuisine in 
their enforced assimilations, exhibiting traces of ancient Shinto nature worship, 
and exuberantly retelling and revising old Japanese folk tales and classic literary 
texts to suit their present hybrid purposes; and even Mordecai Richler’s 
thoroughly contemporary cosmopolitan Montreal Jews, who misremember the 
indigenous meaning of land ownership as an exploitative commercial venture, but 
nevertheless struggle heroically to inhabit the New World in emotionally and 
earth-connected, embodied, ways. (127-28) 
Here Brandt’s conception of a community unified by communal traditions is reinforced by 
literature. In the Anderson sense, literature works to reinforce an imagined community. Also 
crucial is the fact that Brandt is not simply speaking for herself here. Rather, she speaks to and 
for what she perceives to be a community with a common history as a way to challenge the 
system that continues to destroy the land.  
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Brandt creates an intimate public certainly, but it is one that functions much differently 
than the ones that Berlant describes. To an extent, Brandt does rely on affect to make her point. 
She explains how she is connected to others on the basis of collective suffering. Not only do 
these others suffer because they work to benefit elite institutions rather than themselves but also, 
in a much more dramatic sense, they suffer physically along with the land itself as a result of 
destructive farming practices. Yet in no sense does Brandt reaffirm commodity culture in 
creating this communal identity. On the contrary, by calling for a return to an identity that is at 
once independent, socialist, and rebellious, and also fundamentally questions the central 
economic framework that produces commodities and consumers, Brandt directly encourages a 
politically radical paradigm shift. In fact, for Brandt, it is crucial that her intimate public 
understands that such a communal identity exists in order for this political change to occur.  
Ultimately, then, in So this is the world, Di Brandt does not construct an identity that is 
individualistic. Rather, her identity is very much tied to a community of people who have 
relatable histories and concerns and share a similar space within the social hierarchy. I suggest 
that the special role that community plays in her textual self-construction stems from her own 
Mennonite background. This is something Brandt herself acknowledges in the book when she 
speaks of leaving her Mennonite village and experiencing “the sense of deep loss of the gathered 
community that knows each of its members intimately” (79). In constructing an identity in 
relation to a large, communal other, Brandt writes a book that is very much about her own 
experiences yet at the same time focuses a great deal on the experiences of others. As the above 
analysis demonstrates, Brandt autobiographical writing is replete with usages of  “our” and “we” 
frequently in place of “I” and “my.” While she does use the latter, Brandt’s more 
autobiographical essays appear far more concerned with “our shared history” than with the story 
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of “I.” Frequently, too, even “our” and “we” give way to more general discussions about 
Mennonites, or Ossies, or “indigenous and tribal peoples.” Again, Brandt here frequently 
privileges the experiences, stories, and traditions of others over her own experiences. 
 In this chapter, I have examined two authors who see themselves as belonging to an 
intimate public and, in doing so, reveal the influence of community that has historically been a 
crucial component of Mennonite life. Much like the imagined communities that Anderson argues 
emerged via print culture from the modern era, these authors in their autobiographical texts 
conceive of a community to which they belong and whose members they do not necessarily 
know. In Berlant’s terms, these intimate communities are groups who are formed via a 
circulation of texts in a consumer culture and consist of nonprivileged people who share a history 
of marginalization and use text as a way to exchange common stories of suffering and as a space 
to offer comfort. For Berlant, intimate publics are significant in that they give voice to a 
historically silenced group. At the same time, though, she argues that such texts are for the most 
part apolitical and that intimate communities, because they rely primarily on affect and 
emotional connections and neglect to make pointed systemic critiques, typically reinforce rather 
than undermine the consumer culture that constructed the communities in the first place. 
In many ways, the texts that I look at reinforce Berlant’s points in that the authors 
consider their identity as bound to marginalized communities who all share a common history of 
suffering in one form or another. At the same time, though, these texts reveal the limitations of 
Berlant’s discussion on intimate publics. It is true that Funk Wiebe and Brandt presume a 
connection to an intimate community of strangers based on what they perceive to be a commonly 
shared social position and a collective history of marginalization. At the same time, though, 
despite forging emotional connections with others, these authors do not emphasize affect. Rather, 
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they make pointed critiques at what they consider to be a ruling authority, offering solutions as 
well as encouraging their community to interrogate, challenge and ultimately shift the power 
structure. In the case of Brandt, this means considerably undermining consumer capitalist 
culture. In that sense, then, while these texts do reinforce Berlant’s notion concerning intimate 
communities, they also break away by offering significant and, at times, subversive critiques.  
 Finally, what is most significant is that in offering a model of identity that is connected to 
a large community of others, these authors allow themselves to speak autobiographically and 
simultaneously shift attention onto the experiences of others. In the next chapter, I will consider 
how Mennonite authors incorporate what Amber K. Regis has recently termed intertextual 
relationality in their autobiographical texts. I will explore how these authors convey a relational 
identity but also push attention away from the individual self who writes the book by 
incorporating the narratives of other people into their own texts. 
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Chapter Four 
Intertextual Life Writing and the Decentered Self 
In the previous three chapters, I have examined the various ways that Mennonite 
Canadian authors have rendered subordinate the personal story of the self (the autobiographical 
“I”) in the name of emphasizing the story of others. One of the ways that these writers have done 
this, I have shown, is to directly privilege the other over the self, as, for example, Katie Funk 
Wiebe does in You Never Gave Me a Name, when she spotlights the significance of the greater 
women’s activist community over her own personal experiences. Another way that the self is 
subordinated is by the author’s simply devoting more textual space to others, as Connie Braun 
does in The Steppes are the Colour of Sepia, when she focuses the majority of her attention on 
her ancestors and her father, and as Di Brandt does in So this is the world, when she devotes a 
good deal of space to discussing both historical and contemporary victims of oppression.  
In this chapter, I examine a way of emphasizing the other that has gone relatively 
untheorized in contemporary autobiography theory, namely the incorporation of life writing 
documents written by someone else within autobiographical texts. In Rudy Wiebe’s Of This 
Earth and Miriam Toews’s Swing Low, both authors directly use the written (and, in the case of 
Toews, dictated) works of family members within their autobiographical narratives. Wiebe 
incorporates excerpts from his sister Helen’s diary entries while Miriam Toews pieces her 
narrative together, in part, from the autobiographical accounts that her father wrote and spoke 
during the final stages of his life. As I mentioned in my second chapter, both Wiebe and Toews 
write texts in which the authors not only convey the crucial impact of family on their identities, 
but also position the story of the family or a particular familial figure (the father, in Toews’s 
case) as being more crucial than the narrative of the individual telling the story.  
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I argue in this chapter that Wiebe and Toews emphasize the primary importance of others 
by refusing to fully speak for them. Wiebe and Toews do not simply tell the story of Helen 
Wiebe and Mel Toews. Rather, they acknowledge that these two family members have a story 
that should be told personally. In these texts, Wiebe and Toews do not establish themselves as 
the singular authority who can represent their respective family member. On the contrary, they 
highlight the significance of others by letting them directly contribute to the life writing 
narrative, a position that Toews makes clear quite explicitly when she creatively constructs her 
father as the book’s narrator.  
Neither Wiebe nor Toews are entirely unique in this regard. Contemporary Canadian 
Mennonite poet and playwright Patrick Friesen calls attention to the generous incorporation of 
outside sources that occurs in Interim, a collection of Friesen’s essays, some of which could be 
classified as life writing. Throughout the book, Friesen frequently quotes the work (mostly 
poetry) of others in order to help explicate his own point of view. To illustrate an example, in the 
fifteen pages from 120 to 135, Friesen either paraphrases or includes direct quotations from 
Basho (120), Shakespeare’s The Tempest (120), Czeslaw Milosz (125), Jane Kenyon (125), a 
Portuguese fadista (125), Federico Garcia Lorca (130), Gwendolyn MacEwen (130), and Joseph 
Brodsky (134). Many more quotations like this are given throughout the whole book. 
At one point, Friesen somewhat self-consciously confronts his use of other authors in his 
work. He writes, 
Enough quotes. Even in quoting these various artists I’m falling back on what 
we’re taught to do, appeal to authority. Why not simply speak out of personal 
experience? If what is spoken is stupid, it will be judged. Authority doesn’t make 
anything more true. There is, I guess, a reassurance in quoting other artists, a 
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feeling of not being alone. And, often, there is the pleasure of hearing one’s 
incomplete thoughts expressed beautifully by others. Like Bill Evans 
spontaneously quoting someone else’s composition within one of his. The fun of 
it, the endless interrelatedness of things. (39) 
Certainly, quoting others does not necessarily always raise the kind of concerns that Friesen 
raises here. Indeed, within particular contexts, such as an academic essay or a newspaper article, 
quoting is an essential component of the discourse at work. Nevertheless, Friesen’s self-
consciousness about consistently and routinely incorporating someone else’s words into what is 
ostensibly self-life-writing makes sense. Friesen himself notes in this context that quoting tends 
to reaffirm the authority of others rather than the self as an authority. This is a point that is 
especially significant for Friesen given his overall opposition to authority, as he himself notes in 
this quotation.   
Friesen’s conclusions are significant though because he suggests that quotations within 
life writing affirm the notion of relational identities – what Friesen himself refers to as “the 
endless interrelatedness of things.” This point is reinforced further when Friesen somewhat 
comically justifies his own use of outside sources by giving an example of another person, “Bill 
Evans,” who likewise “spontaneously quot[es] someone else’s composition within one of his.” I 
think it is also important to point out that even while Friesen notes his suspicion of quoting and 
even threatens to stop doing it, he continues to do it to a great extent throughout the rest of the 
book, suggesting an overall acceptance of this interrelatedness.  
I agree with Friesen here when he suggests that quoting, especially within this context, 
suggests a kind of relationality. Although Friesen constructs a more conventional relational 
identity in his essays than the authors whose work I foreground in this dissertation, his points 
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regarding quoting and interrelatedness nevertheless work as a helpful jumping off point to 
discuss what Wiebe and Toews are doing in their respective texts. I must note, though, that 
Friesen is somewhat of a different case than Wiebe and Toews. For one, Friesen is writing in the 
mode of the essay and while the type of essays that he writes in this collection do not always call 
for quotations (hence Friesen’s own skepticism about using them in these contexts), they do 
make more sense within the discourse that he is employing here than they might in other self life 
writing contexts.  
Moreover, Friesen uses outside sources in a manner somewhat differently than Wiebe 
and Toews. He quotes from a variety of texts throughout the book, but this is quite different from 
Wiebe’s giving excerpts from his sister’s diary and Toews’s building a narrative from her 
father’s own attempts to write his life story. Wiebe and Toews are explicitly using the self life 
writing of others (and, for the most part, one particular other), whereas Friesen is quoting poetry, 
song lyrics, and essays. What Wiebe and Toews ultimately do that Friesen does not do, then, is 
incorporate the life narratives of someone else into their own work, which is a qualitatively 
different discursive act and one which I argue raises crucial questions in life writing analyses. 
The incorporation of someone else’s life writing within autobiographical texts has not 
been sufficiently theorized. For the most part, the discussion on using the work of others in an 
autobiographical text has been approached within the larger conversation on ethics in life 
writing. Nancy K. Miller, for example, takes on this issue directly in her article “The Ethics of 
Betrayal,” when she debates whether or not to use the “letters written by my ex-husband to me” 
(151) in her memoir. She suggests in the article that it may, in fact, be more ethical to 
incorporate the letters, because it ensures a more objective account of their lives. She writes, “So 
perhaps there really is such a thing as an ethical betrayal: publish the letters and let the man 
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speak for himself” (157). Nevertheless, Miller goes on to note that the bigger obstacles in this 
case are legal restrictions. She observes that “the letter writer (or her estate) retains the right to 
the contents of her own letter, even if the letter is in someone else’s possession” (157). Miller 
concludes, finally, in her article, that she will paraphrase the letters rather than publish them as 
they were originally written. 
Richard Freadman similarly reveals a critical concern of life writing scholars when he 
observes the truism that “Self-revelation just does entail revelations about others” and that “The 
moral issue is where to draw the line” (“Decent and Indecent” 128). One of the crucial questions 
in these analyses is precisely what are the ethical quandaries of representing the lives of other 
real people in autobiographical accounts? What rights do authors have when it comes to sharing 
the story of someone else? As Freadman quite correctly points out, this is a question that applies 
to just about all writers of autobiography. However, as Paul John Eakin notes, these concerns 
have become even more relevant in the contemporary era. He notes how “in recent years, 
reflecting the circumstance of our relational identities, autobiographies have become increasingly 
biographical, featuring those others in our lives – parents, siblings, lovers, friends, and mentors – 
who have shaped us decisively” (“Introduction” 9). If writing the lives of others is somewhat of 
an ethical dilemma, and if relationality is key to the way many authors currently conceive of 
their own subjectivity in life writing, then these ethical concerns are of crucial importance in this 
era of life writing.  
Now that critics have increasingly paid more attention to life writing texts that convey 
interdependent relationships between self and other (often a loved one of some sort), they have 
subsequently confronted the question of whether or not writing the story of someone else is 
necessarily a violation of that relationship. As Claudia Mills puts it in her article “Friendship, 
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Fiction, and Memoir”: “So now the issue is whether one can indeed value one’s loved ones 
appropriately while also drawing on their lives as material for one’s work. We have come to 
what is clearly the central issue when writers write about their loved ones: the public betrayal of 
trust” (104). Mills’s point here regarding the possible “betrayal of trust” is relevant since so 
much of the Mennonite life writing that I am foregrounding examines not only the interrelated 
dynamic between self and others, but also focuses a substantial amount of attention on others 
rather than on the self. Significantly, Wiebe and Toews not only publish the private life stories of 
family members for public scrutiny but they also publish their family members’ own private 
writing. In the case of Wiebe, this means publishing sections from his sister’s diary and in the 
case of Toews it means re-working the notes written by her father. What is more, both Helen 
Wiebe and Mel Toews are deceased.  
Wiebe’s and Toews’s use of these two people in their texts does raise ethical questions, 
such as the one posed by Paul John Eakin: “what rights do the dead retain that the living are 
bound to respect?” (“Introduction” 10). This is the question that Richard Freadman confronts 
when he considers writing the story of his deceased father. He asks, “But what of my father? He 
had been dead eight years. How was I to assess his rights, the feelings he might have had, the 
attitude he might have taken to my project?” (“Decent and Indecent” 124). In many ways, Helen 
Wiebe and Mel Toews appear to be what G. Thomas Couser has termed “vulnerable subjects.” 
For Couser, vulnerable subjects are “persons who are liable to exposure by someone with whom 
they are involved in an intimate or trust-based relationship but are unable to represent themselves 
in writing or to offer meaningful consent to their representation by someone else” (Vulnerable 
xii). And while Couser mostly focuses on people who are unable to represent themselves because 
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of illness or disability, he does explain how death renders someone perhaps more vulnerable than 
any other person. He writes, 
Death would not seem to qualify as a state of dependence; indeed, it might seem 
to suggest utter invulnerability to harm; but I would argue that it entails maximum 
vulnerability to posthumous misrepresentation because it precludes self-defense. 
Thus, we trust that after we die our corpse will be treated with respect, that our 
‘will’ will be honored, and that secrets we may have divulged will be respected, 
either by being kept or by being communicated only to certain parties or in certain 
ways. In this regard, death may be the state of ultimate vulnerability and 
dependency. (16) 
By the parameters sketched out by Couser, then, the ethical concerns of incorporating the texts of 
Helen Wiebe and Mel Toews become apparent. Helen and Mel are essentially doubly vulnerable 
in the sense that both are not only dead but have died as a result of the illness which made them 
vulnerable in the first place, and it is specifically this illness that both writers focus on in their 
respective texts. 
These issues of ethics, illness, and death take on an even greater relevance and poignancy 
in light of the publication of Rudy Wiebe’s Come Back in 2014. The book revisits the character 
of Hal who appeared first as the younger brother of the protagonist Thom Wiens in Wiebe’s 
debut novel, Peace Shall Destroy Many. In Come Back, Hal is in his mid-70s in the year 2010, at 
the same time when Wiebe himself would have been in his mid-70s. As I noted in my previous 
chapter, critic Paul Tiessen has already acknowledged the connection between the literary 
character of Hal and Wiebe himself, in his comparison of Peace Shall Destroy Many and Of This 
Earth. In Come Back, Wiebe draws out these connections further by showing the character Hal 
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mourning the death of his son, Gabe, who committed suicide twenty-five years earlier. Indeed, 
Wiebe’s own son committed suicide in the mid-1980s. Hal, in the book, desires to “know 
[Gabe’s] stories, for myself” (214). Thus, much of the novel includes portions of Gabe’s journal 
entries from the years leading up to his death. Here Wiebe forms a connection between Come 
Back and Of This Earth in that both include diary entries (one presumably fictional, the other 
not) of close relatives who died many years ago.  
Yet the ethical concerns that I have brought up with Of This Earth are important for 
Come Back as well, despite its fictionality. Indeed, the diary entries reveal twenty-three year old 
Gabe’s obsession with Ailsa whom Hal describes at one point as “A girl two months a teen” 
(55). Elsewhere, Gabe himself notes that it was when Ailsa was “nine years old” that he “really 
became aware of [her] existence” and was “enchanted” with her then (73). At one point, Gabe 
also states that “I’ve been looking at pictures of myself from grade 3 or 4, I’ve noticed that I am 
a cute little kid. For a few years then, just after the crew cut, just before the awkward adolescent 
years I looked really cute. Then I noticed I had the same kinds of feelings toward this ‘Gabriel’ 
that I have towards young girls. I think if I had met me when I was that age I would have liked 
myself” (238). What Gabe means here about his feelings toward young girls in grades three or 
four is never stated explicitly but there is indeed a link made towards his romantic attraction to 
the very young Ailsa and his subsequent suicide.  
Given that Wiebe is already drawing connections between Hal’s experience and his own 
personal life, one wonders how much about Wiebe’s own son is being revealed in these fictional 
passages and certainly Come Back provokes possible questions regarding the ethics of Wiebe’s 
decision. These moments, though, serve to illustrate what has been for Wiebe a long time 
fascination with the artifact. In her analysis of Wiebe’s historical fiction Sweeter Than All the 
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World and short story “Where Is the Voice Coming From?”, Hildi Froese Tiessen has argued that 
Wiebe shows us that the “facts and artifacts of history, … may lie at the threshold of the past, but 
we cannot apprehend them as though they were the past itself” (“Between Memory” 634). Yet 
despite the fact that artifacts, such as Gabe’s diary, cannot be fully apprehended and are always 
marked by an “incompleteness,” (636) they nevertheless have the capacity of providing “an 
instant of transcendence” (623), delivering readers “to the location of their desire” (623). Indeed, 
Hal in Come Back grapples with this notion of incompleteness. He wishes to be “a histor, a wise 
Greek who gathers stories” (214) but ultimately finds that there is no revealing fact that unveils 
why Gabe committed suicide. The diary, though, much like the artifacts that Froese Tiessen 
describes, provides an opportunity for “an instant of transcendence” as problematic as the 
privacy violations may be. This, though, may ultimately be Wiebe’s justification for using his 
sister’s own diary entries in his memoir. 
 Whether or not Rudy Wiebe or Miriam Toews succeed in ethically portraying Helen and 
Mel is not the focus of this chapter. Moreover, I do not wish to be in a position to award 
favourable or poor marks to writers for what I perceive to be their ethical stance. However, to put 
it briefly, I will say that the several discussions on ethics in life writing suggest that both texts by 
Toews and Wiebe qualify as ethical treatments of their subjects with some reservations. In short, 
I will concur with Couser, who concludes that life writers give ultimate respect to their subjects 
when they are given a degree of autonomy. As he notes, “Autonomy is best respected when 
subjects are granted some control over their stories” (22).  
There are no firm conclusions when it comes to the ethics of representing others in life 
writing. Theorists for the most part have certainly avoided taking the position that biography in 
general is an unethical act. Furthermore, some of the research suggests that whether or not a text 
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fairly or ethically represents others (especially loved ones) is ultimately a conclusion best 
reached by the author of the text. Take, for example, Richard Freadman, who, in his article 
“Decent and Indecent” finds himself able to fully decide whether or not he is ethically 
representing his dead father only after manufacturing a conversation with him on the subject. Yet 
while life writing theorists have considered the question of ethics from a personal standpoint, the 
positions of both Couser and Miller regarding autonomy suggest to me that in devoting space 
that allows both Helen and Mel to speak for themselves, Wiebe’s and Toews’s use of their 
family members as subjects in autobiographical discourse is ultimately quite respectful.  
At the same time, though, Couser suggests that there is more to the question of ethics 
than mere respect for autonomy. He suggests that “Life writing that is ethically ideal, then, might 
involve optimizing the autonomy of subjects, not merely ‘respecting’ it” (23). Couser gives an 
example for this, noting how “In medicine, one manifestation of respect for autonomy is the 
principle of informed consent” (24). In the case of Swing Low, Melvin does ask his daughter to 
write down what he says (or, at least, that’s how it is represented in the book), though it is 
ultimately unclear whether or not he would have consented to her publishing his statements in 
book form.  
For Rudy Wiebe, it would be impossible for him to gain consent from his sister Helen, as 
the events that he describes are written more than sixty years after her death. However, as 
Kathryn Carter has written, “Diary writing engages in dialogue with an audience – a real or 
imagined community of one or many” (12). She goes on to suggest that diaries have a history of 
being circulated amongst family, friends, and the public, and notes that in the nineteenth century, 
“Diaries were, in fact, semi-public documents” which, she notes, “calls into question what we 
mean when we label diary writing of that period ‘private’” (13). Helen, of course, is not writing 
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in the nineteenth century, but Carter’s point raises the possibility that her diary may have never 
been a private text but instead, something that other members of the family might have had easy 
access to. Nevertheless, the reader should never discount the other possibility that Helen would 
have kept her diary very private. Importantly, though, the information that Wiebe divulges is not 
entirely personal. As I will remark, the notebook entries that he reprints in his book are more 
striking for how impersonal they are.  
I devote space to the subject of ethics here for several reasons. One reason is because I 
think the issue is unavoidable in a discussion of these examples of contemporary Canadian 
Mennonite life writing where the focus is often overwhelmingly on others. The second reason is 
that in this chapter I am dealing with particularly unique cases in which the authors not only 
focus on other people but outright incorporate the stories that other people wrote. And because 
this chapter is focused on this textual act of incorporation, it would be a major omission not to 
discuss the subject of ethics since ethics has been a central theoretical lens through which critics 
examine life writing that writes about, and incorporates the writing of, other people. 
Furthermore, a good deal of the discussion in this chapter is centered around how the authors 
represent vulnerable subjects – subjects who become a key focus for the writers not only because 
the authors were affected by their deaths but also because they were affected (seemingly 
profoundly) by the illnesses that caused their deaths (as were Helen and Mel themselves, as we 
learn from the texts). Significantly, both Helen and Mel appear to grapple with how to represent 
their own vulnerable states.  
For me, though, it is also useful to bring up the subject of ethics in order to reveal a kind 
of gap in the theory that does not necessarily account for other key questions that arise when an 
author incorporates the writing of others into his or her life narrative. After all, what is 
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noteworthy to me in these texts is not the question of whether or not the authors are behaving 
ethically but the fact that neither Wiebe nor Toews is satisfied with speaking for their family 
members. Rather, they are more interested in having their family members speak for themselves. 
Furthermore, in doing so, both authors use autobiographical discourse in a unique way in that 
they are more interested in relaying the story of another’s illness than in how the illness of the 
other has affected them personally. Consequently, I am interested in how incorporating someone 
else’s life writing works to place an emphasis on the other rather than the self. 
In more recent years, the incorporation of outside writing within autobiographical 
discourse has been viewed through the lens of Eakin’s theories on relational identities. In her 
article “Competing Life Narratives,” Amber K. Regis applies the term “intertextual relationality” 
to life writing. Regis examines both an autobiographical account of British author Vita Sackville-
West as well as biographical accounts written first by her son, Nigel, and then by Nigel’s son, 
Adam. Each subsequent life writing account relies on and incorporates the previous accounts. 
Regis draws on the conception of relationality as it is understood in autobiography theory in 
order to explain how the phenomenon of intertextuality that she sees in this work is operating in 
a fashion that is both similar yet also somewhat different from the way that authors construct 
relational identities. She writes, “For Sidonie Smith and Julia Watson, relationality suggests that 
‘the boundaries of an ‘‘I’’ are often shifting and permeable’ (86). Intertextuality extends this 
project, with repetitions and revisions suggesting that life narratives are never fixed, nor are they 
isolable. … These models function as intertexts; they impact on the construction of life-writing 
subjects” (289). For Regis, then, intertextuality dispels the notion of the autonomous individual 
and instead discloses the porous nature of identity. Much like other texts that might construct 
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relational selves, intertextuality in life writing reveals a conception of identity that is constantly 
shifting between self and other. 
Yet while Regis sees how the Sackville-West Portrait texts function when read through 
an established theoretical lens, she also notes how the texts depart from the way relationality is 
typically thought about in life writing. She writes, “By comparison, Eakin’s categories of 
relationality are all intratextual; they recognise the negotiations between subjects that occur 
within texts. Portrait’s composite structure, alongside subsequent revisions and appropriations, 
suggests an intertextual relationality: the construction of narratives and subjects in response to 
existing, alternative versions of a life” (289). What Regis sees as unaccounted for, then, in 
conventional life writing theories is a notion of a relation between two textual subjects: subjects 
who write their lives in relation to other written lives.  
Regis’s observation is significant. For one, it brings to the forefront the notion that lives 
are not merely influenced by others, but by the narratives of others. The suggestion is that the 
way others have shaped their life narrative impacts crucially on the way that we shape our own 
life narratives. For Regis, then, when viewed through the lens of intertextual relationality, the 
narrated identity should reveal traces of the narratives that have informed the author’s own life 
story. This is why, for Regis, “the palimpsest” functions “as an appropriate model for the 
revision, repetition, and accumulation of life narratives” (290). In the examples that Regis uses, 
authors work to “overwrite” (290) previous accounts with a new interpretation. In that sense, 
these autobiographical works are always exposing the self who is writing the life (either 
autobiographically or biographically) and the agenda that is at work in these texts.  
Other critics have dealt with the incorporation of outside writing in a similar fashion. 
More recently, Jo Collins similarly offered the term bricolage in her article on Edwidge 
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Danticat's diasporic life writing. Collins’s term builds on and departs from Françoise Lionnet’s 
métissage. For Lionnet, métissage “is a reading practice” (8) that calls attention to the 
hybridization or creolization of language. Countering what she calls “the totalizing languages of 
racism” (16), Lionnet examines a more postcolonial writing style wherein authors braid different 
forms of writing, reflecting a multiplicity at the heart of the postcolonial condition which is 
typically denied by hegemonic and imperial forms of writing. As Collins points out, though, 
Lionnet’s request for “solidarity” as “the fundamental principle of political action against 
hegemonic languages” (Lionnet 6) is a call for a uniformed response to texts that presumably 
generate “uniform ethical messages” (Collins 11).  
Ultimately, Collins sees “The notion of ‘ethical autobiographical reading’” as one that 
“prioritises the learning experience of the reader over and above the contextual specificities of 
the (postcolonial) realities explored in the text” (11). Collins instead uses the term bricolage, 
which re-focuses attention on texts that juxtapose “previously unrelated, diverse materials” (12). 
Although Collins does not acknowledge his influence, the term bricolage is largely derived here 
from Claude Lévi-Strauss who essentially saw bricolage as “mak[ing] do with ‘whatever is at 
hand’” (11). The project of the bricoleur, he notes, is one that makes use of “a set of tools and 
materials” that are “always finite” and “also heterogeneous” and, finally, have “no relation to the 
current project” (11).  
 Collins argues that Danticat uses bricolage techniques because of “Danticat’s mobile 
authorial stance, coupled with her inclusion of diverse source materials in her writing” (9). She 
goes on to note that “This bricolage … allows for layering and even discordance in signification. 
It also significantly decentres Danticat’s voice within her own narratives, thus emphasising an 
authorial self that is relational rather than ‘monadic and autonomous’” (9). Much like Regis, 
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then, Collins sees autobiographical texts that depend on outside material as falling within the 
parameters established by theorists of relational identities in life writing, as these works 
ultimately produce “decentred and relational authorial stances” (11).  
 Along with Amber Regis’s use of the term intertextual relationality, Collins’s discussion 
of bricolage illustrates the recent emergence of a theoretical discussion that accounts for the 
incorporation of outside autobiographical texts written by others within a larger life writing 
narrative. Collins’s term bricolage, as well as her argument that the layering of voices leads to a 
decentering of the author, is helpful in considering ways to approach these texts, particularly her 
Straussian assertion that acts of bricolage work “to fashion polyphonic forms out of available 
resources” (12). Collins’s point ultimately allows me to liken the subjectivity created by way of 
intertextual relationality to the other kinds of subjectivities (familial, communal, etc.) that I 
discussed in earlier chapters that were also polyphonic in nature. Yet it cannot pass without 
saying that Collins’s discussion of bricolage, just like Lionnet’s use of the term métissage, is 
used by authors as a way of responding to conditions of postcoloniality or diaspora. This is not 
entirely problematic as discussions on Mennonite literature and theories on diaspora are not 
incompatible
23
.  
 That being said, it is difficult to say convincingly that the intertextuality and polyphony 
in Rudy Wiebe’s and Miriam Toews’s books is the result of a condition of diaspora. A case, 
perhaps, could be made in the instance of the former, since diaspora plays a role in Wiebe’s text. 
Yet at the same time, Wiebe’s use of outside texts in Of This Earth suggests more of an 
allegiance to a familial community than a cultural diasporic community. In this sense, while I do 
find Collins’s discussion helpful, I am reluctant to call what Wiebe and Toews are doing 
bricolage. Both Of This Earth and Swing Low are instructive, though, in that they demonstrate 
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how the intermingling of various life writing sources is not merely a phenomenon of conditions 
of postcoloniality and diaspora.  
In fact, I argue that Of This Earth and Swing Low both make use of intertextuality in 
ways that neither Regis nor Collins fully account for. That is not to say that Regis’s use of the 
term intertextual relationality does not apply in these two cases. Indeed, to some degree, Regis’s 
metaphor of the palimpsest is helpful, particularly in the case of Swing Low in which it is 
ultimately unclear whose voice is speaking. Readers can know that there are traces of Melvin’s 
original words that Toews transcribed, but they can never fully say which words are Melvin’s 
and which words are Toews’s. The palimpsest metaphor is less helpful when discussing Rudy 
Wiebe’s work because of the way Wiebe clearly delineates where he is writing and where he is 
devoting space to Helen’s notebook, though, as I will point out, there is a degree of overwriting 
that occurs in Of This Earth as well.  
The metaphor of the palimspsest that Regis employs suggests that intertextuality reveals a 
lack of closure. This is ultimately helpful in my analysis of Wiebe and Toews in ways that I will 
address below. However, neither Regis nor Collins suggests how the incorporation of outside 
texts might work to privilege the story and account of the other. In Of This Earth and Swing Low, 
the authors are indeed expressing how each of them was personally affected by a family member. 
However, the fact that the authors include someone else’s life writing suggests more than merely 
a personal response to the family member (and does more than suggest how the self was formed 
in its relation to another). What Wiebe and Toews tell us is that it is more important for their 
family members to speak their story than it is for the authors to speak for their family. Indeed, in 
Swing Low the source of the the outside material, Melvin, is the key focus and narrator of the 
text. Ultimately both authors use autobiographical discourse but, in practicing intertextual 
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relationality, they shift focus away from their own selves, feelings, and experiences in order to 
highlight the importance of other selves and their feelings and experiences.  
In Of This Earth, Rudy Wiebe uses several examples of what qualifies as external life 
writing. He includes, for example, a letter from the “regional inspector of schools” who 
complains about how Mennonites in Wiebe’s home town took the initiative upon themselves to 
build a local school for the children who had gone without an education (113-14). He also 
includes some entries from his sister Liz’s notebook. Importantly, though, Liz only begins 
writing notebook entries after the death of Wiebe’s sister Helen, who had previously taken on the 
role of the family chronicler. The overwhelming majority of intertextual life writing in Of This 
Earth is Helen’s diary entries and these entries work to reaffirm Helen’s central position within 
the book’s narrative. As Amy Kroeker correctly notes, “Helen has a presence in this story almost 
greater than that of those living as she haunts its edges” (“Scar Tissue” 170). 
From the beginning, Wiebe’s use of Helen’s notebooks has one primary function, which 
is to demonstrate what Helen’s central preoccupations were in the final years of her life. Wiebe 
writes, “a year later [Helen] would begin chronicling all our family illnesses in a tiny notebook” 
(86). A reflection of Kathryn Carter’s point that “The dailiness of diary writing speaks to a desire 
to give meaning to the chaos of everyday events” (19), Helen’s diary entries reveal a desire to 
make sense of familial illnesses, but in particular her own illness that was seemingly taking away 
her life quite meaninglessly. Indeed, many of the entries that Wiebe transcribes display Helen’s 
concern with illness.  
The first entry she writes demonstrates this concern: 
1940. Helen Wiebe got sick 5 of Jan. On her birthday [her twelfth]. was sick quite 
a while had to go to hospital [North Battleford] on 13 of Jan. got operation the 
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same day 13 Jan. at 5 P.M. was very sick got water about 15
th
. got meals on 16
th
, 
then came home on 24 of Jan. still was very sick then on night about the 26 of Jan 
got very sick got heart trouble and stayed in bed 4 months and on Mother’s Day 
[May 12] Schroeder [with his truck] came over and brought me too church & after 
she was well. (86-87) 
Here, and elsewhere in the book, Wiebe’s use of Helen’s entries has several functions. On the 
one hand, it serves to illustrate the decisive impact that Helen and her illness had on Wiebe’s 
own life and sense of self. Indeed, as these personal moments are embedded within the life 
narrative another, they can ultimately serve to illustrate how illness is not necessarily always 
personal (or, perhaps, it is better to say that one’s personal illness can cause ripples that affect 
others in ways that are inevitably different from the ways that one experiences her own illness).  
On the other hand, Wiebe is devoting space that allows Helen to articulate an experience 
that Wiebe himself cannot fully articulate. Recent studies of illness narratives in life writing 
observe that “autobiographical illness narratives reclaim patients’ voices from the biomedical 
narratives imposed upon them by modern medicine” (Jurecic 3). I bring this up not to suggest 
that Wiebe represents the possible threat of modern medicine imposing a hegemonic narrative on 
personal experience, but rather to suggest that what is important about “autobiographical illness 
narratives” is that they allow for those who suffer from illness to tell their own story outside of 
the confines of other powerful discourse models. This is precisely what Helen’s incorporated text 
does within the larger autobiographical narrative written by Wiebe. 
That being said, what is, perhaps, remarkable upon first examining Helen’s text is how 
little it does to challenge “biomedical narratives.” This, though, is perhaps not so surprising 
when one takes into account G. Thomas Couser’s point that “the impulse of patients to reclaim 
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their bodies and their stories from medical discourse” is a “postmodern experience” (Recovering 
11). It is quite likely, then, that because Helen is not writing in an age where it is more common 
to question the authority of discursive master narratives, she mostly conforms to a rather cold, 
clinical, and disinterested description of illness that is more in keeping with medical discourses. 
As Rudy Wiebe himself points out on more than one occasion, “In her tiny pulp-paper notebook 
she always recorded the dates of her life in the third person” (231). The above excerpt from 
Helen’s notebook in some respects illustrates Wiebe’s point.  
The discussion of her sickness is, for the most part, impersonal and unemotional. In many 
ways, Helen is distancing her writing self from the body that is experiencing the illness. Yet, at 
the same time, it must be acknowledged that Helen cannot help at times but revert to a more 
subjective voice, as evidenced by her statement that “Schroeder [with his truck] came over and 
brought me too church & after she was well.” Even in this brief moment, Helen switches back 
and forth between the personal and the impersonal. Here, even the most neutral discussion of 
personal illness inevitably gives way to a kind of subjective experience.  
Ultimately, though, Helen’s impersonal recording of relatively mundane information is 
fairly in keeping with conventional practices of diary writing. Kathryn Carter points out that 
“banal details … form the backbone of a diary” (20). In From the Inside Out, a collection of 
Mennonite diaries from the period of 1863 to 1929, editor/historian Royden Loewen observes 
how the diaries from this period “record daily acts, not emotion and analysis” (1). Ultimately, he 
suggests, these texts typically do not convey “the inner thoughts of the individual” (1) even 
though they do illustrate the “preoccupation[s]” of the person writing the diary, with illness 
being given as an example. Helen’s preoccupation with names, dates, and basic facts also speaks 
to Julia Watson’s observations about genealogical records. In such records, “A personal story is 
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subordinated to the history of the family, and that story tolerates no embroidery” (300). 
Consequently, “the researcher can resist autobiography’s grip by stripping information of its 
narrative elements” (303). In this sense, there are several conventions at work in Helen’s diary 
entries, revealed in the way that she records events.  
Helen does not discuss other events in her life with a great deal of depth or description 
either. At one point she notes, “It’s three months I have been in bed today. Biechs were over 
today. In the evening Rudy read stories to me. Got a dozen oranges from Mrs. Biech” (266). This 
account itself seems not only fragmented but also not entirely rooted in a linear development, as 
the point about the “oranges from Mrs. Biech” seems like it should be written before Helen’s 
statement about Rudy’s stories. Ultimately, Helen’s use of the private notebook allows her to 
explore and consider her experiences outside of the demands of more public or literary forms 
that would typically require Helen’s story to be shaped into a narrative or plot. Couser speaks to 
this distinction between the private diary and the public autobiography, suggesting that, 
Although memoirs cannot render the subjective experience of illness, they can 
represent conditions (and outcomes) unavailable to autobiography. … To a lesser 
extent so can the diary (or journal) precisely because it does not await the 
resolution – whether in recovery from or accommodation to dysfunction – that 
seems to license most retrospective autobiographical accounts of illness and 
disability. (Recovering 6) 
Couser’s point is useful in several ways in that this quotation is not only applicable to Helen’s 
discussion of her illness but also the larger frame of Wiebe’s narrative of the memoir. Indeed, I 
will discuss below the value of Wiebe’s representing illness in a way that is seemingly 
“unavailable” to Helen.  
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 Important too is that Helen is not writing from a point of temporal distance from her 
illness but rather as the events themselves are happening. As Margo Culley says about diaries, 
“A novel creates a fictional world complete unto itself, while an autobiography or memoir looks 
back from a fixed point in time which is the terminus of the retrospective. A diary, on the other 
hand, is created in and represents a continuous present” (20). Culley is sure to note that the lack 
of temporal distance in a diary does not mean that the constructed self is any more authentic than 
the kind that would appear in an autobiography or a memoir. On the contrary, “The pages of the 
diary might be thought of as a kind of mirror before which the diarist stands assuming this 
posture or that” (12). Nevertheless, Wiebe’s incorporation of Helen’s notebook entries allows us 
to glimpse how another conceives of or, at least, writes her illness beyond the constraints of 
certain narrative strategies, such as the conventional recovery plot that is often evoked in 
narratives of individual illness. Certainly, these moments are helpful in showing us a side to 
Helen that Wiebe cannot give to the reader within the greater context of his memoir. As Watson 
correctly points out, forms of life writing such as Helen’s that are solely meant to just give facts 
are not reconciled very easily with autobiography in which there are greater demands for 
narrative. The value of these diary excerpts is not so much that they add any significant detail to 
Rudy Wiebe’s own story. Rather, they are important because they give Helen a voice with which 
to articulate her experience as it is happening. Whether or not they serve to better someone else’s 
story appears to be entirely beside the point. 
Significantly, Wiebe does not attempt here to assimilate Helen’s story into his own. 
Rather the two texts, to use Jo Collins’s term, are juxtaposed, in many ways, against each other. 
This is a significant choice Wiebe makes, given his own history with incorporating other 
people’s life stories into his own work. The most dramatic example of this is the 1998 
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collaborative memoir written with Yvonne Johnson, Stolen Life: The Journey of a Cree Woman. 
In Stolen Life, Wiebe constructs the life story of Johnson, a Cree woman serving a twenty-five 
year sentence for first degree murder. As has now been frequently reported, Johnson specifically 
requested Wiebe to help tell her story after reading his 1973 novel about Big Bear, whom 
Johnson identifies as her great-great-grandfather. Their collaboration elicited mixed reactions. 
Susanna Egan pointed to the main criticism against the book in her article “Telling Trauma” 
when she observed that, 
Wiebe positions himself from the beginning of this text as so immersed in Cree 
culture as to have no critical distance, no position separate from Cree culture from 
which the Mennonite writer, Rudy Wiebe, may come into the situation. For me, 
this immersion … provoke[s] the politically correct reading that excoriates Wiebe 
for appropriation of a Native woman’s voice and story” (“Telling Trauma” 23) 
Indeed, this very notion of “appropriation” was at the heart of many concerns regarding Wiebe’s 
role in the book.  
In Jonathan Dueck’s review of the criticism on Stolen Life, he observes how Wiebe was 
charged with having “stolen a First Nations voice” (146). Dueck notes Stolen Life led several 
critics to conclude that “by appropriating and misrepresenting the voices and stories of First 
Nations people, Wiebe has supported a stellar writing career with less-than-stellar writing” (146). 
If the appropriation and misrepresentation of the other was a key issue for critics of Stolen Life, 
one could argue that Wiebe approaches different but similarly dangerous territory in Of This 
Earth. Ultimately, though, I suggest that because Wiebe’s writing appears in juxtaposition to 
Helen’s and because there is no seamless transition between Wiebe’s words and Helen’s, he does 
not fall into the same traps that Egan suggests he does in Stolen Life; rather, he maintains a 
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“critical distance” and a “position separate” from Helen’s experiences. In constructing a space 
that allows for Helen’s own words to appear in juxtaposition to his own writing, Wiebe neither 
appropriates her story nor misrepresents it.  
In fact, Helen’s diary entries do not quite work to strengthen or legitimize Wiebe’s own 
autobiographical account at all. For one, the entries do not necessarily add any revelatory 
information about Wiebe’s own youth. Nor do Helen’s words help bring Wiebe any closer to an 
authentic or more truthful account. It is certainly true that Wiebe does position Helen’s diary as 
more concrete than the ephemeral oral language that was used during the time period that Wiebe 
writes about. He notes how as a child he and his family spoke Low German which is “A 
language that could not be written down, nor corrected by being made visible” (141). Because 
the language in use was not a written language, he observes that “Everything my parents and I 
told each other in the first twelve years of my life, gone” (141). This, Wiebe notes, is quite 
different from Helen’s diary written in “neat English” and containing words that are “still here 
on the paper of her tiny notebook” (141). The diary, then, operates as one of the few living 
documents that was written during the period that Wiebe represents in the book.   
Yet despite the diary’s status as a concrete document from the era, Wiebe nevertheless 
demonstrates that Helen’s notebook does not work to shed light on the truth or the way things 
actually occurred at the time. Wiebe makes this clear when he points out a discrepancy in 
Helen’s diary regarding his own sickness: 
Helen’s little notebooks actually record ‘Rudy Wiebe got sick’ twice, but they are 
exactly the same words and there is a contradiction in the dates. One note says it 
was “1940” and “Sat July 22,” the other “1939” and the day “Sat July 27.” But 
these dates are reversed: in 1939 Saturday fell on July 22, and in 1940 on July 27 
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and therefore both dates are wrong. So, which year was I sick once? Was I almost 
five or almost six years old when I was dragged uselessly from “Doc” to “nurse” 
to be brought back “home in the night” and be “very sick for first weeks”? If only 
my sweet sister, now sixty years gone, had left a single descriptive word about my 
sickness. (143) 
Wiebe suggests that Helen’s entries are not entirely trustworthy. They are not untrustworthy 
because Helen is lying (in fact there is very little for Helen to lie about) but, rather, because she 
is writing diary entries she is susceptible to minor errors, memory lapses, etc. These moments 
serve to reinforce what Wiebe has shown in other books to be the instability of the historical 
artifact. As Froese Tiessen puts it, for Wiebe, “fact and artifact fail to provide a secure and 
reliable entry into … [the] past” and while artifacts may “suggest something about what the past 
might have been” they nevertheless “fall short on conveying what it was and what it meant” 
(“Between Memory” 628). Again in Of This Earth, the historical documents that Wiebe uses 
serve a purpose other than finding the real story of his past. 
 Wiebe makes it clear that he is not necessarily incorporating Helen’s entries in order to 
help better define a sense of himself. If this were the case he would not point out cases in which 
Helen’s entries only serve to confuse questions of what really happened to Rudy Wiebe as a 
child. The lack of certainty that comes about because of these diary entries reinforces Jo 
Collins’s point that bricolage can offer a sense of discordance. What’s more, as Collins would 
note, these moments work to decentre Wiebe, and distance him from being the book’s primary 
focus. Helen’s diary entries serve to tell us, first and foremost, about Helen herself and namely 
how she was reacting to her own illness, which was simultaneously profoundly affecting 
everyone in the family. This does not mean, of course, that Wiebe does not consider himself and 
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his identity as being bound, in some way to his sister. Indeed, a central reason why Wiebe 
incorporates Helen’s notebook is because the two were and continue to be inextricably linked.  
Certainly Wiebe demonstrates how Helen played an instrumental role in his life. The 
identity that Wiebe constructs for himself in Of This Earth is very much a relational one and 
Helen appears to be one of the more significant figures in his life story as he sees it. In fact, 
Wiebe’s “first memory” (6), which he gives at the very beginning of the book, is more a story 
about his sisters Liz and Helen than it is about himself. He writes,  
My sister Liz – she is five years old, or six – has stepped into the family washtub 
too quickly, at the instant Helen, certainly nine, began to pour boiling water into 
the tepid, slightly scummy bathwater I have just scrambled out of. The boiling 
water slaps down Liz’s leg, that’s her scream, and with a cry Helen drops the steel 
kettle to the floor, the water splashes out with the crash, pours over the bumpy 
boards as the kettle lid rings away and I am screaming too. (5) 
Wiebe himself is certainly involved in this moment but he is, at best, a tangential figure. His first 
memory that he uses to begin his memoir is not so much about anything related directly to him 
but is rather about his two sisters.  
 While this moment features both Liz and Helen, and while the family as a whole unit is 
crucial in Wiebe’s self understanding (as I discussed in chapter two), it is clear throughout the 
book that Helen, specifically, plays a very important role. She, along with Wiebe’s sister Mary, 
is the first to help teach him the English language but also the significance of language in 
general. After the young Wiebe reads a poem that has the word moon in it, the following 
exchange occurs between him and his sister, Helen:  
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“That’s moon,” ten-year-old Helen points up with the same finger that has led her 
voice and my eyes across the page, speaking out loud the tiny black tracks on the 
perfect white paper. In the long northern evening light she is multiplying meaning 
from sound to sight and back again. “It’s almost like Mohn, just a little different.” 
And of course I believe her instantly; I will understand these shifty differences for 
the rest of my life. For Helen and me anything can have as many names as it 
wants: that giant ball of light rising out of the black aspen across the field on 
Louis Ulmer’s homestead can change its sound from Mam’s Low German de 
Mohn to the church preacher’s High German der Mond to the school English ‘the 
moon’ as easily as it will, I already know, change its shape night after night 
sailing across the sky. (41-42) 
Helen, here, appears to teach Wiebe important facts about the nature of language. In conveying 
how the object moon can produce multiple words, she reveals to him the arbitrary relationship 
between signifier and signified as Saussure would put it, or the “arbitrary mysteries that 
everyone older agrees about” (40) as a young Rudy Wiebe understood it. Furthermore, Helen 
also helps Wiebe come to understand that the sign as a concept and a sound-image does not 
necessarily refer to anything stable, as the moon itself changes “night after night.” Thus, Wiebe 
also comes to understand language as an “endless chain of signifiers” in the Derridean sense. It is 
in this moment of the book where we learn that Helen plays a crucial role in the development of 
Wiebe’s mastery over the English language. It is not outrageous to suggest, then, that Wiebe is in 
many ways crediting Helen as significantly influencing his own identity as a writer. 
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 Important, too, is that the entries that Wiebe (perhaps strategically) chooses from Helen’s 
notebook reveal how Helen also saw herself as being very much bound to her brother, 
specifically more than to other family members: 
Saturday, Feb. 3: I started to knit the other sock while mom and dad went to 
school to wash floor. I helped Rudy make a scrap book on food in the evening. 
Sunday, Feb. 4: Today nobody was over, and Rudy helped me learn the ten Bible 
verses by heart, which was terribly hard, He also stayed home with me at night for 
there was church. (267) 
This section, along with several others, illustrates how Helen also very much conceives of her 
identity as relational. Wiebe tells us in these moments that the relationship between him and his 
sister was largely one based on reciprocity. Just as Helen helps Wiebe with language as well as 
the “scrap book” for school, he helps her with “Bible verses” and provides what was most likely 
much needed company and companionship when the house was otherwise vacant. Helen’s 
notebook ultimately confirms how both Wiebe and his sister were very much reliant on each 
other. 
The impact of Helen on Wiebe’s life though is perhaps rendered more significant as a 
result of her death. This point is made clear when Wiebe departs from the autobiographical 
format in order to insert an early draft of one of his earliest pieces of short fiction which was a 
quasi-autobiographical story of the night of Helen’s death written “eleven years after” (250). 
This section is remarkable not just because it gives what might be read as a dramatic and 
emotional account of Helen’s last night, but also because in presenting the events of this evening 
via his former short-story, Wiebe simultaneously reveals the impact that this moment had on him 
(so much so that it became the source of his first fictional writing). Here Wiebe detaches himself 
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from speaking about the event in a personal way by shifting the autobiographical “I” over to his 
short story narrator.  
Here and elsewhere, Rudy Wiebe shows us the profound impact that Helen’s death had 
on him. As he indicates in the story, “The house did not smell right” (259) following his sister’s 
death. Upon going to school, the autobiographical character in Wiebe’s short story similarly 
observes that “somehow, school was not right either” (259). Wiebe portrays not only the 
character within the short story but also himself as a person whose life has been irrevocably 
altered not only as a result of the death of his sister but also because of the extremity of her 
illness the night before her death. He writes, “Then, inhumanly, the screaming came again. It was 
like a pointed … he could hear and feel nothing, just the searing scream, as if he and it were the 
sole inhabitants of a universe. It drowned his brain until he could not hear it for the sound” (251). 
The short story serves to highlight what the book as a whole reveals – that Helen’s early death 
continues to significantly affect Wiebe.  
In that sense, the book occasionally slips into the category of the grief narrative, since it 
is clear that even sixty years later, Wiebe still mourns the loss of his sister. As Amy Prodromou 
recently suggested, grief narratives work as a reminder that we are relational subjects. She 
writes, “The loss of a beloved other results in the loss of a vital understanding of our selves in 
relation to that other - the whole concept of self must be reworked and revisited when we attempt 
to define ourselves within the literal (geographical) and psychically altered space that results 
from this new absence” (58). By focusing on Helen, her illness, and the aftermath of her death, 
Wiebe illustrates how her absence shifted his sense of self. 
At the same time, though, Wiebe does not fully adhere to the generic demands of the 
grief narrative. As Smith and Watson put it, “Memoirs of grief are often passed from hand to 
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hand as how-to guidebooks, serving as contemporary books of consolation” (138). Yet as 
Prodromou points out, many contemporary autobiographical texts by writers dealing with loss 
are now avoiding this particular narrative model. She refers to the texts that challenge this model 
as memoirs of “textured recovery.” Prodromou writes that “many memoirs provide answers and 
have definite agendas for what the purpose of their memoirs should be, while memoirs of 
textured recovery do not” (61). Rather, memoirs of textured recovery “complicate traditional 
movement from loss to renewal” (61). While Wiebe’s discussion of Helen does indeed reveal 
that her death is still very much a crucial marker in his life, he resists using her death as a way to 
posit advice on how to recover from grief. At the same time, though, in spite of what Prodromou 
suggests is also the case with memoirs of textured recovery, Wiebe does not “insist on a grief 
that does not end” (62). Perhaps the reason why Wiebe avoids either of these tropes is because 
ultimately, when discussing Helen, Wiebe’s focus is primarily on her feelings rather than on his 
own. 
In that sense, then, Helen’s function in Of This Earth goes beyond a conventional reading 
of relational life writing. She exists in the book not simply to illustrate the impact she had on her 
brother’s life. Certainly it is the case that she had an impact and this is what allows Wiebe to 
focus so much attention on her within his own autobiographical narrative. Yet at the same time, 
Wiebe tells us that quite apart from the kind of impact that she had on him, Helen’s life in and of 
itself is important and worthy of focus and attention. The story, he suggests, is not necessarily 
about him in relation to his sister. Rather, in certain parts of the book, what matters is simply 
Helen’s life and her own experiences. That her story does indeed come across in the book is a 
remarkable achievement particularly when one takes into account the kind of life that Helen has 
in her fourteen years. G. Thomas Couser points out that, 
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although our selves and our lives are fundamentally somatic, the body has not 
until recently figured prominently in life writing. Traditional biographers usually 
treat illness as an interruption of the life that is their proper concern, except when 
it threatens life or ends it. And although autobiographers are better situated than 
biographers to report on the somatic lives of their subjects, traditionally they too 
have seemed disinclined to do so. (Recovering 5) 
Couser suggests that if it is the case that autobiographical or biographical accounts 
conventionally call for some sort of narrative, then illness typically goes undiscussed because it 
is largely considered to be that which thwarts any kind of linear development of a life narrative. 
Couser, therefore, goes on to conclude that “illness or disability” is often considered to be 
“threatening” to “one’s sense of identity” given that it disrupts “the apparent plot of one’s life” 
(5).  
As Wiebe tells us, though, Helen’s whole life has been consumed by illness. He notes 
that “Helen had been sickly, sometimes gravely ill, from the day of her birth” (262). 
Consequently a good deal of her life is spent without much activity. Countless times throughout 
the book, Wiebe discusses Helen’s seclusion. He observes, for example, how Helen spent much 
of her life “in bed, barely able to step outside the house for a brief picture” (232). Helen’s own 
words reflect a life of inactivity. She writes: “Was at home for a month and was not feeling very 
good. Had to go and see the doc in Battleford on the 21. Had to stay home a whole month and on 
21 June went to see the doc” (233). Helen reveals how months go by without too much to report. 
In some ways confirming Couser’s point, Helen has little to say here other than that she “was not 
feeling very good” and the only events that seem to operate as markers of narrative development 
are her trips to the doctor.  
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 On the surface, then, Helen’s life lacks the kinds of events that might count as 
meaningful experience
24
. Wiebe, for example, tells us that examining Helen’s notebook reveals 
that she stopped going to school several years before her death: “While I gnawed my way 
happily through grade school, Helen did not. … her attendance days throughout October, 
November and December [1942] are simply marked ‘S’ – sick. Her fifteenth birthday was on 
January 5, 1943; the school began on Wednesday, January 6, and her line of attendance for the 
rest of the year is blank: she never returned to any school” (230-31). As a young woman who has 
been ill since birth, Helen is largely bereft of the events and social relationships that are crucial 
in helping to create one’s sense of identity. In this sense, perhaps Wiebe’s insertion of Helen’s 
diary (a form that itself typically rejects conventional notions of narrative and plot) works to 
convey Helen’s life as a sick young girl in a way that his autobiographical writing could never 
fully achieve. 
 Wiebe’s book illustrates though that while Helen was denied the kind of moments in life 
and social relationships that are conventionally held as significant in informing one’s sense of 
self, she nevertheless was a person who had very real experiences that are worthy of readerly 
attention. Wiebe not only devotes space within his memoir for Helen’s own life writing but he 
also takes the focus off himself within his own narrative in order to give a good amount of 
biographical information about Helen. In many ways, Wiebe accomplishes in his own narrative 
what Helen does not, or perhaps cannot, in that he constructs Helen as someone other than a 
person consumed with, as well as consumed by, illness. Affirming Couser’s point that memoirs 
can represent conditions of illness that are “unavailable to autobiography,” Wiebe articulates his 
sense of Helen in a way that seems to be beyond the generic confines of the personal diary and 
outside the demands of autobiography for a personal story of the individual author.  
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Helen records day-to-day experiences and events, which means that only reading the 
diary entries leaves us with very little insight about her personality and character, as valuable as 
the entries are. Wiebe, on the other hand, tells us that “Helen loved to sing, smiling even when 
she could not breathe well enough to join in with Isola on her guitar or Mary pumping our brown 
organ. … She liked stories” (273). Similarly, he also notes that while Helen certainly was 
“Afflicted with sickness all her life,” it was nevertheless also true that “her hope for ‘many 
years’ did not falter” (241). These biographical additions by Wiebe flesh out a personality for 
Helen that does not come across in her diary both because of her own illness and, simply, 
because of the conventions of the form. In that sense, as Amber Regis might suggest, Wiebe does 
in some ways overwrite Helen’s narrative.  
However, in Regis’s discussion, overwriting occurs when multiple life writing narrative 
accounts are in competition with each other. She suggests that authors in some ways appropriate 
the life narratives that they are recycling to suit their own current purposes and concludes that 
“constant revision and reiteration” allows for “the constant repackaging” of particular lives “for 
the market” (299). However much this makes sense for Regis’s example of Vita Sackville-West, 
it does not entirely hold true here. After all, Regis notes how subsequent authors would recycle 
Sackville-West’s confession in order to, first, blanket and, then, “restore its narrative of 
homosexuality” (298). This is significant because here the purpose of recycling is to alter the 
public perception that was shaped by the previous act of intertextuality.  
In Of This Earth, though, the implications of the intertextuality are entirely different. 
Unlike in the case of Sackville-West, there is no significant consumer market that would have 
been previously aware of Helen’s life nor would an audience have formed any opinions on it. 
Wiebe’s overwriting, then, is not working to alter a public mindset that Helen’s writings 
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previously shaped. Moreover, Wiebe’s main goal in overwriting (or, perhaps, supplementing) 
Helen’s diary with his own biographical details appears to be to tell the audience more about 
Helen and the aspects of her identity that do not come across in her own notes. Again, just as is 
the case with Wiebe presenting excerpts from Helen’s diary, the focus in these biographical 
moments is far more on her than on him. In the two quotations above written by Wiebe about 
Helen, he observes that while illness was clearly a significant part of her identity, she was 
nevertheless not entirely oppressed by it. He portrays Helen as a girl who continues to sing even 
when she is having difficulty breathing.  
While Wiebe certainly represents Helen as having lived a rather sheltered and troubled 
life on the homestead as a result of her illness, he refuses to project Helen as a victim. For 
Wiebe, Helen is also, as he notes, a positive figure, a symbol of hope, as well as being “sweet” 
(241) and the “gentlest” (231) of sisters. Important too is his observation that Helen “liked 
stories.” This is a point that Wiebe makes earlier in the book as well when he examines a 
photograph: “All the girls look into the camera, except Helen, who is exactly my height on the 
chair and looking at me, her mouth open. Perhaps she is already telling me a story” (28). This 
quotation reaffirms the notion that this book is not merely about Rudy Wiebe but it is also about 
Helen’s story. And more significantly, the book is not only Helen’s story as told by Wiebe but 
also Helen’s life as told by Helen. Just as she was always telling Wiebe a story in his youth, 
Wiebe gives Helen the opportunity to tell a story in his memoir, more than sixty years after her 
death. Indeed, Wiebe does embellish Helen’s writing. By including her diary entries, though, 
Wiebe gives the reader an insight into how Helen perceived her own day-to-day life.  
The question to ask is why Rudy Wiebe singles out Helen’s narrative in particular. Wiebe 
addresses this point when he speaks to how Helen’s diary managed to remain a family 
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possession sixty years later. He writes, “Beyond all odds in my older sisters’ relentless 
opp’rieme, cleaning up, after our mother died, Helen’s notebooks have survived, … It may well 
be these notebook words exist because they were Helen’s; her life was so short and we had so 
little to remember her by; and she lived such a continuous illness that the repeated litany became 
her solitary solace” (142-43). Ultimately, then, placing Helen’s diary entries within his own 
narrative preserves her memory and, importantly, because Wiebe’s book is published on a wide 
scale, her writing is ultimately preserved in the public sphere that was largely denied to Helen for 
most of her life.  
Of This Earth reaffirms a good deal of what both Regis and Collins have to say regarding 
the use of other life narratives within larger autobiographical frameworks. The embedding of 
Helen’s diary entries within Wiebe’s memoir illustrates and reinforces the mutually fluid 
identities of both Rudy and Helen Wiebe. As Regis suggests, the use of outside life writing texts 
does not function to make the story appear any more authentic. Helen’s entries, at times, 
reinforce Wiebe’s own memories, but ultimately they do not necessarily encourage the reader to 
trust the story any more than they would without the entries. In fact, Wiebe goes out of his way 
to demonstrate both the untrustworthiness of Helen’s entries as well as their lack of detail. As he 
points out: “Dates, times, contradictions. Visible words that fix memory despite decades of 
forgetting and impossible recall” (248). As this quotation suggests, though, it is ultimately not 
accuracy or the level of detail that matter so much as the fact that Helen’s words exist and should 
be given import. As Regis would put it, Wiebe’s own sense of self is not simply indebted to 
Helen but to Helen’s life writing. The book is an example of how one person’s life narrative is 
ultimately reliant on outside writing that depicts other people’s lived experiences.  
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Ultimately, though, Regis’s notion of intertextual relationality is still very much bound to 
considerations of what these acts of intertextuality can tell us about the author. Regis argues 
ultimately that intertextuality reveals either the wish of the author to “overwrite” the previous 
text so that it aligns with the agenda of the current life writing project, or the motivation of the 
author “to ‘resurrect or uncover the underlying text’, to restore an original, authentic account” 
which, in fact, does not exist (298). Thinking of Of This Earth strictly in these terms, though, 
would be limiting. What is important here is Wiebe’s refusal to appropriate or misrepresent 
Helen. Instead, he creates a space for her to speak to her own particular experiences. In this 
sense, the intertextualism in Of This Earth works to illustrate the privileged role that Helen’s life 
and life writing play in Wiebe’s memories of his own youth. 
Like Of This Earth, Miriam Toews’s Swing Low contains a substantial amount of 
intertextual material, yet it does not attempt to change the public perception of any previous text. 
As is the case with Wiebe, the texts that Toews uses in her own book – the notes left to her by 
her father which were written in the months leading up to his death – had been previously 
unknown to the public. This is not to say that there is not overwriting taking place in Swing Low. 
Toews’s book is based partly on the notes that Mel himself made as well as the remarks that he 
asked his daughter to write down for him. Unlike in Wiebe’s memoir, it is difficult to tell for sure 
which sections came directly from Mel and which parts were written by Toews herself based 
either on conclusions reached from Mel’s notes, her interviews with others, or her own personal 
memories. The text, in which Toews employs the discourse of self-representation so that Mel can 
tell his own story as the autobiographical-I, is ultimately the result of a blending of writing by 
both Toews and her father.  
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In her introduction to the book, Toews describes the process that ultimately led to the 
narrative of Swing Low. She writes, “At the end of his life, my father, in a rare conversation, 
asked me to write things down for him, words and sentences that would lead him out of his 
confusion and sadness to a place and time that he might understand” (xiii). By the end of his life, 
Mel suffers to a greater extreme from a bipolar depression he had experienced throughout his 
life. As I will detail below, Mel’s mental illness makes communication more difficult for him. 
The book conveys how he has a particularly hard time expressing himself via the written word. 
Yet, at the same time, Mel desires to express himself because, for him, writing and reading his 
own story allows him to retain a sense of himself which he feels is disappearing as a result of his 
illness.  
In that sense, Toews is crucial for Mel as she, in effect, is able to translate his story into 
something that will not only be helpful for him but for her as well. She notes, 
Soon I was filling up pages of yellow legal notepads with writing from his own 
point of view so he could understand it when he read it to himself. After his death, 
when I began writing this book, I continued to write in the same way. It was a 
natural extension of the writing I’d done for him in the hospital, and a way though 
not a perfect one, of hearing what my father might have talked about if he’d ever 
allowed himself to. If he’d ever thought it would matter to anybody. (xiii) 
This passage is, perhaps, the best explanation of both how and why Swing Low was written. The 
book is, in some sense, a transcript of Mel’s own spoken words. In its pre-published form, 
Toews’s transcriptions were meant to have a kind of therapeutic value for Mel who could “read 
[them] to himself.” Yet as Toews also admits here, she continued writing after Mel’s death, not 
necessarily transcribing his words but, instead, writing “what my father might have talked 
239 
 
about.” She goes on to note that “By dragging some of the awful details into the light of day, 
they became much less frightening. I have to admit, my father didn’t feel the same way, but he 
found a way to alleviate his pain, and so have I” (xiv). Here, Toews refers to Mel’s suicide, 
which was, according to Toews, the way he “alleviate[d] his pain.”  
Yet she notes here too how the text ultimately had a kind of therapeutic value for her as 
well in that telling the story has allowed her to come to an understanding about her father’s 
mental illness. In my second chapter, I spoke about how Swing Low works to convey the 
importance of family and how Toews is, in many ways, a person who has been dramatically 
affected by her father’s illness. In this chapter, I wish to explore the act of intertextuality in 
Swing Low and what it means to use and transform the written (or in this case, spoken) work of 
an other who is struggling with mental illness. I want to suggest that, in making this textual 
transformation, Toews uses autobiographical discourse not to spotlight her own experiences but 
instead to give voice to an experience that was, for Mel, unrepresentable and outside the confines 
of conventional discourse. 
 Ultimately, the overall focus of Swing Low is Mel and his own personal struggle with 
depression. One of the ways in which this struggle manifests itself is in his inability to 
legitimately express his own subjective experience of mental illness. The book begins with Mel 
lying in a hospital bed talking about the trouble he has in both writing and understanding his 
experience. He says, “I’ve been trying for weeks to make sense of things. For instance, why am I 
here? I’ve filled up several yellow legal pads, right to the margins, with words and sentence 
fragments, but nothing is clear to me” (1). This quotation is significant for several reasons. In 
having Mel reference the “yellow legal pads,” Toews joins together her own writing project with 
her father’s. In an above quotation, Toews makes the same reference about herself filling out 
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yellow legal pads with writing. Immediately, Toews establishes a fluid and relational identity 
with her father to the extent that the line between the two becomes blurry. Toews makes it 
unclear from the beginning precisely who is doing the writing. While she does suggest here that 
the text is explicitly intertextual and very much the result of the notes that Mel outright says he is 
making at the beginning of the book, she ultimately does not reveal to what extent she relies on 
these notes. This moment is also significant, though, because here Toews establishes what Mel 
considers to be his inability to construct a coherent narrative. His writing, he tells us, is reduced 
to “fragments.”  
 This difficulty in writing is a major theme throughout Swing Low. Significantly, Mel sees 
writing as a way to alleviate his symptoms of depression. At one point, he says, 
I will write my way out of this mess! I will fool myself. If I can continue to 
remember right up to the present, then I will know why I’m here. Slowly, I will 
creep towards the present, step by step, memory by memory, and my mind will 
then be eased, gradually, into a place of understanding. It will be very natural. Am 
very excited with new strategy. Pens, paper, must have, and to begin, now. (92) 
Crucially, by “writing,” Mel specifically means life writing. He discloses his desire to “review 
my life as a movie” (19). Yet while the above quotation expresses a kind of hope that writing 
about his own life will act as a kind of cure, he is ultimately unsuccessful because he is unable to 
write about himself in any clear and cohesive manner. Mel admits from the start that “words 
don’t come as easily to me” (2). His mental illness ultimately seems to work as a kind of block 
that prevents him from writing. He says, “My brain is still stuck. I meant to write about myself as 
a boy but…reverse, forward, reverse, forward, reverse…flooded” (17). The narrative of the 
book, then, is, in many ways, about Mel’s inability to construct his own life narrative.  
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The epilogue, written by Toews in her own voice, glaringly reinforces this point when 
she writes about the day that her father committed suicide by throwing himself in front of an 
oncoming train. Toews explains that, 
even after his body was removed, there remained scattered on the tracks and in 
the ditches on each side of it several bright yellow recipe cards for writing notes. 
For as long as I can remember, he wrote notes to himself on cards like these 
before going to bed, carefully arranging them on top of his shoes where he’d be 
sure to find them the next morning. Sadly, the yellow cards that fell out of his 
pocket and onto the tracks were blank. (190) 
Again, Toews provides the repeated image of the yellow paper, though this time rather than 
being “filled up” as they are in the previous examples, they are blank. On one level this 
illustrates how Mel never fully explained his reason for committing suicide and this absence of 
explanation appears to be what specifically motivates Toews to write the book. Furthermore, the 
blank notes reinforce Mel’s ultimate inability to complete the written narrative he was hoping 
would act as a kind of cure – a point that is rendered even more dramatic when Toews tells us 
how Mel’s unwritten life was found at the same time and place that his body was discovered. 
 Mel’s inability to construct a narrative is very much in keeping with several studies on 
illness life writing. Sidonie Smith was an early contributor to this discussion in her article on 
autobiography and austism. In the article, Smith urges critics to “consider the everyday 
impediments to autobiographical storytelling” (227). Smith focuses specifically on writers with 
autism and notes that “Perhaps, … autistics remain outside the linguistic, narrative, and 
communal circuits of autobiographical telling, unautobiographical subjects who cannot get the 
message into the narrative ‘life’ in our everyday sense of the term” (231). Ultimately, then, 
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Smith asks the crucial question, “Does this mean that a person cannot be an autistic and an 
autobiographical subject simultaneously?” (243). Mel’s situation is somewhat different from the 
kinds of cases that Smith describes and I want to avoid conflating a biopolar disorder with 
autism. Indeed, Mel is able to communicate in a way that people with the kind of severe 
symptoms of autism that Smith is talking about are not. Indeed, Smith is referring specifically to 
“autistics [who] remain forever silent of speech, or become only occasionally communicative 
through mimetic utterances” (235).  
Yet, at the same time, Mel is not entirely dissimilar to these cases. Certainly, by the end 
of his life, as represented in the book, Mel is usually unable to communicate in any way that 
might be considered rational or clear. Indeed, his very lack of clarity is what makes him repeat 
phrases that are entirely rooted outside of reality, such as his ongoing false assertion that “I have 
killed my wife” (6). To borrow G. Thomas Couser’s phrasing, Mel has become “simply too ill – 
too debilitated or traumatized by [his] condition – to imagine writing about it” (Recovering 
Bodies 5). Ultimately though, Mel does “imagine writing” about his life, but finds it impossible 
given his condition. Smith’s description of “unautobiographical subjects” seems particularly apt 
for describing Mel’s own situation. This becomes most apparent when Mel remarks on several 
occasions how he is unable to grasp a sense of self as a result of his illness. He says, “Nothing I 
see is familiar and the parts of my body are strange, as though they belong to somebody else” 
(14). Very soon after he notes the same problem in relation to the writing he is doing. He writes, 
“It is interesting that I have used the word ‘myself’ three times in the last two paragraphs and 
have no idea what it means anymore” (18). In both of these cases, Mel’s self is positioned as an 
unknown and unknowable foreign entity.  
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Much like the people whom Smith discusses, Mel is constrained by the very nature of his 
illness, which prevents him from writing about himself in a coherent way. As the title of Swing 
Low suggests, Mel’s depression causes powerful mood swings that ultimately bring about shifts 
in character, as if he swings from one type of person to another. This is not to say that Mel 
suffers from a multi-personality disorder, but the book certainly does reveal two distinct 
identities for Mel throughout the book – the seemingly happy, professional, and successful 
teacher and the overwhelmingly unhappy sufferer of depression who typically exists behind 
closed doors. It is as if these swings, then, prevent a coherent narrative from developing because, 
in fact, there is no development, but rather a series of stops and starts or, as Mel might put it, 
“reverse, forward, reverse, forward, reverse.” 
Mel, in fact, makes this point when he begins writing and observes of his life that “It has 
all the structure of a bamboo hut in a hurricane and I must apologize for this lack of cohesion. A 
series of jerky stills, courtesy of my renegade mind, will have to do. Just wait for the inevitable 
upside-down slide in the carousel” (19). Quotations like these are crucial because they suggest 
that Mel is not simply writing to alleviate his illness but also to regain a sense of self that he feels 
has been lost. It is a rediscovery of self that Mel feels will help him manage the symptoms of his 
mental illness. In other words, Mel feels that his identity has been in some way erased by his 
depression and he is attempting to recuperate this identity through the process of writing.  
In many ways Mel reaffirms Couser’s observation about how many see illness as an 
interruption of life. Therefore, illness is perceived to be that which exists outside of the 
parameters of life narratives. The crisis that Mel experiences is not unlike the one that Richard 
Freadman describes of author Inga Clendinnen, in his article “Clinging to the Shreds of the Self.” 
Again, Clendinnen’s experience is different from Mel’s – her illness is physical, the result of 
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liver failure. Yet, like Mel, Clendinnen experiences what Freadman calls “florid hallucinations” 
that “are playing havoc with her customary sense of things and her memory, her very sense of 
self and with them her capacity to enact a coherent response to her situation are faltering” (377-
78). Importantly, Freadman notes the significance that writing plays to the subject whose illness 
results in a dissipating sense of self. He observes, “Clendinnen fears that without writing there 
will cease to be a sentient individual who suffers the disease; … In order to continue to be that 
sentient narrative individual she must write; and writing can then help make further sense of 
what is going on” (381).  
Freadman later notes, “Discomposed by illness, as it were, she claims to have 
recomposed herself in narrative” (386). Freadman’s observations about Clendinnen can very 
much be transplanted to Mel and both cases speak to the impulse in illness life writing 
(particularly where the writers see their illness as destroying their sense of identity) to recuperate 
a lost self textually. Yet there is a striking difference between Mel and Clendinnen as Freadman 
describes her. Indeed, Freadman considers Clendinnen’s autobiography to be proof that life 
writing may operate as “a place in which an enhanced self can flourish, even as that self is 
severely threatened” (381). Swing Low is far less affirming in that Mel never entirely finds a way 
to express himself in a way that is fulfilling, a point reinforced by the fact that the book is 
ultimately written by Toews rather than Mel. A text like the one Freadman describes appears to 
adhere to what Couser refers to as “the comic plot expected of autobiography” which typically 
concludes with a “triumph over adversity” (5). Yet as Couser notes, “those with chronic 
disability or illness may have difficulty reconciling their experience of illness” with this 
conventional plot structure and “in many cases the culturally validated narrative of triumph over 
adversity may simply not be available” (5).  Indeed, Mel’s difficulties in articulating his own 
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experiences affirm the point made by Timothy Dow Adams that “Only a very small percentage 
of mentally ill people survive their experiences with the ability to write a sustained narrative” 
(“Borderline Personality” 123). Swing Low in many ways represents a person’s struggle with 
being an un-representable autobiographical subject. 
However, this is not to say that the book’s message on these issues is entirely hopeless. 
Intriguingly, one of the ways that Mel was able to manage his depression for quite some time 
was of establishing connections with textual others. Early in the book, Mel says, “I’ve been 
researching the lives of important Canadians such as Emily Carr, Lucy Maud Montgomery, and 
Foster Hewitt. By writing down the details of the lives of these accomplished individuals, I learn 
how to live” (4). Later in the book, Mel reiterates how reading non-fictional narratives of others 
has been instrumental in informing his own sense of self. He writes, “All my life I have read 
biographies of famous men and women, mostly politicians and journalists, and these life stories 
help to give my own a little context, and also inspiration. They give me tips on living, goals to 
strive for, pitfalls to avoid, they teach me about life. I look up to these individuals. I suppose that 
sounds boyish but it’s the truth” (36).  
This moment reinforces Amber K. Regis’s point that relationality extends beyond the fact 
that people’s lives are impacted by other people and suggests instead that people’s sense of self 
can be informed specifically by someone else’s life narratives, here not so much 
autobiographical writing but biographical writing. Ultimately, though, Mel gains an 
understanding of his own life – in fact, learns how to live his life – via the narratives of others. 
Importantly, this is not simply something Mel has begun to do since his hospitalization but is 
rather something he has done “All my life,” and thus during periods when he was able to better 
manage his depression. Unlike Clendinnen’s book as Freadman describes it, Swing Low does not 
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stress writing a personal narrative (particularly since, for Mel, it is impossible for him to do so on 
his own) so much as it acknowledges the vital role that other non-fictional narratives of lived 
experience have in informing one’s own sense of self. 
Swing Low, then, emphasizes the necessity of the other in narrative formation, 
particularly for someone suffering from an illness that makes the construction of selfhood so 
difficult. Grace Kehler argues how Swing Low demonstrates that “Psychic afﬂiction, typically 
experienced individually, bespeaks both the inevitable failures of the relational and the need for a 
receptive community” (171). Kehler’s point here stresses the positive possibilities of a properly-
functioning relational community – namely, a community that does not silence otherness but, 
instead, incorporates it. Importantly, then, when Mel confronts his inability to tell his own story, 
he comes to understand his dependence on others to help him realize his own selfhood. He says, 
“I reminded myself of phone calls I needed to make, questions I needed to ask, but towards the 
end I was going in circles. Towards the end I was going in circles. Towards the end I asked her 
to write it down for me” (38). Of course, the “her” here is Miriam Toews and it is at this point 
where Mel expresses his desire to construct a life narrative that is collaborative rather than 
individualistic. In the conversation regarding ethics, this moment is also significant as Toews 
suggests that Mel expressly asked his daughter to help construct his story. 
Swing Low ultimately posits collaboration as an important element in the development of 
illness narratives. The text consistently, though at times with a great deal of subtlety, reminds the 
reader that this is a story that is being told by both Mel and Toews. That being said, while Toews 
acknowledges her instrumental collaborative role in the realization of her father’s life narrative, 
she nevertheless places most of the focus of the text onto Mel. In other words, despite the fact 
that this is a story being told both by Toews and by Mel, Toews ensures that the autobiographical 
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discourse she employs functions specifically to construct Mel as an autobiographical self. At one 
point in the book, Mel notes, “What I do believe is that I have accomplished nothing in my life, 
nothing at all. I have neglected my children and I have killed my wife. There is nothing left to do 
now but record the facts, as I always have” (6). In her introduction, Toews said that it was this 
belief, which she ascertained directly from Mel’s own spoken words “Nothing accomplished” 
(xi), that ultimately spurred the development of the narrative as a whole.  
Toews writes, “I don’t know what my father meant when he said it. I had asked him, the 
day before he took his own life, what he was thinking about, and that was his reply. Two 
hopeless words, spoken in a whisper by a man who felt he had failed on every level. This book is 
my attempt to prove my father wrong” (xi). Ultimately, then, Swing Low is an uncontroversial 
example of intertextuality in that it is an autobiographical narrative developed out of another 
autobiographical text (or, at the very least, other moments of autobiographical discourse spoken 
by Mel) and, in fact, it frequently (though, at times, ambiguously) directly incorporates the other 
autobiographical text into the new narrative. Swing Low sits somewhat outside the theoretical 
lens of intertextual relationality established by Amber K. Regis because Toews’s writing, along 
with her outside sources, are all working to forge one autobiographical-I for the same person. In 
that case, despite its intertextuality, Swing Low poses a challenge for critics reading the text 
strictly for relational paradigms. 
This is not to say that there is not a degree of relationality at work here. As I mentioned in 
chapter two, the kind of critical work that interprets Stein’s Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas in 
terms of what it can tell readers about Stein’s own relational identity can be similarly done here 
too. Indeed, Toews illustrates to us that her own sense of self has been dramatically affected by 
Mel. This is why writing an autobiographical narrative from his point of view helps to alleviate 
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her pain. Toews reinforces this relationship with her father throughout the book. Mel recounts 
one particular incident in which he attempts to prevent Toews from leaving home on a trip to 
Quebec, to be followed by a trip to Europe, after her graduation from high school. His desire to 
keep her from travelling appears to stem directly from his illness. He writes, “When it came time 
for Miriam to graduate from high school, I suffered another breakdown and was hospitalized 
here, at Bethesda. Had I been trying to avoid the inevitable reality of my youngest child leaving 
home, for that is what she did directly after the graduation ceremony?” (160). Mel’s attempts to 
get her to stay are ultimately fruitless but they have a profound impact on Toews. Mel notes, “I 
quietly retreated to my bedroom and listened to her sobbing in the kitchen, asking Elvira why I 
had to be that way, why I was the way I was, and Elvira saying nothing but I don’t know, honey, 
I don’t know” (161). Here, Toews is responding, it seems, not just to this one incident, but rather 
to a lifetime of incomprehensible actions.  
The book demonstrates, then, that Toews indeed sees herself in relation to her father. 
This relationship is presented structurally in Swing Low via intertextuality. Toews reveals the 
fluid relationship between self and other in a text that ambiguously shifts between Toews’s 
writing and Mel’s writing. Yet significantly, Toews uses autobiographical discourse less to 
construct her own selfhood but, rather, to tell the story of an other. Indeed, because it is never 
clear who exactly wrote what and because the autobiographical “I” (outside of the brief prologue 
and epilogue which total to roughly five pages altogether) is always Mel’s, Toews is suggesting 
ultimately that the important story is Mel’s and that it is his story to tell. In speaking with 
Natasha Wiebe, Toews herself has made this clear, noting that “the reason why I wrote it from 
his point of view, … [was] because of his experience in hospital and how eventually I had to 
write things from his point of view for him to read so that they would make sense to him because 
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he was so confused” (“It Gets Under” 122-23). Toews, then, reveals two central reasons for 
turning Mel’s notes into a narrative written from his perspective.  
On the one hand, she suggests that doing so provided a kind of therapeutic value for Mel 
while he was alive. Collaborating with him, based on his own notes, Toews could shape Mel’s 
writing into the cohesive narrative structure that eluded Mel in his own attempts to write, thus 
helping him re-gain a sense of the self that he believed was slipping away. Secondly, Toews is 
compelled to continue the narrative for another central reason after her father dies, namely to 
construct a life narrative for Mel that she feels is more accurate than the one he was constructing 
for himself in his final days. Toews herself has publicly attempted to de-emphasize her own role 
in shaping the narrative. She tells Natasha Wiebe, “His thoughts at any given time are based on 
what people told me about that he had said about what he was thinking. So in the book when I 
say he’s thinking this or that, it’s based on something that somebody had told me he had said” 
(“It Gets Under” 123). It must be noted that Toews, here, minimizes what is surely her role as a 
meditator as the story’s writer.  
Yet at the same time, the quotation betrays the impulse on Toews’s part to write a book 
that attempts to accurately capture her father’s own words. Much like Wiebe does with Helen, 
Toews allows Mel to speak to his lived experience – a significant decision when considering 
how, quite frequently, testimonies from patients are silenced or de-privileged. As Couser writes, 
“doctors may both reinterpret patients’ pasts and literally pre-script their futures. The process is 
collaborative but one sided; patients must submit their bodies to tests, the life histories to 
scrutiny, while doctors retain the authority to interpret these data” (10). To some extent, Toews 
does reinterpret her father’s past and in some ways submits his “life history to scrutiny.” Yet, I 
would suggest that by giving Mel his voice, and by attempting to avoid putting words in his 
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mouth, Toews demonstrates how in this collaboration, it is Mel’s testimony that matters, rather 
than her own interpretation. 
In many ways, Toews does reinforce Amber Regis’s point that intertextual life writing 
often betrays the desire to locate an “original, authentic account.” I do not want to stress this 
point too much though, as Toews does indeed trouble any notions of there being an authentic 
identity available to write for Mel in Swing Low. Given that Toews portrays Mel as a private man 
who spent a good deal of his life hiding crucial parts of his own self from the public, the reading 
audience is made acutely aware that we are only getting the side of Mel that he revealed to 
others. Certainly, Mel reveals more at the end of his life when he is no longer in as much control 
of his intense emotional and mood swings, but we are nevertheless never fully sure just how 
much Mel ultimately kept to himself. 
Ultimately, what is more important for Toews than constructing an originary and 
essentializing identity for Mel is to have him speak a story of his life that he, in his final days, 
was unable to articulate or make sense of. In doing so, Toews acknowledges the fluidity of her 
own identity in relation to her father. Both she and her father compile the narrative of his life 
which is portrayed as a life that significantly impacted those around him, including Toews 
herself. More than Of This Earth, Swing Low openly acknowledges the kind of use value that 
relationality with other textual selves can have as it portrays Mel as a man who attempts to gain a 
better sense of himself by actively reading the biographies of famous people. Yet while relational 
identities are certainly constructed in the text, what is ultimately important is less Toews’s story 
than Mel’s story. Toews uses Mel’s notes in order to construct a narrative wherein the focus is 
predominantly on Mel and his life. Toews ultimately produces this story because Mel’s own 
illness prevents him from writing his own life in the way that he himself might have wanted it 
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written. Ultimately, then, Toews’s use of intertextuality is significant as it highlights the fluid 
relationship between self and other. Importantly, though, Toews shifts the focus onto the other to 
the extent that the other becomes the autobiographical-I for the overwhelming majority of the 
book. 
 In my previous chapters, I have examined how history, family, and community have 
played crucial roles in informing the author’s sense of self. In my final chapter, I have used 
Amber K. Regis along with Jo Collins in order to show the impact that other texts, namely other 
life scripts or life writing texts, have had on the author. Both Of This Earth and Swing Low are 
books that make use of autobiographical discourse and simultaneously rely on the 
autobiographical narratives of others. In the case of Rudy Wiebe’s Of This Earth, this is 
articulated by Wiebe interjecting his own narrative with the diary entries of other family 
members, most predominantly his sister Helen’s. In Swing Low, it is less clear when Toews is 
using the text written by her father and when the text is a product of her own writing. Ultimately, 
though, in both cases, the author’s identity is constructed as being bound to the other, indeed the 
textual other, whose writings are being incorporated into the autobiographical narrative. 
Furthermore, using the text of someone else, in these cases, allows the authors to stress the 
importance of the other person’s story over the story of the self.  
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Conclusion 
The Value of Decentering and Where to Go From Here 
For the Penn State symposium, “Mennonite/s Writing: After Identity,” in May 2013, Di 
Brandt wrote a paper that called on Mennonites to recognize, rather than ignore, hybridity as a 
crucial component of their cultural condition. Brandt noted that Mennonites “were always a 
thoroughly hybrid people,” (“Is There Such” 4) pointing to their beginnings as “part tribal 
kinship, part international peasant land rights cause, part cosmopolitan urban intellectual church 
reform group, part Christian, part traditionalist pagan, part Converso Jew” (4). She also called 
attention to how the diasporic condition of the Mennonites added to their hybridity and observed 
how different “food, clothing and farming practices” (4) were picked up in the various countries 
in which the Mennonites landed over centuries. Brandt troubles the notion of a stable category of 
Mennonite and suggests instead that Mennonites bear the marks of a cultural group who have 
been substantially impacted by outside influences.  
Consequently, Brandt laments the preference by some Mennonites to keep apart or to 
maintain a sense of an essential Mennonite identity. In many ways, the critique bears a striking 
similarity to the critics of the paradigm of individualism in autobiography theory and the work 
that these critics have done to interrogate the notion of a stable individual self who stands over 
and above his culture and society, affecting others while never being affected by them. Brandt 
suggests that Mennonites should be “fluidly ‘open to the Other,’” (11) and says that it would “be 
better if all people did what most writers aspire to do, to speak out of their whole selves, 
including their interculturally hybrid selves” (13). Brandt, here, calls attention to the work of 
authors who construct not individual identities, but identities that speak to the various influences 
that make up hybrid identities. 
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I conclude my dissertation with these remarks because the texts I have foregrounded 
speak to the kinds of identities for which Brandt calls in her talk. The authors who have written 
these memoirs have all constructed identities that are, to use Brandt’s terminology, “fluidly open 
to the Other,” if not the multiple and varied others of whom Brandt speaks. In some ways, 
though, these texts do not entirely reveal quite the same sorts of hybrid selves. Brandt would 
prefer Mennonites to think of the influence and impact of histories, communities, and customs 
outside of their own. In that case, when Connie Braun connects with her forebears who 
experienced the trauma of Stalinism, she demonstrates what Brandt calls the conventional 
Mennonite “attachment to that particular version of our history and identity” (6) – a history that 
Brandt believes has kept Mennonites isolated and precludes their connecting with others. 
In other cases, though, Brandt’s sense of hybridity is on display such as when Brandt 
herself, in So this is the world, connects with a large community of people who have been 
affected by contemporary capitalism’s destructive environmental policies; similar hybridity is at 
work in Katie Funk Wiebe’s You Never Gave Me a Name, when Funk Wiebe sees herself in 
connection with numerous feminist groups, some Mennonite, some not. One could likewise 
easily suggest that there is nothing particularly Mennonite in the way that Rudy Wiebe and 
Miriam Toews portray the influence of family and familial illness. Significantly, though, I 
suggest that collectively examining several contemporary Canadian Mennonite memoirs works 
to disrupt conventional ways of thinking about life writing; in other words, that because 
conceptions of history and community have dominated in some Mennonite groups (something 
Brandt very much acknowledges in her essay), contemporary Canadian Mennonite life writing 
can serve as an excellent paradigm for questioning certain theoretical assumptions about 
autobiography.  
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Rocio G. Davis has correctly observed that “One of the most consequential insights in 
auto/biography theory in the last two decades has been that identity - for both men and women - 
is essentially relational, defined and represented intersubjectively” (“Writing Fathers” 229). 
Certainly, a substantial amount of theoretical work has been done exploring texts that reveal 
relational identities rather than independent, unified, and essential individuals. In the works I 
have looked at here, the authors indeed display their relational status. But more than that, these 
works are distinct because while they all use autobiographical discourse, they frequently position 
themselves in the background of their own autobiographical text or they privilege the narrative of 
others, sometimes eliminating the individual writing altogether. The selves in these books do not 
sit comfortably within the binary established within autobiographical criticism in the sense that 
they are not individualistic nor entirely relational. I believe, then, that there are important facets 
to these books that are ignored when viewed through these theoretical lenses. As a case in point, 
we might examine, for example, what I consider the crucial political import of these texts.  
The books that have been the focus of this study have been published at “a time when 
neoliberal capitalism has gained ascendency across Western democracies, including Canada” 
(Greig and Martino 5). According to Christopher J. Greig and Wayne J. Martino, there has been 
a “neoliberal assault on the welfare state” (5) which had led to “the slashing of public services in 
health care, education, social services, and infrastructure” (6). The neoliberal capitalist model 
tends to favour personal responsibility and self-reliant individualism yet those who implement 
these programs neglect to take into account the disadvantages faced by particular socio-economic 
and cultural groups in a culture that has historically privileged affluent white males. Greig and 
Martino note that neoliberal programs have especially “presented significant economical, 
political, and social challenges” (6) for women, visible minorities, and the working class. The 
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neoliberal capitalist system, then, ignores the significance and importance of the other in the 
constitution of the self, such as the dominating role that history plays in identity formation and 
the substantive role that family plays in determining one’s social status. Furthermore, the 
massive cuts to social spending suggest that the neoliberal capitalist model fails to take into 
account the role that community (and even the political construction of community) plays in 
informing one’s place. 
What the books I have looked at in this dissertation tell us, though, is that for some 
people, other narratives take precedence over the self-narrative. These books, in privileging “the 
other” over and above the individual self who is writing the story, have the potential to provide 
alternate ways of thinking about the self in our relation to history, family, and community at a 
time when the individual is being problematically privileged at the expense of public services 
and social programs. Thus I believe we do a disservice to these texts and overlook the potential 
relevance they have when we strictly see the identities constructed within them as being 
relational and as part of a mutual dynamic between self and other. In my discussion of these texts 
I have pushed aside their political relevance which I think is very much there in order to discuss 
how particular narratives of history, family, and community have a privileged place in these 
works. The political issue, though, is one that I believe to be worth pursuing and may be an issue 
for other critics to take up in subsequent analyses that look beyond what Eakin calls the 
relational paradigm. 
Again, I do not mean to suggest doing away with this paradigm nor do I wish to ignore its 
import. Ultimately, I agree with Davis’s point that the concept of relationality beyond the binary 
opposition of gender has been “one of the most consequential insights” in autobiographical 
theory in the past twenty years. I might also suggest, though, that life writing critics would do 
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well to attend to how broadly the term “relational” has been applied to texts, and to consider 
what kind of work is being done by these applications. In 2011, the journal Life Writing devoted 
an issue to the subject of Lives in Relation. In the first article, Holly Furneaux examines John 
Forster’s biography on Charles Dickens, Life of Charles Dickens. Furneaux notes that since the 
book’s publication in the late nineteenth century, Forster has been critiqued for his “obtrusion 
into the text” (244). Furneaux takes a different stance and instead reads Forster’s frequent 
appearances in the text not as an example of obtrusion but as a testament to the “significance of a 
personal relationship between biographer and subject” (244). In other words, for Furneaux, 
Forster, in his biography, constructs a relational dynamic between himself and Dickens.  
 Arlene Leis, in the next article, examines the eighteenth century portraits by Jean-
Francois Rigaud in order to similarly argue that the artist’s “group portraits of Founding 
Academicians operate as a revealing form of pictorial biography and autobiography that 
represented the interdependency and shared ideals of a community of artists” (264). Leis 
provides images of the two portraits; significantly Rigaud does not, in fact, appear in either. In 
the first article, a biography in which the author appears in a way that many have deemed 
obtrusive works to reveal a relational life; meanwhile another cultural object in which the artist 
does not appear at all also works to reveal a relational life. In other words, the same terminology 
is used to describe what are, in my opinion, two vastly different forms of self-representation. 
Indeed, in the case of the latter, the authorial self does not appear at all.  
I am not arguing against the arguments made by Furneaux and Leis. However, I do 
propose a new way of thinking about relationality in order to avoid eliding the crucial differences 
between different modes of self-construction. I believe it is crucial for life writing scholars to 
recognize that “relationality” in the field, as it has been defined in the literature so far, is one of 
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several models of identity available to authors of life writing and exists as a theoretical lens for 
critics through which certain performances of identities can be seen, and others cannot. While 
Eakin provides a definition for relational life writing that narrows the kinds of interpretations that 
can be made, his initial point that “all identity is relational” has made for a very broad 
application of the term. I think, then, that it is necessary to consider a distinction between 
relationality as a human condition and relationality as a model of literary self-construction and a 
mode of interpretation. I think critics, in being attentive to this distinction, will be better 
equipped to consider the crucial differences between autobiographical texts in which authors see 
themselves in relation to an other and texts in which the authors position themselves in relation 
to several different others. Likewise, recognizing this distinction will also ensure that critics do 
not elide the differences between authors who posit a fluid identity and authors who privilege 
other narratives over their own to the extent that they can occasionally disappear from their own 
text. 
 Indeed, the five texts that I have examined in this dissertation can very well be read with 
what I suggest is a relational lens. However, read collectively, these texts illustrate the 
limitations of this lens. I do not mean to suggest here that only contemporary Canadian 
Mennonite life writing can challenge the limits of the “relational paradigm”; nor do I mean to 
argue that all contemporary Canadian Mennonite life writing does this. However, I do suggest 
that reading these texts together brings the problematic nature of the “relational paradigm” to 
light in a very stark and overt way. I do think in these cases, the dominating role played by 
specific histories, as well as what were once dominating conceptions of family and community in 
some Mennonite groups, have had an impact on the way in which these five authors made use of 
the autobiographical discourse. 
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Again, though, different writers have their own histories and their own conceptions of 
family and community that would be similarly dominating. Consequently, I look forward to 
seeing other analyses of life writing that look at identities beyond the dichotomy of individualism 
and relationality and to considering the possible reasons why the personal and the self are 
positioned in the background in favour of other narratives. I think it would be useful to consider 
the similarities between the Mennonite literature that I have examined here and Michael 
Ondaatje’s Running in the Family or Wayne Johnston’s Baltimore’s Mansion. In the case of the 
former, how can we examine a text that makes much use of the autobiographical-I but is also, at 
the same time, very much an attempt to recover what Ondaatje calls a “lost history” (43) and 
ultimately becomes a story about the author’s father. What, too, can we make of the role of 
magic in a life writing text? Johnston’s book, in similar fashion, begins with his telling the reader 
how he was “foreborn of spud runts who fled the famines of Ireland in the 1830s” (1). Soon, he 
transitions into telling the story of his father and Newfoundland’s Avalon Peninsula which, 
Johnston recounts, was “founded in the 1620s” by Lord Baltimore. Although packaged as a 
memoir, Johnston’s book is far more about his father, Arthur, as well as the historical and 
mythological narrative of a place and its people. We might also re-consider Gertrude Stein’s The 
Autobiography of Alice B. Toklas in light of my arguments here; rather than consider how the 
text “intimates that [Stein’s] own identity is inextricably combined with that of Toklas,” (T. 
Smith 67) we might consider specifically why Stein experiments with the discourse of 
autobiography in order to tell someone else’s story. Indeed, all of these books reveal relational 
identities, but there are other strategies of self-representation or even non-self-representation at 
work here that invite further consideration.  
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I believe too that we can use this study in order to further examine the role of 
autobiographical discourse in texts that may be classified more easily as fiction. As I have 
already noted, several of the authors I have foregrounded here have written autobiographically, 
beyond the memoir or autobiography, without fully going the distance and making an 
autobiographical pact with the reader as Lejeune would have it. Indeed, several texts by Rudy 
Wiebe, Di Brandt, and Miriam Toews have had many autobiographical and personal elements in 
them, but these personal elements have been masked by fictional characters, third-person 
narrators, or a poetic voice. Just as we might consider the reasons why an author uses 
autobiographical discourse to privilege the narrative of another, we might likewise consider why 
an author writes autobiographically under the guise of fiction. What does it mean to write semi-
autobiographically? In this case, I am thinking of texts like James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist 
as a Young Man or Jeanette Winterson’s Oranges Are Not the Only Fruit. 
 Ultimately there are still many questions to pursue and I hope that critics will see the 
value in considering tactics of non-representation or of de-privileging the self in life writing. I 
hope to have shown the various ways that one could approach such an analysis. In some cases, 
such as Connie Braun’s memoir The Steppes Are the Colour of Sepia, I have demonstrated how 
the narrative of the self can be subsumed by a singular dominating historical narrative. Likewise, 
Miriam Toews in Swing Low largely tells the story of one significant other, namely her father. In 
some ways, this fits the standard conventions of the filiation narrative in which the author 
typically positions herself in relation to the other. Yet importantly, in Swing Low, Toews places 
far more emphasis on the narrative of the other than the self, thus rendering difficult the standard 
interpretations of life writing that sees the self as belonging to a mutual dynamic and in a fluid 
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relationship with the other. While Toews’s central influence is only one other figure, the 
presence of that other figure is a dominating one. 
Other texts, such as Di Brandt’s So this is the world, Katie Funk Wiebe’s You Never 
Gave Me a Name and Rudy Wiebe’s Of This Earth present more conventional autobiographical 
selves but frequently present these selves in relation to a wide range of multiple others. In doing 
so, these authors illustrate qualitative differences from standard relational identities where the 
self is positioned in relation to one other. Again, in these books what matters is how the authors 
appear to privilege the narratives of others over the self. Indeed, there are a variety of selves on 
display in these books and there are a variety different ways and reasons why the authors either 
push themselves into the background or de-privilege their own narrative. The books do not 
suggest a singular way that contemporary Canadian Mennonites approach autobiographical 
discourse. They do, however, work nicely together to showcase the validity of interrogating the 
relational paradigm in life writing theory. 
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Notes 
 
1
 Among the examples of Canadian Mennonite literary texts that express the tension between the 
individual and the community are Rudy Wiebe’s Peace Shall Destroy Many (1962), Patrick 
Friesen’s play The Shunning (1980) and Miriam Toews’s A Complicated Kindness (2004). As I 
will note later in the introduction, this issue of the self vs. community has been taken up by 
critics as well, though the focus has been on fiction. 
2
 In the latter half of this introduction, I will show that current understandings of autobiography, 
in fact, affirm Olney’s point that autobiography is “practiced by almost everyone.” Olney 
though, at this stage in 1980, seems to have a more traditional understanding of autobiography, 
referring to this popular form as writing that is “offered up to the general public for 
consumption” (3). The fact that Olney is evoking consumerism here suggests, to me, that he is 
talking about a more conventional style of autobiography - one that is published and sold in book 
form, rather than, say, private journals or personal letters. Hence my assertion that his point (at 
this stage) is hyperbolic. 
3
 In general, many of the texts that exist either focus on spirituality and the spiritual journey, 
such as J.B. Toews’s JB: The Autobiography of a Twentieth Century Mennonite Pilgrim and 
David Ewart’s A Journey of Faith: An Autobiography. Other autobiographical texts have focused 
on the transition from Russia to Canada, such as Gerhard Lohrenz’s Storm Tossed and the 
collection Hope Beyond the Horizon, compiled by John P. Nickel. Many other earlier life writing 
texts were not published until more recently, such as Royden Loewen’s anthology of Canadian 
Mennonite diarists, From the Inside Out. 
4
 The Mennonite Brethen originated in the Russian colony of Molotschna in 1860. As Frank H. 
Epp observes, the Mennonoite Brethren “thought of themselves as Mennonites” but were 
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influenced by “the Luteran Pietists and German Baptists” (174). The Mennonite Brethren were a 
dissenting group who, according to James Urry, formed a new congregation as a result of “the 
lack of spiritual life in the colony, the sinful practices of colonists, and the failure of religious 
leaders to maintain proper discinpline. The only true Mennonites they claimed were those whose 
baptism confirmed a true experience of faith and salvation” (None 180). Indeed it was baptism 
by immersion that soon became a definable mark of distinction for the Mennonite Brethren. As 
Epp notes, “the Brethren were the leading renewal movement” and “when the movement was 
transplated to North America, it became the second largest in Canada and the third largest in the 
United States” (174). There are currently over 250 Mennonite Brethren congregations in Canada. 
Both Katie Funk Wiebe and Rudy Wiebe identify as Mennonite Brethren. 
5
 See Smith and Watson’s book Reading Autobiography for their discussion of the history of 
autobiography criticism. 
6
 See the second chapter for a more in-depth discussion on filiation memoirs. 
7
 See my conclusion for how I think this kind of analysis can be applied to other texts. 
8
 Two counter examples of this are Connie Braun’s book The Steppes are the Colour of Sepia 
and Miriam Toews’s Swing Low. Intriguingly both authors spend less time talking about 
themselves in these books than the other three authors that I look at in this dissertation. While I 
analyze Toews’s book in two chapters, I am mostly examining how the book largely uses 
autobiographical discourse to tell the life story of her father. I only look at Connie Braun’s book 
in chapter one given the extent that she focuses on one particular historical group, and focuses 
specifically on her father’s early 20th century experiences. Yet while Braun and Toews do not 
shift attention towards a multiplicity of others, they still work to challenge conventional readings 
of relational identities in that the authors are very much not the central focus of their narrative. 
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9
 As I suggest elsewhere in this chapter, Brandt, Wiebe, and Funk Wiebe do not focus on 
historical others in quite the same way that Braun does. Indeed, Connie Braun’s book focuses 
almost entirely on her extended family along with other Mennonites and their experiences under 
Soviet rule. This kind of focus does not occur in the other books that I look at here. This explains 
why this is the only chapter in which I discuss Braun, while I look at the other three books over 
several chapters including chapter one. In other words, while Braun focuses on the story of 
Mennonites rooted in a historical period, Brandt focuses her autobiographical narratives on 
several others. This one chapter, then, does not necessarily show the extent to which Brandt, 
Wiebe, and Funk Wiebe privilege the story of others in the way it does for Braun. However, the 
culmination of all the chapters should demonstrate the extent to which each text works to tell the 
story or privilege the story of other people. 
10
 Photography plays a significant role in Braun’s book. She includes twenty-nine photos, all of 
which were taken before she was born. Given that the book is marketed as a memoir, the photos 
are demonstrative of the way that Braun conceives of her identity and also illustrate which story 
Braun believes to be the important story to tell within the format of the memoir. Photography is 
likewise important in Rudy Wiebe’s book, Of This Earth. However, the photographs function 
somewhat differently in that text. Many of the photos, for example, are taken after Wiebe’s birth 
and several feature Wiebe himself. The topic of photography within a life writing context is an 
important one and I devote a good amount of space to it when I discuss the subject of family in 
the following chapter. 
11
 Landsberg’s claims are undeniably useful, as I hope to make clear in this chapter, but they are 
also problematic. These particular quotations illustrate the somewhat generalizing and 
universalizing nature of her claims and do not fully account for the possibility that, for some, 
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kinship ties remain strong. I agree with Landsberg’s point that modernity offered new ways to 
take on memories but I am less convinced that previous ways of memory-making were largely 
broken. While this chapter affirms the former point, the following chapter challenges the latter 
point. Furthermore, I want to be careful about Landsberg’s claim that memories of others can be 
acquired by “anyone.” It is crucial to note that Landsberg does not say “everyone.” While it does 
remain possible for anyone to acquire memories prosthetically, it does not necessarily follow that 
they will. Indeed, the negative consequences of this have been taken up by critics, which I 
address in subsequent paragraphs. 
12
 Wiebe, here, is referring to Russian Mennonites of the 1920s migration, often referred to as the 
Russländer generation of Mennonite immigrants to Canada, as opposed to the Kanadier who 
migrated to Canada in the 1870s. 
13
 It is no coincidence that this very term “mutual recognition” (148) should come up in Eakin’s 
own analysis of Kathryn Harrison’s The Kiss, a book, he argues, that illustrates “Benjamin’s 
theory … in striking fashion” (144). 
14
 Epp does point out that “Many Mennonite families that arrived in Canada as displaced persons 
from the Soviet Union and eastern Europe after the Second World War were ‘fragmented’ or 
‘grab bag’ families” (98). It is possible that narratives that come out of this particular wave of 
Mennonite migrants might very well speak to the kind of lived experiences that Landsberg 
suggests in her book. This quotation insinuates, though, that there was a relative stability and 
coherency amongst migrant Mennonite families before this wave and perhaps speaks to the ways 
in which family is prioritized in the books that I look at in this chapter. 
15
 See, in particular, David Parker’s “Narratives of Autonomy and Narratives of Relationality in 
Auto/Biography.”  
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16
 The following section from Mason’s chapter should indicate the kind of example she sees 
being used most frequently in women’s autobiography: “A modern parallel to the Duchess’s 
story is to be found in the two-volume autobiography of Beatrice Webb, … Her first volume, My 
Apprenticeship, is dedicated to Sidney Webb, Beatrice Webb’s marital other; the second volume, 
The Partnership, opens with a chapter entitled ‘The Other,’ which unsurprisingly, is a 
minibiography of her husband/partner. Likewise, Elizabeth Barrett (Browning as she was to 
become), who as a young girl wrote brief autobiographical accounts that reveal – as with the 
Duchess of Newcastle – an early vocation as a writer, tells the story in her autobiographical 
Sonnets from the Portuguese of her identification with Robert Browning, her husband, a poet less 
known that she was when they married. In the present century, Simone de Beauvoir’s 
public/private relationship to Jean-Paul Sartre has often been at the center of the self-defining 
efforts of her autobiographical volumes without at all diminishing the strong sense of her 
identity” (231-32). 
17
 See pages 76-99 for Funk Wiebe’s discussion of her first forays into the publishing world. 
Here she acknowledges the significance of both Harms and Herztler. 
18
 It should be noted here that Marjorie Toews similarly ended her life by suicide on June 5, 2010 
after, what her obituary in the Winnipeg Free Press called “a hard struggle with mental illness.” 
http://passages.winnipegfreepress.com/passage-details/id-165454/ 
19
 In my fourth chapter, I speak in greater detail about the issues of representing mental illness 
and how this relates to intertextual relationality. 
20
 Note that in Brandt’s case, I am restricting myself to mostly looking at the more 
autobiographical essays in her collection. Other essays in the text, such as Brandt’s critical 
reviews of other texts, may very well be self-revealing and may also be useful in considering 
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how Brandt sees herself within a community. Nevertheless, I am more interested in the essays 
that are more overt examples of self-life-writing in order consider how Brandt sees herself and 
her life as being connected to an intimate community of others. 
21
 Importantly, Warner has also collaborated with Lauren Berlant on the subject of publics, most 
notably in the article, “Sex in Public.” Critical Inquiry 24.2 (Winter 1998): 547-66. 
22
 In more general terms, Brandt frequently discusses a communal relationship (and therefore 
responsibility) to nature. An excellent example of this in the book is Brandt’s chapter “& then 
everything goes bee: A poet’s journal” (171-200) which is ostensibly about Brandt’s 
collaboration with artist Aganetha Dyck and the poem she was asked to write for Dyck’s bee 
project. Brandt defers in several ways in this chapter. In one act of deferral, Brandt puts off her 
poem until the very end of the chapter. In another act of deferral, Brandt largely devotes most of 
her attention to a likeminded community of others, like Dyck herself whose project ‘Hive 
Bodice,’ Brandt says, responds “to the deep suffering of women, whose bodies are registering 
the ravages of environmental pollution in even greater numbers” (178). Brandt also devotes the 
majority of space to talking about (and quoting) others, such as biologist Rupert Sheldrake (190), 
anthropologist Jeremy Narby (196) and poet Louise Halfe (197) who all stress the value of 
treating the natural world humanely rather than exploitatively.  
23
 See in particular chapter one for a lengthier discussion of diaspora in Mennonite life writing. 
There has also been some discussion about how Mennonite writing in Canada could be seen 
through the lens of postcolonialism. In her introduction to Acts of Concealment, a compilation of 
articles derived from a 1990 conference on Mennonite literature in Canada, Hildi Froese Tiessen 
writes that “Post-colonial literary theory may well prove to be instructive in any future study of 
the development and place of the literature of the Mennonites in Canada in so far as it has 
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focussed on how language and writing in post-colonial cultures have been appropriated for use 
away from a ‘privileged norm’ or dominant cultural centre” (12). Froese Tiessen is correct in 
noting the overlap in Mennonite literary studies and postcolonial theory. Indeed, postcolonial 
theory is concerned with how the subaltern speaks when they have historically been forced to 
adopt the language of colonial oppressors. Consequently, as Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin 
suggest in The Empire Writes Back, truly independent literature is “dependent upon the 
abrogation” of the “constraining power” of imperial discourses, “and the appropriation of 
language and writing for new and distinctive usages” (6). Froese Tiessen herself notes how “the 
current generation” of Canadian Mennonite authors write “in English, with a sprinkling of 
German and Low German words and syntax” and this works to demonstrate their “cultural 
distinctiveness” (12). These aspects are certainly at work in Mennonite literature and have been 
and continue to be well worth exploring. That being said, as Amy Kroeker points out in her 
article, positioning Canadian Mennonites as postcolonial subjects is complicated for several 
reasons. For one, she notes the concern by theorists such as Linda Hutcheon and Arun 
Mukherjee, regarding whether a “settler/invader country like Canada” should be included within 
the parameters of postcolonial theory in the first place. Furthermore, as I pointed out in the 
previous chapter, Kroeker also notes the Canadian Mennonite “position of ambivalence” as 
subjects who struggled against cultural and linguistic norms practiced by the hegemonic majority 
but also settled within the country and displaced the native population (240). As I noted in 
chapter three, some Mennonite authors like Di Brandt reflect this position of ambivalence rather 
than strictly a position of postcoloniality. Needless to say, the question of Canadian Mennonites 
as postcolonial subjects, is an issue just as vexed as the question of Canadians in general as 
postcolonial subjects. 
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24
 For more on Joan Scott’s notion of what counts as meaningful experience and the role of 
ideology in the notion of experience, see Chapter Two. 
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